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Abstract
Donald Davidson, in his essay, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,"
presents arguments against what be calls the "the dualism ofscheme and content."
This dualism is the result ofan argument that typically insists that language is a
conceptual scheme, structured by a paradigm, ideology, or framework. that shapes or
organizes empirical contents, usually manifested as representations, facts, sensory
stimulations or experience. The result of this posited dualism is that different schemes,
having different structures, constitute ontologically different worlds. Since it follows that
speakers in those different worlds use languages that talk: about radically different things,
translation between those linguistic communities is impossible. This thesis of
untranslatability is sometimes referred to as conceptual relativism or incommensurability.
Davidson argues, and this thesis is a defence ofms claim, that such a dualism is
based. on an incorrect account of the relation between world and language. Through an
analysis of truth, meaning, reference and interpretation, Davidson is able to show that the
relation between world and language is unmediated. His analyses, I hold, pivot upon two
claims: i) that the meaning ofa sentence is the condition under which it is true; and ii) we
have to obey the principle ofcharity, that is, when we interpret a speaker, we must
necessarily count her right in most matters.
The arguments against the dualism ofscheme and content are supplemented in
this thesis with a comparison ofDavidson and Hans-Georg Gadamer, a Continental
philosopher. I compare claims made by both thinkers regarding understanding,
interpretation and truth. I show that not only are there many undeniable convergences
between them, but also that Gadamer's analysis ofhenneneutics can be used to
complement and illuminate some ofDavidson's concerns.
The conclusion reached in this thesis is that the dualism ofscheme and content is
partly the result ofattempts by some philosophers to define truth in tenns ofsomething
more fundamental. viz., reference. Drawing on some ofDavidsoo's later work.
supplemented with arguments by Arthur Fine's, '"Natural Ontological Attitude," I show
that truth is the most fundamental concept we have and escapes all attempts at general or
absolute characterization. In consequence, I maintain: i) that the relation between world
and language is unmediated; and ii) that Davidson's account oftruth transcends the
coherence/correspondence debate and the realism/anti-realism debate.
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IDtrodumOD
The aim of this thesis is to outline and defend Donald Davidson's arguments,
classically presented in his essay, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme."I against
conceptual relativism. Conceptual relativism, he argues, is entailed by a philosophy of
language that adheres to the dualism of scheme and content. 1bis dualism, or what has
become known as "the third dogma ofempiricism,rl1 states that there is a scheme or
language that is strUctured by a paradigm, framework or ideology, etc., that organizes and
shapes empirical content. Empirical content is here understood as experience. the totality
IDonaid Davidson. "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." in~
Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1984). pp. 183-198.
toavidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 189. The first two
dogmas ofempiricism, those of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.
and reductionism, were exposed by Willard Van Orman Quine in "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism," in From a Logical Point oCYiew (Cambridge. Massachusetts: The Harvard
University Press, 1953), pp. 20-46
offacts, sensory stimulations or swface irritations, etc. Because different languages cut
up or organize the world differently, people from different linguistic communities live in
ontologically different worlds. As a result, communication between speakers of these
two different languages can be blocked, in principle, because such speakers could be
talking about radically different things.
In chapter 1 of this thesis I give a brief sketch ofwhy it is that some philosophers
think this is the correct account of the relationship between world and language. I show
that the idea ofa world organized by linguistic structures barks back to Descartes' and
Kant's emphasis on the subject as foundational in any articulation offirst philosophy.
Taking this emphasis into the twentieth century and into the linguistic turn, "subject"
becomes replaced by "conceptual scheme" or '"paradigm" in such thinkers as Wharf,
Kuhn, Feyerabend and Quine This replacement results in languages that are
untranslatable or incommensurable.
For Davidson, incommensurability is, in principle, impossible. He argues for the
rejection of incommensurability through an analysis of truth, meaning and interpretation.
In chapter 2 I outline his position on the status oftbese concepts. Davidson adopts the
work done by Alfred Tarski towards a characterization ofa truth predicate for a formal
language.} But for Davidson, the definition oftrutb is not all that can be achieved. with a
}Alfred Tarski, "1be Concept ofTruth in Formalized Languages," in~
Semantics and Metamathematics translated by J. H. Woodger (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1956), pp. 152-278.
truth theory. He argues, as I demonstrate in this chapter, that a truth theory, with some
modifications, can be used as a meaning theory. That is, it can be used to state the
conditions under which any arbitrary sentence ofa language is true. Meaning, for
Davidson. becomes truth condition.
Davidson continues his polemic against conceptual relativism by showing how it
is that we develop truth theories for natural languages. This analysis, which is an
extension ofQuine's "radical translation,'>4 results in the articulation of several conditions
for the possibility of interpretation between two speakers. I outline Davidson's
conclusions from this analysis in chapter 3. One precondition of interpretation, which I
see as central to his argument, is the "principle ofcharity." This a priori principle
counsels that we must regard the speaker we are trying to communicate with or
understand as a speaker of the truth. That is, we bave to assume that an agent who
possesses a language necessarily shares with us a large number afbeliefs about the world.
With the results afthe analyses of truth, meaning and interpretation in mind, I
show how our conceptions ofworld, language, and the relationship between the two,
must change. The change is radical. Davidson himself says in one ofhis later essays that
..... there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many
4Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1960), pp.
26ff.
philosophers and linguists have supposed.."S In chapter 4 I try to illuminate and expand
on some of the results ofDavidson's arguments by comparing him with the hermeneutic
philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer. I argue, for instance., that "world" has to now be
interpreted as an horizon that is coextensive with with the language that constitutes it but
is always open to the possibilty of new encounters and interpretations. In contrast, the
thesis of incommensurability endorsed by Kuhn and Feyerabend, relies on the conception
of language as a closed horizon. The openness and flexibility of language, maintained by
Davidson and Gadamer, is the result. I ariuc, of placing primary emphasis on the concept
of truth. Different languages mesh with others easily because they are, for the most part,
concemed with the truth of the same subject matter. The mistake made by Kuhn and
company is that they place primary emphasis on the wrong semantic concept, viz.,
reference.
In chapter 5 I clarify why truth is the most basic concept we have by giving
arguments to show that it cannot be defined in tenns ofanything more fundamental.
Reference, ofcourse, does playa primary role within different semantic theories of truth,
but it can never be an explanation ofthose theories. Keeping this distinction in mind, we
are able to see that coherence and correspondence truth theorists are chasing phantoms in
their attempts to explain truth in terms ofsomething more basic. Following Richard
'Davidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitapbs," in Tnrth and Interpretation·
Pecmt!ljriy<:s Qn the PhilQsQphy Qn Ponald Davidsgn Ernest Lepore ed. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986), p. 446.
Rorty's suggestion6, I argue that we should adopt Arthur Fine's '"Natural Ontological
Attitude," which Fine utilizes in an effort to prevent us from the pseudo debates of the
realists and anti-realists.
'
Those debates, Fine contends, also revolve around the mistaken
belief that truth can be reduced to something more primitive or fundamental.
The conclusion I reach in this thesis is that conceptual relativism and theses of
incommensurability are not acceptable results in a correct philosophy of language.
Taking trUth as basic, we can see that the relation between world and language is
unmed.iated. That is, there are no epistemic intermediaries (schemes or contents) that
play an explanatory role in how it is that we know the world or understand a language.
6Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," in Obiectivity Relativism
and Tnub· Philosophical Papers Volume [ (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press,
1991),p.150.
'Arthur Fine, ''The Natural Ontological Attitude," in The Shaky Game (Chicago:
The University ofChicago Press, 1986), pp. 112-135.
Chapter 1
A Statement of tbe Problem:
Tbe Dualism of Scheme and Content
1 I Introduction
Descartes developed and empbasized several principles which came to be seen as
cornerstones to the understanding and articulation ofany future philosophy in the West.
The basic principle, the foundation ofall others, is that knowledge of the existence of the
self is indubitable. The cogiro is the most certain individual piece ofknowledge we can
have; it is the only belief that can survive a rigorous methodological doubt. Through a
series ofwell-known deductions, Descartes claims that this cogito, a spiritual or mental
substance, is radically distinct from the external world or material substance. As well as
being distinct from material substance. spiritual substance is more well known than
material substance. Ali a self, or cogito, the self bas privileged access to itself. In
addition, the means to knowledge of the external or material world is the spiritual
substance. r am more certain ofmy perceptions of the world. which are a part ofme, than
I am of the world itself. That is, I am certain that I have perceptions ofthe external
world, but I am not certain that these perceptions are accurate representations oftbe world
"in-itself" By giving epistemological priority to the self and its components (Le.,
perceptions). Descartes forever put into doubt the ''thing-in-itself.'' We can know
ourselves directly, but the knowledge of the world is always mediated by our perceptions
or representations of it.
It is commonly accepted that after Descartes. philosophy split into two separate
schools: rationalism. and empiricism. To put it crudely, it could be said that these schools
were based (respectively) upon the two ideas that Descartes asserted were indubitable: the
self, and the perceptions that this selfhas of the external world. For my purposes. it is
important to emphasize the fact that both of these branches emphasize the mental (or
aspects of it) over ''the external." The external world in-itself is cognitively inaccessible.
This tendency to neglect the thing-in-itself in favour of the mental, and what is given to
this substance, is again reaffirmed in the philosopby ofKant. Kant showed through a
transcendental analysis that there is no cognitive access to the noumenal world. Our only
cognitive access to the world is "filtered" through the forms of intuition and the
categories of the understanding. These "filters." so to speak, give us the only picture of
the world that we can comprehend. What we consider to be "material" is a synthetic
product of the intuitions and categories ofthe mind - what Kant calls the phenomenal
world. Kant's famous metaphor is that we see the world as if through coloured glasses-
and, to continue the metaphor, there is no way that we can take the glasses off.
The start of the twentieth century saw a revolution in the history ofphilosophy
that was tantamount to Descartes' meditations on the self. Since Gustav Bergmann. this
revolution is usually known as the "linguistic tum.nl This revolution emphasizes the
importance of language in philosophical matters and sees language as the key to
understanding, resolving, or sometimes even dissolving, philosophical problems. With
this revolution, there is a new understanding ofold concepts and debates.
One such "new understanding" is a reinterpretation ofwhat the mind is. It came
to be seen that a condition for rationality (or humanity) is the possibility of utilizing and
understanding a language. Kantian philosophy, which tries to give the transcendental
conditions ofexperience, was reinterpreted by this "tum" to language. The Kantian
categories are now translated into linguistic concepts. Our only access to the world is
through the mediation of these concepts. In the same way that Kant would have argued
that an alien who bad different categories or forms of intuitions would live in a different
phenomenal world, so some new philosophers tried to argue that a change ofconcepts
(essentially a change of language) results in a different understanding and experience of
IGustaV Bergmann. "Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of
Metaphysics," in The MetaphYSics of[ ogiC31 Posjtivism (Westport: The Greenwood
Press. 1954). pp. 30-77. Richard Rorty bas also collected a series ofessays on semantics
in a book under this title; Richard Rorty, ed. The Linguistic Tum· Recent Essays in
Philosophical Method (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press. 1967).
the world. All access to the world is linguistically mediated. Language is the way we
organize the world, and it is organized differently according to the language that one
speaks. In the representative words ofBenjamin Whorf:
... rnhe forms ofa person's thoughts are controUcd by inexorable laws ofpattern
ofwhich he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperuived intricate
systematisations ofhis own language - shown readily enough by a candid
comparison and contrast with other languages. especially those ofa different
linguistic family. His thinking itselfis in a language - in English. in Sanskrit, in
Chinese. And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in
which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality
not only communicates, but also analyses nature, notices or neglects types of
relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house ofbis
consciousness.2
To follow Kant's metaphor, language is a set ofcoloured glasses, except for the fact that
there are many pairs that we could possibly wear (many languages that we could possibly
speak). This, at least, is what some argue.
The assumption that prevailed in this "tum" to language was that we still needed a
first philosophy. rn the Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. it is God, the self(cogilo) or
the transcendental categories that were the ground ofall possible knowledge and
experience. The revolutionary "tum" merely shifted this ground from God, the cogilO, or
the categories, to language. Language became the "cooditionless condition" - it became
tim philosophy.
Rorty argues:
%Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Language, Mind, and Reality," in Language ThQught.
and Reality· Selected Writings ofBeniamin Lee Wharf ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Pn:ss, 1956), p. 252.
... [this] became necessary because, in the course ofthe nineteenth century,
evolutionary biology and empirical psychology had. begun to naturalize the
notions of "mind,""consciousness," and "experience»]
Language was one of the last domains that a philosopher could turn to that apparently
escapes the naturalization processes ofhistory and evolution. The concepts of"mind,..
"consciousness," and "experience" became replaced by concepts such as "language,"
"meaning," and "facts." "Philosophy of language ... was supposed to produce conditions
ofdes<:ribability, just as Kant had promised. to produce conditions ofexperienceability."4
In the "linguistic tum,.. the world is still a realm that is out ofour reach except through
some sort ofmediation.
Rorty argues that the assumption that language is the proper subject of first
philosophy is the result of the works ofsuch thinkers as Frege and the Tractarian
Wittgenstein. But language, as a transcendental enterprise, did Dot survive the scrutiny of
the push for naturalization. The Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations for
instance, sees language as a tool - a set of noises and marks that we use to get things
done. As a tool, it has no determinate structure or meaning. Language is not absolute or
necessary in any sense at aU. It is a contingent, arbitrary and completely natural
endeavour. With the Wittgensteinian notion oflanguage, the world no longer becomes a
3Rorty, "Wittgeostein, Heidegger, and the Reification ofLanguage," in:I:M
Cambridge CompanioD to Hejdegger (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press,
1993), p. 340.
4Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the ReificatioD of Language," p. 341.
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by-product ofthe selfor language. The world is now something that we are in
unmediated touch with.
1 2 The Qayj4s0ojan Project
For the most part, the philosophy of language, in the second halfof this century,
bas followed the later Wittgenstein in his attempt to naturalize language. In many
respects, Davidson is a disciple of Wittgenstein in that he attempts to demonstrate the
contingency oflanguage and tries to restore our contact with the world. One of
Davidson's endeavours, according to Ratty, has been to expunge from a naturalized
philosophy oflanguage any hidden assumptions or dogmas that hark back to the "heyday
ofmeanings'" and the "reification oflanguage.'Wl Two of those dogmas were exposed by
Quine, Davidson's teacher, in his famous essay, "Two Dogmas ofEmpiricism."
It could be argued that these dogmas were exposed after recognition of the fact
that meanings ofwords are not determinate in any sense at all. The notion that there are
determinate meanings "out there" with names as labels is what Quine calls the "museum
myth ofmeaning." Against such a myth, Quine argues that there are two parts to
SIan Hacking, Why Does I anallagE! Maner to PhilOSOphy (Cambridge: The
Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 57ff. Hacking sees Russell and the early
Wittgenstein as spokesmen for this heyday.
'Rotty cites Bjern Ramberg as pointing out that ..... Davidson's principal motive
is to avoid the reification of language;" "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of
Language," p. 346. cf. Bjern Ramberg, Donald Pavidson's PbUgsopby ofl,angwwe' An
!nlrol!lIolilm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 98ff.
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knowing a word: knowing how to make the sounds (the phonetic part), and knowing how
it is used (the semantic part). The meaning ofa word is not some entity, but rather bow a
word is used in some language.
For naturalism the question whether two expressions are alike or wilike in
meaning bas no determinate answer, known or unknown. except insofar as the
answer is settled. in principle by people's speech dispositions, known or
unknown.1
The first "dogma" Quine attacks is the distinction between analytic and synthetic
statements. In traditional concepts of language, it was held that there was a clear
distinction to be made between statements that were true by virtue ofmeaning alone, and
statements that were true because of some experience or fact about the world. Examples
such as:
(I) All bachelors are unmarried men.
were seen to be paradigmatic of the former, viz., analytic statements. In these statements,
the predicate term exhausts all instances of the subject term. It is part of the meaning of
the subject term to be subsumed under that predicate. What Quine subsequently showed
was that, ifthere was no such thing as "meaning" (taken in the sense ofan "obscure
intermediary entit[y],"), and ifwords were tools, as argued by the later Wingenstein, then
the distinction could not be maintained between analytic and synthetic. No statement is
1Quine, "Ontological Relativity," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
(New York.: The Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 29.
'Quine, ''Two Dogmas of Empiricism," p. 22.
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true in virtue: ofmeaning or in virtue of fact. Meaning is bow a word is used. and this
usage is easily altered. Furthermore, in a holistically understood language, it is difficult
to separate facts from meaning. To alter the meaning ofa sentence or word is at the same
time the alteration of the facts. Fact and meaning are not as independent ofeach other as
some philosophers have argued..
The second dogma exposed by Quine was that of reductionism.. Reductionism
was the philosophy of the verificationists. They held that every statement was either
d.irectly about experience, or else, logicaliy reducible to such a statement. But, argues
Quine, to hold that statements can be confirmed by appeal to the facts (synthetically) is
also to hold that there are other statements that can be confirmed. by meaning alone
(analytically). Quine opts for a holistic notion oflanguage where it is not statements that
are empirically significant, but whole theories (or languages):
Ifthis view is right, it is misleading to speak. of the empirical content ofan
individual statement - especially if it is a statement at all remote from the
experiential periphery ofthe field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a
boundary between synthetic statements, which bold contingently on experience,
and analytic statements, which bold come what may. Any statement can be held
true come what may. ifwe make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the
system.'
Davidson bolds that be bas discovered a third dogma, viz., the dualism ofscheme
and content. To hold that there is a scheme (or language or structure or system) that
organizes the contents ofexperience is to bold that language is a transcendent, reified
'Quine, "Two Dogmas ofEmpiricism," p. 43.
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entity that is not a part of the world (or experience of the world), but a condition of it.
Davidson's arguments against this third dogma apply, then, to a select group of thinkers:
those that belong to the later Wittgenstein's naturalized philosophy oflanguage and who
do DOt adh= to the first two dogmas which Quine bas~
Ifwe give up the dualism [ofanalytic and synthetic statc:m.cntsJ, we abandon the
conception ofmeaning that goes along with it, but we do not have to abandon the
idea ofempirical content. Empirical content is in tum explained by reference to
the facts, the world, experience., sensation, the totality ofsensory stimuli, or
something similar•..• Thus in place of the analytic+syntbetic we get the dualism of
scheme and contenL ID
Davidson's project, as will become evident in later chapters, is to get rid of the
idea that reference to an extra-linguistic reality plays a primary or constitutive role in an
account ofwhat our words mean. He rejects the notion ofa conventional and
community-based language with a fixed structure that shapes or organizes, through the
constitutive referential relation, empirical contenL It: as Davidson argues, reference does
not playa primary role in how it is that our words mean what they do, then there is DO
referent (content), and DO organizer (scheme). 1his is not to say that there is no world or
DO language. Rather, what Davidson is denying is that there are intermediary entities,
like representations, meanings. experiences, the totality ofsensory stimuli, etc., which
can be shaped or organized by the conceptual schemes ofdifferent languages. with the net
result being "worlds" that are radically different in different languages. M Davidson
says:
'''Davidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 189.
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In giving up the dualism ofscheme and content. we do not give up the world. but
re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our
sentences and opinions true or false. 11
I take Davidson's point in this last quote to be that i.t is "truth.. that is the concept that bas
to play the primary role the relation between language aDd world. and not "reference." If
we take reference as primary we open ourselves up to the possibility ofconceptual
relativism.
In the next three sections. I look at three thinkers. Quine, Feyerabend and Kuhn.
who take "reference" to be the mainco~t in the description between world and
language. In the articulation of their respective positions, it becomes obvious that they
bold that there is an epistemic intermediary, taking the form. of sensory stimulus,
experience, etc., that can be organized or cut-up depending upon the language (or theory)
which one bas. It is lhat position which Davidson argues against in his essay, "On the
Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," and ofwhich this thesis is a defence.
J 3 Ouine's Tbeor#jcaI Qualjsm
Part of Davidson's project to get rid ofthe dualism. ofschcm.e and content is
already carried out in the work. ofQuine. For Quine. as we have already seen, there is no
sense to be made of the notion of reference to extra-linguistic entities (whatever form.
they may take) in an account ofmeaning. Quine's contention is that reference is
IIDavidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 198.
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inscrutable.12 For the most part. we come to this conclusion of the inscrutability of
reference through the fact that translation is indeterminate. This indeterminacy is
demonstrated in radical. translation. By "radical. translation," Quine means the task of
trying to understand a native speaker from scratch strictly by her behaviour and
dispositions. Quine argues that there is no other way. When we try to translate the
native's words, or develop a translation manual13, we will soon discover that a native's
sentence can be translated consistently in more than one way.
Quine uses the famous example ofa native uttering the word "gavagai" in the
presence ofa rabbiL When the radical translator tries to develop an analytical hypothesis
for this utterance in her translation manual, she will notice that several translations will
work equally well. "Gavagai" could equally be translated as. for example, "rabbit,"
«rabbit-part," "rabbit-hood," etc.• without any determination as to which is correct. In
12fiowever, Quine and Davidson come to two radically different conclusions from
this realization. Quine holds that the inscrutability ofreference leads to the possibility of
several equally consistent translation manuals for the same language. and that each
translation manual posits a different ontology into that theory or language. Quine's
conclusion. then. is ontological relativity. Davidson argues that the inscrutability of
reference leads one to abandon the idea that reference plays any role in a theory of
meaning. Instead ofontological relativity, Davidson argues that "reference" must be
abandoned. See chapters 4 and 5 for my account of the importance ofDavidson's
rejection of ,'reference" and the consequences it has for the dissolution ofthe "third
dogma."
lJDavidson's equivalent ofQuine's translation manual is what he calls a theory of
truth. Quine's translation manual is a list ofanalytical hypotheses, whereas Davidson's
theory oftruth is a list ofT-sentences. The importance of the distinction between
Quinean translation manuals and Davidsonian truth theories is spelled out in section 3.2.
16
fact, the notion of"correct" here bas to drop out Correctness of translation is a
cornerstone oCthe museum myth ofmeaning. What we have, rather, are translations that
are relative. And if the native's utterances could be translated in more than one way, then
the reference ofthose utterances is also relative. That is, there is no way to know what a
native is refening to by her statements. There can be several translation manuals for the
same language, as weU as several determinations as to what the reference ofthose
translations are. The conclusion is that if there are several ways to develop a translation
manual for a language, then it has to be granted that the ontology ofdifferent languages is
also relative. In fact. states Quine, ontology is doubly relative:
Specifying the universe ofa theory makes sense only relative to some background
theory, and only relative to some choice ofa manual of translation oCthe one
theory into the other. 14
The "background theory" which Quine is referring to here is, ofcourse, one's own
language. Reference, however, is just as inscrutable here as it is in the translation of the
native's language:
On deeper reflection, radical translation begins at home. Must we equate our
neighbour's English words with the same strings of phonemes in our own
mouths? Certainly not; for sometimes we do not thus equate them. 15
Ontology cannot be specified for one's own language, nor can it be specified for the
native's language that the translator is trying to translate.
14Quine, "Ontological Relativity," pp. 54-5.
UQuine, "Ontological Relativity," p. 46.
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Quine says that this postulating ofalternative theories can happen in science as
well. That is, Quine asserts that a scientist can develop two alternative theoretical
systems oCthe world that are both empirically equivalent (that is. both theories analyse
the same domain ofexperience. and both imply the same observation conditionals but do
not reduce to each other). If the theories did reduce to each other by a reconstruaI of
predicates. then they would be logically equivalent to each other. By "reconstruaI of
predicates." Quine means that the two theories say exactly the same thing, just using
different signs (e.g., the second theory may be identical to the first except for the fact that
two predicates have switched places). Quine says that there can be an articulation of two
theories that are empirically equivalent, but not logically equivalent, and, hence. not
reducible to each other. But instead ofopting for a relativism (as it appears Feyerabend
and Kuhn argue for; see below), Quine states that we assign different signs to the two
theories and accept a dualism. In fact, this happens in practice all the time. "Oscillation
between rival theories is standard scientific procedure anyway, for it is thus that one
explores and assesses alternative hypotheses."16
Feyerabend and Kuhn, as I will show here, do not opt for a dualism between rival
theories using distinctive signs. They argue that scientists, in practice. do not use
different signs each time a theory changes (and, hence, the meanings ofthe terms), but
rather say that two rival theories are incommensurable. That is, the meanings of the
l~e. "On Empirically Equivalent Systems oftbe World," Erkenntnis. 9
(1975). p. 328.
18
words are not consistent between the two theories and hence they are extensionally
incompatible.
I 4 Feymhend'$ Theoretical Pluralism
Like Quine. Feycrabcnd holds that we cannot make a clear distinction between
analytic and synthetic statements. Because ofthe abolition of this distinction in a
coherent notion of empiricism. Feyerabeod holds that the distinction between observation
statements and theoretical statements is aiso an out-moded or dogmatic notion. Like
Quine, he holds that it is whole theories that confront experience. not individual
observation statements. Feyerabend asserts that there is no asymmetry between
observation statements and theories. Even the simplest statements ofperception entail
some theory - regardless of bow gencral:
According to the point ofview I am advocating, the meaning ofobservation
sentences is determined by the theories with which they are connected. Theories
are meaningful independent ofobservations; observational statements are not
meaningful unless they have been connected with theories.. n
The dogma of reductionism is also dropped by Feyerabcod. In fact, not only does
Feyerabend drop the idea ofpossibly reducing highly abstract theories to a purified set of
observation statements, be also denies the possibility of reducing one theory to any other.
17paul K. Feyerabcnd, "Problems ofEmpiricism," in Beyqod the Edge of
~ cd. Robert G. Colodny (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), p. 213.
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That is. he argues that there can be two theories that are empirically adequate for the same
set or domain ofevidence, yet these two theories are not reducible to each other.
Feyerabend argues that the traditional conception ofscientific methodology as
theoretically monistic is flawed. Feyerabend defines whaI he calls "theoretical monism.n
or "radical empiricism," as the position that holds these two dogmatic principles: i) the
principle ofconsistency, and ti) the principle of meaning invariance. These dogmas are
congruent with the two exposed by Quine.
The principle ofconsistency stateS that ifthere are two theories, Tand T', that
cover the same domain ofexperience D. and are mlpirically adequate. then T is either
reducible to, or subsumed under, T', A condition of this principle is the notion of
meaning invariance. This latter principle states that tenos have a constant meaning,
independent of their context of usc. If there are two theories, T and T', that use the same
term x, then the meaning (in whatever way "meaning" is understood) ofx stays constant.
According to radical empiricism. ifT' is inconsistent with T, then it is to be rejected.
There is an inconsistency because there is an improper use of the terms - that is, the new
theory uses the terminology in an incorrect way. It does not adhere to the principle of
meaning invariance. A statement in T' cannot be reduced to a statement in T ifa teon x
changes meaning in the two theories.
As stated above, Feyerabend holds that the meaning ofa tenn is dependent upon
the theory that it is a part of. A direct consequence ofthis, and., bence, a refutation of the
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notion ofmeaning invariance, is that meaning varies when the theory varies. Feyerabend
gives numerous examples in the history ofscience that demonstrate this fact. For
instance. "mass" bas a different meaning in classical (Newtonian) physics than it bas in
relaJivity theory. In classical physics. it is held that the mass ofan object is equal to the
sum of the mass of its parts. whereas in relaJivity. the concepts of~elocity.""energy,"
and the chosen coordinate system play an integral role in the determination ofmass.
Because ofthe fact that "mass" bas such divergent meanings in these two theories, it is
evident that it would be impossible to connect these two theories (classical and relative)
by some sort ofbridge law or reduction. Ifterms have different meanings in different
theories, then this demonstrates the impossibility ofa reduction ofone theory to another.
Feyerabend calls this impossibility of reductionism "incommensurability." ''Two
theories will be called incommensurable wben the main descriptive terms depend on
mutually inconsistent principles.""
Feyerabend asserts that the correct empirical method ofscience is what he terms
"theoretical pluralism." 1his method. which he argues would lead to a strict empiricism.
allows for incommensmable theories within the same domain ofexperience. Actually,
Feyerabend encourages the development of incommensurable theories. In this way, we
are able to challenge and test the theories that came before. For the most part. theories
are internally consistent The only way of refuting them is to take a position outside of
llfeyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism," p. 227, 019.
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that theory. According to theoretical monism., incommensurable alternatives to consistent
theories are to be rejected in favour ofthe true and tried. Feyerabend, however, holds that
ifwe bad accepted this methodology we would not have made any scientific progress.
His theoretical pluralism allows for the development ofcrucial tests that determine which
theory is to be preferred. The preferred theory is usually the one that leads to new facts
and new predictions that were not derivable from the old theory. So, on Feyerabend's
account, incommensurable alternatives are the key to scientific progress. Feyerabend
argues that it:
... has been shown that in most cases it is impossible to relate successive scientific
theories in such a manner that the key terms they provide for the description ofa
domain D', where they overlap and are empirically adequate, either possess the
same meanings or can at least be connected by empirical genera1izations.19
1 5 Kubnian Incornrnensurabjljty
Kuhn is another empiricist who has accepted Quine's embargo on the distinction
between analytic and synthetic statements and the possibility ofreductionism. Thus, he,
like his contemporary Feyerabend, accepts the notion oftheoretical holism - the doctrine
that it is whole theories, and not individual statements, that are meaningful. Kuhn also
denies that there is a neutral observation language to which we can appeal to allow us to
contemplate alternative theories. For Kuhn, the way that we see the world is through our
19Feyerabend, "Explanation. Reduction, and Empiricism," in Minnesota Studies in
the PhiloSOphy gfScience vol 3 cd. Herbert Feigl. el al. (Minneapolis: The University
ofMinnesota Press, 1962), p. 81.
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sensations of stimuli. Our sensations are essentially our world. Ofcourse the stimuli
does not change. says Kuhn. but our sec.sations do. Sensations are the product of filtering
stimuli through educational programming. If someone bas a different programming or
educational background, theD.,. asserts Kuhn. our sec.sations, and, hence, our world, differ.
The possibility ofany meaningful statement in science requires that there be a
background in which it is framed:
What is built into the neural process that transforms stimuli to sensations has the
following characteristics: it has been transmitted through education; it bas, by
trial. been found more effective th8.n its historical competitors in a group's current
environment; and, finally, it is subject to change both through further education
and through the discovery of misfits with the environment.20
These frameworks are what Kuhn refers to as "paradigms." People in different
paradigms live in different worlds.
Kuhn's works. especially The Structure of Scjentific Revolutions are illustrated
with numerous supporting examples from which he is able to abstract what be bolds to be
the structure ofchange from one paradigm to the next. Kuhn argues that there is a period
of Donnal science where the theories and the laws are firmly embedded in the psyche of
the scientists and the public. When a problem arises which the scientist believes he can
solve, he applies these theories and laws to the problem in order to solve it. The
problems are also identified using these frameworks of theories and laws. Ifone wanted
to find out the particular laws and theories that are characteristic ofa paradigm, all one
2O'Thomas Kuhn. The Structure ofScientific Revolutions 2nd ed. (Chicago: The
University ofChicago Press,1970), p. 196.
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would have to do would be to consult the textbooks and journals that are used in the
education ofscientists at that time.
Kuhn holds that within a paradigm. or period ofnormal science. there can occur
anomalies that cannot be solved using traditional methods. These anomalies lead to
crises that in tum lead to paradigmatic revolutions. A revolution occurs when a new
framework. is able to solve the crises. This new framework. however. is not something
that is merely added on to the existing one. It totally replaces it That is, by merely being
able to solve the problem. the new framework reworks the accepted laws and theories
that came before it Not only do the laws and theories change, but even the meanings of
words. since meaning depends upon a framework. Between the transition from one
paradigm to the succeeding one. Kuhn asserts that there is a period ofupheaval where
there is a debate between the supporters of the different paradigms. However. different
paradigms are incommensurable with each other. and.. therefore. the supporters ofthe
different paradigms experience a communication breakdown - that is, they are talking at
Ctoss·purposes to each other:
The sorts ofcommunication breakdowns now being considered are likely
evidence that the men involved are processing stimuli differently. receiving
different data from them, seeing different things or the same things differently.2!
Kuhn's reflections on the structure ofscientific revolutions have brought the
criticism that his analysis leads to a picture ofscience as irrational. relativistic. and
IIKuhn, "Reflections on my Critics." in Criticism in the Growth afKnowledge
ed.lmre Lakatos. et a/. (Cambridge: The University ofCambridge Press, 1970), p. 276.
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arbitrary: "irrational" because the transition from one paradigm to the next is not based
upon reason but persuasion; "relativistic" because truth is relativized to a paradigm; and
"arbitrary'" because ifthere is no absolute truth extema.l to the paradigms, then there is no
criteria upon wbich we can say that science moves progressively. Karl Popper has
criticized Kuhn on these grounds.
According to Popper, there is a truth that we strive for when we move from one
paradigm to the next; that is how science progresses. He agrees with Kuhn that there is
no purely neutral language that we can take up to analyse different theories. However,
people from different paradigms can translate their respective languages and then decide
which theory to accepL The one they accept will be closer to the truth:
The central point is that a critical discussion and a comparison of the
various frameworks is always possible. It is just a dogma - a dangerous dogma-
that the different frameworks are like mutually untranslatable languages. The fact
is that even totally different languages (like English and Hopi, or Chinese) are not
untranslatable, and that there are many Hopis or Chinese who have learnt to
master English very well.
The Myth of the Framework is, in our time, the central bulwark of
irrationalism. My counter-thesis is that it simply exaggerates a difficulty into an
impossibility. The difficulty ofdiscussion between people brought up in different
frameworks is to be admitted. But nothing is more fruitful than such a discussion;
than the culture clash which has stimulated some ofthe greatest intellectual
revolutions.21
On the point of translation raised by Popper, Kuhn agrees. Those with different
languages can translate and understand one another. He denies that his notion of
2lKarI Popper, ''Nonna! Science and its Dangers," in Criticism and the Growth of
~pp.56-7.
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incommensurability brought out in The Structure ofScieotific Reyolutions ever implied
untranslatability. Rather, what Kuhn wants to say is that such translation is difficult and
sometimes only partial. This partiality comes about because of the fact that the language
ofa theory can determine (or is determined by) the ontology ofa theory. Members of
different frameworks not only speak different languages. but they also live in different
worlds - they are ontologically different. Ifa historian were teaching a class on the
history ofscience, he would have to point out not only the different laws and theories
(languages) indicative of each paradigm. but also the different ontologies that they imply.
Kuhn holds that a translation manual is not good enough to communicate between two
cultures or paradigms; we also need an indication ofwhat kind ofontology the alien
holds to. And Kuhn, like Quine. holds that this is impossible to determine exactly_ We
could have two translations for the same language or theory, and yet these translations
could imply two completely different ontologies. Indeterminacy of translation leads to
ontological relativity:
Why is translation, whether between theories or languages, so difficult? Because,
as has often been remarked, languages cut up the world in different ways, and we
have no access to a neutral sub-linguistic means of reporting. Quine points out
that, though the linguist engaged in radical translation can readily discover that
his native informant utters 'Gavagai' because he has seen a rabbit. it is more
difficult to discover bow 'Gavagai' should be translated. Should the linguist
render it as 'rabbit,' 'rabbit·kind.,' 'rabbit-part,' 'rabbit-occurrence.· or by some
other phrase he may not even have thought to formulate?23
2JKuhn, "Reflections on my CriticS," p. 268.
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Kuhn's corrected account of"incommensurability" between theories or languages does
not imply untranslatability, but, rather. difficulty in translation because ofaltemative
ontologies. Ifall languages cut up the world in the same way, then there would be no
incommensurability, and translation would be a smooth and easy process:
One need not go that far to recognize that reference to translation only isolates but
does not resolve the problems which have led Feyerabend and me to talk. of
incommensurability. To me at least, what the existence oftranslation suggests is
that recourse is available to scientists who hold incommensurable theories. That
recourse need not, however, be to full restatement in a neutrallaoguage ofeven
the theories' consequences. The problem of theory comparison remaios.24
The problem that remains is that different theories demarcate ontologically different
worlds. If the meaning ofa word or sentence is based upon the relation of reference
between word and world. where the "world" is seen as a by-product ofa scheme or
language and some sort ofempirical content (representation, sensory stimulation, surface
irritation, etc.), then two sentences that are phonetically the same but belong to two
different frameworks could possibly have two different truth values. It is in this sense
that comparison between two incommensurable theories is difficult. If truth is relative to
the theory, that is, relative to the way a theory or language cuts up the world. then the
decision as to which of two theories is the better cannot be based on truth., but on some
other, maybe irrational, principle.
24Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics," p. 268.
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1 6 Conclusjon
The intent of this chapter was to give a briefexposition of what Davidson is
arguing against. In his essay, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," it is Quine,
Kuhn. and Feyerabend whom Davidson names as his chiefopponents. Although they
have shaken off the dogmas outlined by Quine, he claims that they are still left with one
dogma which leads them to postulate such notions as theoretical pluralism (Feyerabend),
theoretical dualism (Quine), and incommensurability (Kuhn and Feyerabend).
Theoretical pluralism. states that~ can have two empirically equivalent theories
that are irreducible to one another based on the fact that they do not obey the principle of
meaning invariance. Feyerabend sees pluralism as a point in favour ofempiricism
because it leads to new fields ofdiscovery for science. Pluralism demands that we test
alternative incommensurable theories to see which leads to the best results. I think that
Quine's theoretical dualism is similar to Feyerabend's pluralism. except in one respect:
Quine would not refer to two theories as empirically equivalent if it could be determined
that one was better after a crucial test. The Duhem·Quine thesis denies crucial tests
because of the fact that any statement can be altered to account for anomalous
observations. Therefore, ifthere are two irreducible (untranslatable) theories, then we
have no choice but to accept both of them.
Ian Hacking frames the problem this way: for Quine, there are a large number of
ways in which to translate a theory because ofhis thesis of indeterminacy oftranslation.
28
Since they are empirically equivalent, one has to accept them all. He sees Feyerabend as
taking an opposite view - that is, two theories could be so disparate that there is no
possibility of translation; they are incommensurable.ll
Davidson makes the claim several times that translation between schemes is
always possible and that we would not know what it would be like to come across an
untranslatable language. On these grounds, incommensurability is uninteUigible. But, as
I indicated above, this is not the only meaning that Kuhn gives to his notion of
incommensurability. And it is Kuhn's "new" formulation of incommensurability which
is Davidson's real target. Reformulated, the incommensurability of irreducible theories
results in ontological relativity, which refers to the fact that two or more schemes can cut-
up or organize empirical content differently.
Davidson does not want to discover what the real relation between scheme and
content is, but rather destroy the notion that there is a relation at all. Davidson's project
is to get rid of incommensurability by analyzing such notions as truth. meaning,
interpretation (or translation), and belief. Through the analysis ofthese concepts, and a
study ofthe process of"radical interpretation" (a variation ofQuine's "radical
translation'), he shows that the concepts of"scheme," "content" and "reference" play no
role in an cu:count of linguistic communication.
llHacking, p. 152.
29
As I said, Kuhn's refonnulation of incommensurability states that it is not merely
translation between languages that causes the problems, but also the difference in
ontology. This is a point that Quine sympathizes with:
If empiricism is construed as a theory of truth, then what Davidson
imputes to it as a third dogma is rightly imputed and rightly renounced.
Empiricism as a theory of truth thereupon goes by the board, and good riddance.
As a theory ofevidence, however. empiricism remains with us, minus indeed the
two old dogmas. The third purported dogma, understood now in relation not to
truth but to warranted belie£: remains intact. It bas both a descriptive and a
normative aspect, and in neither aspect do I think. of it as a dogma. It is what
makes scientific method partly empirical rather than solely a quest for internal
coherencc.26
It appears from this quote that Quine sees Davidson's refutation ofconceptual relativism.
as a merely linguistic endeavour. At that level, Quine holds that Davidson's analysis of
untranslatable languages is acute and that his arguments are valid - for languages. But it
appears that he still wants primacy to be given to epistemological concerns. As will
become evident in later chapters, Davidson's holism prevents one from making too sharp
a distinction between epistemology and semantics. Both require the other. How we
come to mow what a word means is at the same time how we come to know what the
world is like. Davidson argues that ''the methodology of interpretation is ... nothing but
epistemology seen in the mirror of meaning.om Echoing this claim, he elsewhere says
16Quine, "On the Very Idea ofa Third Dogma." in Theories and Thjngs
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1981), p.
39.
2'Davidson, "Thought and Talk," in Inquiries jnto Tnrtb and Interpretation p. 169.
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about his methodology of interpretation that we "have erased the boundary between
knowing a language and knowing our way around the world generally.oql
2SOavidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," pp. 445-446.
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Chapter 2
Truth and Meaaiag
2 I Introduction
Davidson's argument for the refutation ofconceptua1 relativism is the result of
many years of work in the philosophy of language - especially in semantics. Davidson
comes to the conclusions reached in "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme" through
a prior analysis ofsuch notions as "'truth," "meaning," "belief," and "language." In order
to appreciate the depth ofhis remarks, therefore. it is necessary to look at his early work
in semantics. In this chapter, I will look at his ideas on "truth.. and "meaning," by
examining Alfred Tarski's work on the search for a formal definition of truth and
showing how Davidson utilizes this definition as a meaning theory. I will also examine
the arguments which Davidson uses in defence of the claim that Tarski's truth theory is a
meaning theory and outline some ofthe answers Davidson offers to the criticisms that
have been brought against his projecL In chapter 3 I will look at his ideas regarding
"language," and the related notions ofholism, beliefand the "principle ofcharity."
22 Tarski's Tnrth pefinitioD
Davidson holds that the notions of"truth.""meaning," and "belief" are
inseparable in any account ofour understanding or interpretation ofa speaker ofa
language. Alfred Tarski's work on the semantic conception of truth brought Davidson to
this realization. Tarslei's project was to give an account or definition of the classical
(Aristotelian) conception of truth that was both materially adequate and formally correct. I
That is, a satisfactory definition of"true" must account for all instances of its use when
used in the classical sense, as will be explained, and it must not lead to any ambiguities or
anomalies.
The classical sense of"tnrth" which Tarski bas in mind in his work is the intuition
expressed by Aristotle inhis~:
A falsity is a statement oftha! which is that it is not, or of that which is not that it
is; and a truth is a statement of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that
it is not. Hence, be who states ofanything that it is, or that it is not, will either
speak truly or speak falsely.'
ITarski, "The Concept ofTruth in Formalized Languages," p. 156.
lAristotle, Aristotle's Metaphysics translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle
(Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1979), 1011b25.
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A materially adequate definition of truth will account for all instances where the term.
"true" is used to evaluate a statement. Tarski argues that if there are instances where the
term does not fit this chara.cteri2ation, then it is not being used in the classical sense. For
Tarski (and Davidson), "true" applies strictly to sentences. For example. the statement,
"snow is white." is true ifsnow is white. Tarski gives a schema of the form ofa true
sentence which exbaum all uses ofthe classical sense of ,'true," and which he calls
Convention T.
Convention T is the criterion which is placed on a formal system that claims to
give a materially adequate (extensionally correct) definition of"truth:' Convention T
states that a truth definition must give either a list ofall the true sentences that use the
predicate ''true'' in a language. or a way recursively to generate all such sentences. Each
such sentence will be a partial definition of truth - their totality will give the full
definition of"truth" for that language. Each partial definition takes the form ofa T-
sentence:
(1) s is true if. and only if. p.
In this schema, "p" is replaced by any true sentence ofthe language and "s" is replaced
by the name of that sentence. Any use of the term "true" in the classical sense will adhere
to this schema.
What makes Tarski's work on truth important is his stress on the formal
correctness ofthe definition. One ofms main priorities is to avoid any paradoxes or
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anomalies that could resulL Paradoxes are easy to generate in semantics because ofthe
fact that we are using language to describe language. Language is self·reflexive. The liar
paradox is one of the most well known examples:
(1) I am a liar,
or, to put it in semantic terms:
(2) This statement is false.
In this case we have a statement that is making an evaluative judgement about itself. It is
paradoxical because ifwe evaluate the statement as true. then it is false, and ifwe
evaluate it as false. then it is true. Tarsld contends that this occurs because we bave
allowed a semantic term into our language. He argues that paradoxes are a result ofone
allowing terms from the metalanguage into the object language.
By "metalanguage," Tarski means the language that is used in talking about
another language, and the "object language" is the one that is being talked about. The
metalanguage is a language that transcends the object language and is "essentially richer."
It is essentially richer because it contains not only all the vocabulary of the object
language, but also semantic terms such as «truth," "denotatioo," "satisfactioo," etc. By
making a distinction between a meta- and an object-language, we prevent the paradoxes
from arising.
In Tarski's T·sentences, the left-hand side of the biconditional \s") names a
sentence of the object language, and the right-band side, and the biconditional itself ("is
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true it: and only if. PJ. is the metalanguage. It is important to notice that the semantic
tenn "true" does not occur in the object language, and thus it is impossible to generate a
semantic paradox.
Another ofTarski's priorities in developing the definition of truth is to avoid
ambiguity in the definition oftbe semantic terms. For Tarski, the classical notion of truth
can be defined in terms of satisfaction. Satisfaction is the relation between objects and
sentential functions. We say ofan object that it does or does not satisfy a function. For
example. in the English language, "snow" satisfies the predicative function, "x is white."
Sentences with variables, like "x is white," are called "open sentences," while those
without variables, like "snow is white," are called "closed sentences." For a sentence to
be true, it bas to be satisfied by all objects, and for it to be false, it bas to be satisfied by
no objects. Open sentences that are satisfied by all objects constitute the axioms and
theorems oflogic. For example, "x=.r," "-(x.-x),'· etc., are satisfied by all objects ofany
language. The truth ofa sentence, within a particular language, is defined in terms of
satisfaction. In a given language, satisfaction is defined recursively:
We indicate which objects satisfy the simplest sentential functions; and then we
state the conditions under which given objects satisfy a compound function -
assuming that we know which objects satisfy the simpler functions from which
the compound one has been constructed. Thus, for instance, we say that given
numbers satisfy the logical disjunction "x is greater than y or x is equal to y" if
they satisfy at least one of the functions "x is greater thany" or "x is equal to Yo")
lTarski, '"The Semantic Conception ofTruth and the Foundations of Semantics,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1944), P 353.
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It is these simplest sentential functions. the objects (vocabulary) that satisfy them. the
satisfaction relations. and the rules ofa first-order logic (grammar). which constitute the
axioms ofa truth theory. The compound sentences are recursively derived from the
simple axioms and complement these simple sentences to compose all the possible
utterances in the entire language.
A closed sentence, although it has no variables, still has to be satisfied by all the
objects ofa language in order to be true. This is done by checking to see iftbe sentence
is implied or refuted by any ofthc satisfaction relations. For example, assume that we
have a language that has two objects. Q and b. two sentential functions, F(x) and G(x), and
a logical system of first order predicate calculus. Ifwe outlined all the satisfaction
relations for that language, then we could determine. by structure alone, which sentences
were true and which were false. Let a satisfy F(x), and b satisfy G(;c). From this, it is
easy to sec that the closed sentence, F(a), is true because it is satisfied by all the objects
of that language, a and b. F(a) states that there is a satisfaction relation between F(x) and
a. To confirm this. all we have to do is check our axioms that outlined the satisfaction
relations ofall the objects. Since there is no contradiction. Le., since neither a nor b
disconfirm this, the sentence is true. The closed sentence G(a) says that there is a
satisfaction relation between G(x) and Q. Since this is not confirmed by the axioms that
outline the satisfaction relations. it is false.
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23 Davidson's Notion ora Innh Theory as a Mgmin, Theory
As I indicated above. Davidson's main coneem in philosophy is semantics. One
of the most important tasks, argues Davidson, for a philosopher of language is to develop
a semantic theory. A semantic theory is a theory that is able to give an account ofbow to
determine: the meaning ofany arbitrary sentence in a naturallanguagc, and to show bow
the meaning ofa sentence is composed and intlueoced by its constituent partS. [fwe can
develop such a theory, then it could be said that we have discovered what the conditions
arc for the possibility ofunderstanding or grasping the meaning ofa sentence.
In the past there have been many attempts to do this, but they have all failed. One
ofthe main reasons for this failure is that many philosophers of language do not
acknowledge that a semantic theory bas to be finitely recursive. That is, a semantic
theory has to be able to generate the meaning ofan i.nfinity ofsentences from the finite
resources ofvocabulary and grammatical rules (or logical system). There arc two reasons
for this as far as I can see: i) as language users, or as rational beings. we arc finite
ourselves and cannot process an infinite amount of information, and itl for a language to
work. it must have elements that are repeatable and combinable - that is. it must be
holistically compositional. A word must be able to be used over again in different
contexts without changing the meaning ofthat word:
When we can regard the meaning ofeach sentence as a function ofa finite
number of features ofa sentence, we have insight into wbat there is to be learned;
we also understand how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by finite
accomplishments. For suppose that a language lacks this feature; then no matter
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bow many sentences a would-be speaker learns to produce and understand., there
will remain others whose meanings are not given by the rules already mastered..~
A theory that definitely does not work. as a semantic theory is one that correlates
meaning (as an independent entity) to every sentence. This theory violates the principle
which states that recursion theories can only have a finite amount ofsemantic primitives.
If this theory was correct, Le., the theory that correlated an independent entity as a
meaning for every meaningful sentence, then the meaniag ofa sentence becomes the
semantic primitive and thus there would~ an infinite number ofsemantic primitives that
the theory must account for, and an infinite number ofprimitives that the language user
must learn. TIlls is impossible.
Quine argues that "meaning" cannot playa role in a semantic theory because it is
an obscure and enigmatic notion that cannot be captured by a fonnal theory. Because of
its obscurity, we have to try to do without it. For Davidson, a semantic theory attempts to
account for how an infinity ofmeanings could possibly be generated by a language.
Since a philosopher oflanguage is trying to account for what or explain what "meaning"
is, she cannot use meaning as the explanation:
Paradoxically, the one thing meanings do not seem to do is oil the wheels ofa
theory ofmeaning - at least as long as we require ofsuch a theory that it oon-
trivially give the meaning ofevery sentence in the language. My objection to
meanings in the theory ofmeaning is not that they are abstract or that their
~Davidson,"Theories ofMeaning and Learnable Languages," in~
Truth and I0lewretatiQD p. 8.
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identity conditions are obscure, but that they have no demonstrated use.S
A theory ofmeaning bas to be constructed in terms other than itself. "Meanings" play no
role in a theory ofmeaning (in the same way that "dormative power" plays no effective
role in the explanation ofwhy sleeping pills work).
Davidson sees a key to such a semantic theory in the truth theory that was
developed by Tarski. Tarski's theory was able to define the predicate "true" for all
sentences ofa language in a finite and recursive way. This was accomplished through the
use of the semantic relation ofsatisfaction. The vocabulary ofa language (the semantic
primitives), the simple sentential functions. the rules of recursion (the logical system),
and the satisfaction relations that map the objects oftbe vocabulary to the simple
sentential functions constiMe the axioms from which the sentences (theorems) of the
language are derived. These axioms are finite in number. A truth theory, then, meets at
least one criterion ofa semantic theory - a finite set ofaxioms can entail an infinite
amount of theorems to compose a language.
Now, however. since the theorems that a truth theory entails are only the true T-
sentences, it could be said that a truth theory gives the truth conditions for any sentence
of the object language. That is, a troth theory with a finite set of axioms will entail
sentences ofthe form,
(1) s is true if, and only if. p,
SDavidson, ''Truth and Meaning," in Inquiries into TOIth and Iptemn;;tatiQo pp.
20-21.
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as Tarski bas demonstrated; where "I' is the name of a given sentence and "p" is the
translation ofthat sentence in the metalanguage. p is the condition under which s is true.
The recognition that a true T-sentence gives the truth conditions of the sentence
on the left-band side of the biconditional leads Davidson to the conclusion that a Tarskian
theory oftrutb is a semantic theory. Each T-sentence gives the conditions ofwbat it is for
a sentence in the object language to be true. This is just as good as giving the meaning of
every sentence oftbe object language. This is much more obvious in the less trivial case
where the object-language is not the same as the metalanguage. Here, the right·band side
of the biconditional is an interpretation of the utterance on the left-hand side. For
Davidson, to give an interpretation ofa sentence is to show an understanding of the
meaning oftbat sentence. We could conclude then that each T-sentence could be
replaced by an M-sentence:
(M) smeansp.
Davidson does oot suggest such a replacemeot because '"meaning" is an unanalysed (and
uoanaIysable) semantic term that cannot, as was already demonstratcd.lead to a better
Wlderstanding ofwhat it is for a sentence to mean something. But as a rough
approximation, "truth condition" seems to be as close to "meaning" as we will ever come:
The definition [oftruthJ works by giving the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the truth ofevery sentence, and to give the truth conditions is a way ofgiving
the meaning ofa sentence. To know the semantic concept oftnrth for a language
is to know what it is for a sentence - any sentence - to be true, and this amounts,
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in one good sense that we can give to the phrase, to understanding the language.'
Davidson develops Tarski's analysis in two respects: firstly, he argues that a truth
theory is a meaning theory, and secondly, that Tarski's characterization ofa truth
predicate can be applied to a natural language. On the first point, Tarski says nothing.
His project stops at a definition of'<nuth." He is not interested in the notion ofmeaning.
In fact, he takes meaning for granted in this quest for a definition of tnnh.
In regards to the second point, however, and more importantly, Tarski warns us
that the task of defining truth for a natural language is impossible and, presumably, so is
the task ofa giving a semantic theory for a natural language.
2 4 Meaning Theory for a Natural I&oguage
There are several reasons why Tarski argues that a truth theory is not applicable to
a natural language.
Firstly, and this the main substance ofTarski's polemic against a naturalized truth
theory, i) the universality of natural languages prevents the possibility offonnalization.
That is, a natural language is too "rich" to be able to have a theory about it. Ifa
metalanguage is developed, it immediately becomes part of the natural language. At each
attempt to transcend the natural language, the natural language becomes richer. As was
'Davidson, ''Truth and Meaning." p. 24.
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indicated above. any theory that tries to define semantic notions requires a distinction
between object and metalanguage foc fear ofsemantic paradoxes. like "The Liar."
Further. a natural language has ii) many sentences that have ambiguous meanings
and iii) many sentences that a truth theory cannot accommodate. e.g.• demonstratives.
indexicals. injunctions. adverbial modifications. etc.• because ofthe fact that they are not
truth-functional. In a natural language. we also have the phenomena that iv) sentences
uttered at different times or by different people have different truth values. Tarski argues
that this goes beyond the resources of any finite theory.
Davidson disagrees with Tarski on: i) the universality ofa natural languages. He
recognizes the fact that semantic paradoxes can occur. but argues that they are harmless.
and brushes this problem away in a very Wittgensteinian gesture:1
In any case. most of the problems of general philosophical interest arise within a
fragment ofthe relevant natural language that may be conceived as containing
very little set theory.1
"Wittgenstein shrugs ofIthe problem ofparadoxes - even the paradoxes of
mathematics (e.g.• Russell's paradox) which seem to undermine a search for the
foundations of that discipline. He does not see them as causing any difficulties. We don't
need to solve them. argues Wittgenstein, all we need is a rule stating that we do not
derive anything from them:
Think ofthe case of the Liar. It is very queer that Ibis should have puzzled anyone - much more
extraordinary than you might think.: that this should be the thing 10 worry human beings. Because
lhe thing works like this: ifa man says 'I am lying' we say that it follows that he is not lying, from
which it follows that he is lying and so on. Well, so what? You can go on like uuu until you are
black in the face. Whynot? Itdoesn'tmatter.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wjugeustein's Lectures on the Foundations ofMatbematics
Cambridge J939 ed. Cora Diamond (Hassocks. Sussex: The Harvester Press. Ltd.•
1976), p. 207.
'Davidson, '"Truth and Meaning," p. 29.
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Davidson's point is that what should concern us as philosophers oflanguage is not the
semantic paradoxes. These paradoxes are quirks ofa language that will not do harm to
any serious philosophy.
Neither does Davidson think. that ii) the ambiguity of terms is a problem for a
meaning theory. You don't need to know the specific or exact meaning ofa term to
develop a meaning theory for a language. You need to know whether one can discover
the truth conditions for the specific T-sentence. [fthe sentences of the object language
get translated into the metalanguage, that is, ifwe know what the truth-conditions of the
sentences are, we won't ron into problems. The reason is that the metalanguage is my
language. I know what all the terms in my language mean - or I at least know bow to
use them. By my own admission, many of them are vague and unclear. But this
vagueness will not affect the truth-conditions of the sentence that they are used in. "As
long as ambiguity does not affect grammatical form. and can be translated., ambiguity for
ambiguity, into the metalanguage, a truth definition will not tell any lies.'" Just because,
for example, I have not taken on the project ofa philosophical analysis of the term
"good," it doesn't mean [ do not know the conditions for the sentence "spaghetti is good"
to be true. "Spaghetti is good" is true if, and only if, spaghetti is good. Davidson advises
us:
'Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 30.
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[t is hard to exaggerate the advantages to philosophy oflacguage of-bearing in
mind this distinction between questions oflogical form and grammar, and the
analysis of individual concepts. IO
On point iii), Davidson bas written extensively_ A good portion ofdaily discourse
is given to utterances that are not assertive, i.e., not truth~functiooal. An account ofthe
rest of the discourse that we participate in must be solved ifany theory oftruth is to be
given for a natural language. His solutions to the adverbial modification problem
(positing an ontology ofevents) in order to reveal the finite structure ofa natural
language is indicative of the hope he fosters that a truth theory can be given for such a
language.II The main point to keep in mind when examining Davidson's work on the
solutions to the problem ofsentences that do not have a truth-functional surface structure
is that Davidson sees a truth theory, along the lines ofthe one given by Tarski, as a
condition for the articulation ofa meaning theory. That is, a sentence must have a truth-
functional deep structure if it is to be counted as meaningful within a particular language.
You cannet find the meaning ofa sentence ofanother language if a predicate that
demarcates all the true T-sentences cannot be given for that language. Ifall the T-
lODavidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 31.
IISince it is not my intention to explicate or defend Davidson's work en the
finiteness and truth-functionality of a natural language, [ will merely give a list ofsome
oftbe work done by him. in this area: "Quotation," ''00 Saying That," and "Moods and
Performances;" these three wodes are to be found in: Davidson, Inquiries into Tnnb and
~. As wen. ''The Logical Form ofAction Sentences," "Causal Relations,"
''The Individuation ofEvents," "Events as Particulars." and "Eternal liS. Ephemeral
Events;" these five essays are found in: Davidson. Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1980).
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sentences are to be given, or ifa list ofaxioms is to be given from which the T-sentences
can be derived. the axioms have to be finite in number (l.e., there can only be a finite
amount ofsemantic primitives), and all sentences that are not assertive have to be
transformable into truth·functional structures. Davidson has to reject any previous
theories that have not met these guidelines because it seems unlikely that any theory at all
could be given for how they work.
The last transformation that Davidson has to make ofTarski's truth theory in
order to enable it to handle a natural language is to account for: iv) the fluctuation of truth
values ofsentences spoken at different times or by different people.
Davidson's solution is to make truth a three-place predicate. lbat is, truth is not
only relativized to a sentence, but, in his view, also to speakers and times. By relativising
truth in this way, Davidson has found a way to deal with demonstratives ofa natural
language and has also indicated at which point a truth theory goes empirical:
Sentences with demonstratives obviously yield a very sensitive test of the
correctness ofa theory ofmeaning and constitute the most direct link between
language and the recurrent macroscopic objects ofhuman interest and attention. 12
T-sentences now alter in form from:
(I) s is true if, and only if, P.
to
(0) s is true for speaker u at time I if, and only if, p,
12Davidson. "Truth and Meaning," p. 35.
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where "s" is replaced by a name ofthe sentence, "zr by the person uttering the sentence
named, "I" by the time that the sentence is uttered, and "p" by the statement with the open
variables, u and t, if the sentence contains indexicals. For example, the following
indexical sentence could be a typical theorem in a semantic theory ofmy language:
(3) "This gavagai tastes good," is true, as spoken by me, at 3:00 pm on
Saturday, 02 Nov 96, if, and only if. the gavagai that I am tasting on the
aforementioned date tastes good.
Davidson makes three major contributions to the philosophy of language by
making truth a three-place predicate.
Firstly, a truth theory with a truth predicate ranging over these three variables is
able to accommodate a natural language and its empirical nature. Tbis is achieved by
having an ontology, not of statements or timeless propositions, but rather of utterances.
A truth theory is ofthe actual and possible utterances ofa particular individual on a
particular occasion. lbis was not recognized before because there was always taken to be
a distinction between the saying ofsomething (the speaker and time), and what is said
(the statement). Truth, it was thought. could only be determined. for the statement; the
speaker and time ofspeaking were thought to be irrelevant to assignment of truth values
and meaning. Seeing truth in this light was also one of the obstacles to making a truth
theory for a natural language. In a formal language, like arithmetic, it doesn't matter who
utters a theorem or when it is uttered. All that was seen to be important was the statement
uttered. ''2+2=4" is true whether it is uttered by me or by a parrot. or whether it is uttered
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today or a hundred years from now. Because such sentences are true in all circumstances.
it was seen to be characteristic oftrutb that it transcend time, people and places. Since
natural languages deal directly with times. people and places, it was seen to be impossible
to develop a truth theory for this language. Davidson bas shown us a way out.
The second contribution that a relativized notion of truth bas for a philosophy of
language is that it gives us more resources, and better hopes, for solving semantic
problems. Truth, taken as a three place predicate. directly overcomes the problems of
demonstratives and indexicals; the problem being that indexical statements are true under
some circumstances and false under others. Since Davidson bas given a solution to
demonstratives - by making "truth" a three-place predicate - if there are other sentences
that pose semantic problems because they have hidden demonstratives, or a deep
structure composed ofdemonstrative elements, then. presumably. we have a solution for
them as well. His essays on quotation. indirect discourse, and adverbial modification are
attempts to develop such solutions. l)
The third contribution that Davidson makes here is probably his most
controversial one. and I intend to deal with it in more depth in chapters 3 and 4. If truth
is relativized to speaker, time. and utterance, then a truth theory is relativized to these
variables as wen. Now, however. since a truth theory is constructed for a specific
language, it appears as if there are a lot more "languages" than there were originally
llSee note 11 for references to these essays.
48
thought to be. That is, we don't have the language "English," for example, that we each
speak. but rather we all have our own languages. "I shall therefore [states Davidson,]
treat theories of truth as applicable in the first place to individual speakers at various
periods or even moments of their lives."'4 lflanguage is regarded as a conventional set of
rules ofsyntax and vocabulary that is a necessary condition for communication in which
communities participate, then '"there is no such thing as a language."IS Davidson argues
that communication takes place, not because ofsome conventional understanding ofa
language prior to interaction with another individual, but because of the ability of the
speaker and interpreter to develop truth theories of the other's linguistic behaviour.
"Language" is reinterpreted in Davidson's philosophy as the convergence of truth
theories developed by the speakerrmterpreter at the moment of communicative
interaction. Every person that I encounter has their own language, and 1have to develop
a truth theory in order to understand their utterances (Le., imply their T-sentences). That
is, I have to translate their statements into my language in order to communicate with
them. Even my own language that 1have now is contingent because it is relativized to
time. It is liable to change tomorrow, and most likely will. This is clearly a dangerous
philosophical position and could lead to claims ofrelativism. Davidson's arguments in
14Davidson, 'The Structure and Content ofTruth," The Journal ofPhilosophy,
(Volume LXXXVII. No.6, June 1990), p. 311.
"Davidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 446.
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"On the Very IdeaofaConceptual Scheme." and the arguments that I intend to elaborate
and defend in this thesis, are attempts to show that this is not the casc.
25 Tarski's Trivial Truth Theory
Many argue that Tarski's theory oftruth and the T·sentenees that are derived for a
language are trivial. Critics argue that T-sentences like. '''snow is white' is true ifsnow
is white," give us no insight into the nature oftruth. Ofcourse, this is as much a criticism
of Davidson as it is ofTarski because Davidson's program is built upon Tarski's account
of truth. The triviality is argued for in several ways.
One way is to refer to Tarski's Convention T as disquotational. By
..disquotation,.. the critics mean that the theory does nothing more than show us how to
rid our language oftbe predicate "is true," by dropping the quotations from the name of
the sentence on the left~bandside of the biconditional. That is, since T-sentences show us
that "'snow is white' is true," is equivalent to "snow is white," we can replace all
sentences in our language ofthe form, "s is true" by ''p.'' Truth is a redundant concept
and can be easily removed from our language. What the critic fails to realize here is that
the transition from the object language to the metalanguage is one that is accomplished
by interpretation, and not mere absence ofquotation marks. The metalanguage is the
language of the interpreter and the object language is the language of the speaker. If the
speaker is German and the interpreter is English, then it is clear that Convention T is not
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merely disquotational. Davidson urges: "One cannot find an English equivalent of the
English sentence '''Schnee ist weiss' is true (in GermanY' simply by removing the
quotation marks from 'Schnee ist weiss·... l,
This emphasis on the importance of interpretation also saves Convention T from
claims that it is merely a logical function that generates logical tautologies. This is a
claim raised against Tarski by Hilary Putnam.11 [fwe have a truth theory that specifies a
satisfaction relation between object a and the predicate F(r). resulting in the T-sentence,
(4) "F(.)" is true if, and only if, F(.)
is it fair to say that we have said anything substantial about truth? Ifthe extension ofthe
predicate F(r) is defined by listing the things to which it applies. isn't (4) nothing more
than a stipulative definition? And do stipulative definitions really say anything at all?
Davidson argues that the assumption made by Putnam that T-sentences are
stipulative is a wrong one. What Putnam is missing in Tarski's formulation is that the
right-hand side of the biconditional is an interpretation of what is said on the left-hand
side. Putnam sees Tarski's work as purely formal. Semantics. however. is more than
formalism. Davidson writes:
·'Davidson, ''The Structure and Content ofTruth,.. p. 285.
l1truary Putnam. "On Truth,.. in How Many QuestjQM? eds. Leigh Cauman, et
af. (Indianapolis: The Hackett Publishing Company, 1983) pp. 35-56.
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The question whether [the T-sentence] is purely stipulative is not one that can be
alisWered by studying the fonnal system; it concerns the intentions of the person
making the definition. II
The person making the definition is the interpreter, the one interested in fonnulating a
meaning theory. The interpreter does not note or remark upon the axioms that the
speaker bas stipulated for her language. The interpreter does not have access to these
axioms in radical interpretation; they doo't exist. These axioms are constructed by the
interpreter. 19 The interpreter constructs a theory for an already living language in terms
ofher own language. The axioms are noi stipulations. but rather generalizations or
abstractions from empirical observations and inherent beliefs about the way things are.
2 6 Michael Dummett
Dummett is also interested in the project ofdeveloping a meaning theory for a
natural language. He agrees with Davidson on what a meaning theory should
accomplish, but disagrees with him on what form it should take. With Davidson,
Dummett agrees that a meaning theory should be able to give the meaning of any
arbitrary sentence ofa language and it should remain faithful to the insight that the
"Davidson. "The Structure and Content ofTruth." p. 293.
19Radical interpretation is the process ofconstructing a truth theory for an
individual's language - it is an account ofhow it is that we understand what someone
says. In chapter 3 [ outline and examine Davidson's claim that understanding the
presuppositions that allow radical interpretation to take place gives the philosopher access
to the necessary and sufficient conditions ofunderstanding.
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meaning ofa sentence depends upon the role of its constituent words. So much for the
points of agreement. In terms ofdisagreements, there are plenty. In Dummett's work on
meaning theories20 there are three major areas under which all his contentions against
Davidson's project can be classified: i) the rejection ofDavidson's holistic account of
language; ii) the claim that Davidson is a realist, and, iii}; Dummen's anti-realist, or
verificationist, stance. These three areas ofcontention derive from the disagreement
between the two thinkers as to the nature of language.
Dummett sees a theory for a language, following Frege, as composed of three
parts.
Firstly, we have the primary level, accounted for by a theory of truth or reference.
The theory of reference gives all the satisfaction relations ofall the words and sentences
ofa particular language. At this level, meaning is completely extensional and, argues
Dummett, truth functional. The problem. is that we can never have a full grasp ofa
language at this level. The grasp (or sense) that an individual does actually have ofa
language at any point is accounted for in a theory of sense:
The shell- the theory ofsense - relates this theory of truth (or of reference) to
the speaker's mastery ofhis language; it correlates his knowledge of the
2OM.ichaei Dummett, "What is a Theory of Meaning?(I)," in Mind and I..angua~
ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 97-138. and "What is a
Theory of Meaning?(II),It in Truth and Meaning- EAYS in Semantic$, cds. Gareth Evans,
er al. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 67-137.
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propositions of the theory of truth with practica1linguistic abilities that he
displays.u
This secondary level, the theory ofsense, cannot be truth functional because it is
incomplete; the iod.ividual does not have access to all the satisfaction relations ofa
language to be fully able to state the truth conditions ofall sentences ofa language.
Thirdly, a meaning theory for a language must account for the force ofsentences ofa
language; this is accomplished in a theory of force.
The theory of force will give an ac;couot of the various types ofconventional
significance which the utterance ofa sentence may have, that is, the various kinds
oflinguistic act which may be effected by such an utterance, such as making an
assertion., giving a command, making a request, etc..n
This is not Davidson's conception ofa meaning theory for a language. For
Davidson., the split between sense and reference is nonexistent because of the fact that
there is DO such thing as a community-based language.D Language is the idiolect. In
Davidson's conception., meaning theorists should regard an individual's "grasp" of the
sense ofa language as identical to the satisfaction relations that determine the truth of that
particular language. lbis allows one to develop a meaning theory for an individual that is
completely holistic, extensional and truth·functionaJ. In regards to the third level ofa
language (the theory of force) that Dummett outlines, Davidson argues that this level is
21Dummett, "What is a Theory ofMeaning?{u)," p. 82.
nDummett, "What is a Theory ofMeaning?(U)," p. 74.
Def. Davidson, "Communication and Convention.," in mgllities into Truth and
~ and Davidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs."
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beyond the capacity ofa theory ofmeaning. Foree is certainly part ofcommunication,
but it docs not necessarily need to be accounted for in a meaning theory. Foree is
parasitic on truth and meaning. Davidson urges that we have to make a clear distinction
between what words. on a particular occasion. mean. and what those words are~ for.
A theory ofmeaning or truth is not coocemed with bow words are used.
rn Dummett's picture oflanguage we have a transeeodent entity (language) that is
a list ofaxioms and satisfaction relations. People come to this language and use bits of it
for different purposes and they always somehow distort it24 1be reason for this distortion
is that, as was already indicated. one cannot get a full grasp of the language, and hence
one's understanding will always be incomplete. Many times, as wen. a person has
intentions and motives that she may try to incorporate into the WQrds that are oot given in
the "language."
Dummett's failure to recognize Davidsoo'sclaim that the theoryofsense is fused
with the theory oftrutb (or reference) leads him to the following three criticisms (which I
already mentioned above).
24Dummett's insistence that a meaning theory is a theory ofsense that is distinct
from a theory of truth is a reason to classify Dummett with Kuhn and company as a
philosopher who holds to the dualism ofscheme and content Dummett uses the abilities
of the speaker (the theory ofsense) as an intermediary entity that stands between the
world and language, in the same way that Quine and Kuhn use sensory stimulations as a
content waiting to be organized. See chapter S for a fuller account ofDavidsoo's
rejection of this dogma.
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Firstly, and Davidson's defence will be more fully demonstrated in the next two
chapters. Dummett does DOt bold to a holistic philosophy of language in the same way
that Davidson does. Actually, Dummett recognizes that language is holistic, but he
disagrees with the claim that a theory ofmeaning can or should be concerned with
holism. A theory ofmeaning, argues Dummett, is concerned with bow it is that the
individual bas been able to master a language. It is the language that is holistic, DOt the
individual's grasp ofit He says: '1 conclude. therefore, that a theory ofmeaning, ifone
is to be possible at aU, must accord with an atomistic, or at least molecular, conception of
language, not a holistic one.1I'1S
Part of the reason for the rejection of the holistic llCCOWlt is that, for Dwnmett, the
language (theory oftruth) that an individual speaks (or bas a particular mastery of) is
primary, while the grasp that this individual has of this language (her idiolect - theory of
sense) is secondary. People partake in speaking a language; it is something that they
learn and master as they get older and more experienced.. With this split between bow
things actually m: (in a theory of reference), and what the individual knows (her theory
of sense), it is possible to make a fwther distinction between knowing the meaning ofa
sentence (sense) and knowing its truth condition (reference).
Davidson takes the opposite view. For him, it is the idiolect that is primary. It is
the idiolect that we develop meaning theories for. Davidson holds that there is "no such
llDummett, "What is a Theory ofMeaning?(I)," p. 123.
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thing to be leamed, mastered or bom with.>t26 We do Dot learn chunks of language and
get closer to bow the "real" language (say, the one we find in a dictionary) is supposed to
be. At each point in oW' life we have a complete and holistic language that is CODStantly
rq>1a<:ing and r=ealing itself:
... [I]n so far as we take the "organic" characteroflaoguage seriously, we cannot
a=ttalCly describe the first stepS towards its cooqucst as learning pan of the
language; rather it is a matter of partly learning.n
With that view in mind, Davidson makes DO distinction between meaning and truth
condition - they are onc and the same.
1be second criticism that Dummett levels against Davidson is the ll(:cusation that
Davidson is a realist.n 10 chapter 5 I intend to demonstrate how it is that Davidson
avoids this labelling (as weU as the label "anti-realist") by transcending such debates.
For Dummett. a realist is one who holds that all sentences are determinateiy either true or
false. In his account of"meaning" as "truth condition." Dummett mistakenly sees
Davidson as holding that to know the meaning ofa sentence is to know whether it is true
or false. Dummett rejects this view and adopts an anti-realist (intuitionist) approach to
semantics because there are a wide range ofsentences that are in fact impossible to say
26Davidson. "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 446.
21Davidson, 'Theories ofMeaning and Learnable Languages," p. 7.
lIActually, Dummett's claim bere, and his next "criticism," is more ofa
misunderstanding ofDavidson's position than a criticism. The two are much closer in
their views than Dummett leads us to believe.
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wbctber they are true or DOL These types ofsentences fall into three main categories: i}
subjunctive conditionals; it) past tense sentences. and; ill) sentences lhat quantify over an
infinite or unsurveyable totality. Since a theory ofmeani.ng for Dummett is a theory of
sense. there are many such types ofsentences that an individual does not have access to
in her language. Dummett argues that ifa meaning theory is modelled after a trUth
theory, that is ifwe need to know the truth ofa sente:nee to know the meaning of it, then
we will never be able to know the meaning ofsentences of the kinds i), li}, and iii}.
The problem with Dummett's second criticism is obviously that he takes "truth..
to be something quite different from Davidson's and Tarski's conception. For Dummett,
"truth" is attributed to a sentence when we know what it is true in virtue of:
(fa statement is true, there must be something in virtue ofwhich it is true. This
principle underlies the philosophical attemptS to explain truth as a correspondence
betwem a statement and some component of reality.2f
Davidson agrees that a statement is true in virtue ofsomething else., but this "something
else" is DOt a component ofan extra-linguistic reality, but rather a component of the parts
of that particular sentence, and ofother sentences that a person takes to be true:
Nothing, bowever, no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience,
not surface irritations. not the world, can make sentences trUe. That experience
takes a certain course, that our skin is warmed or punctured, that the universe is
finite, these facts, ifwe like to talk that way, make sentences and theories true.
But this point is put better without mention of facts. The sentence "My skin is
29Dumm.ett, "What is a Theory ofMeaning?(U)," p. 89.
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wann" is true ifand only ifmy skin is warm.. Here there is no reference to a fact.
a world, an experience, or a piece ofevidence.XI
When truth is defined in terms ofsatisfaction there is nothing that is WlSUI"Veyable. Truth
is a product ofthe satisfaction relations ofan individual's language (idiolect). Wba1
Dummett seems to be contesting is bow it is that a certain individual comes across the
axioms ofa truth theory, oot whether the T-sentenccs derived from them are in fact true.
As I will try to show in chapters 3 and 5, it is the coDditions oftruth themselves and the
Linguistic behaviour of the speaker that C8;USe an individual to hold that certain words
have certain meanings.
The third major area ofcontention that I wiU look at is based upon Dummett's
rejection of a realist theory ofmeaning. As I already argued. however, I bold that this
rejection is unfounded because Davidson does not bold to a realist theory ofmeaning (oor
to an anti-realist theory). Oummett's rejection of realism, though, does prompt him. to
offer an alternative which will be worthwhile analysing.
Dummett wants a theory that is based upon the intuitionist model of mathematics.
In the intuitionist modellhe notion ofbivaIence is dropped. Ifwe equate "meaning" with
"proof' in mathematics, as Dummett suggests we do, then an intuitionist would say that
we know the meaning ofa statement, not by knowing bow to prove it as true or false, but
by a capacity to recognize such a proofifwe came across one:
On this account, an understanding ofa statement consists in a capacity to
lOI)avidson, "On the Very Ideaofa Conceptu.al Scheme," p. 194.
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recognize whatever is counted as verifying it. Le.• as conclusively establishing it
as true. It is not necessary that we should have any means ofdeciding the truth or
falsity ofthe statement. only that \W: be capable of recognizing when its truth has
been establisbed.l !
Dummett adopts a vcrifieationist or falsificationist theory ofmeaning. This meaning
theory is the theory ofsense that can be attributed to a speaker ofa language thai. is
essentially truth functional. Dummett collapses a theory of reference into a theory of
sense and defines it in terms ofverification aDd falsification. Davidson. on the other
band. coUapses a theory of sense into a th~ry of reference. and defines his theory in
terms of truth and falsity. In practice. both theories sbould accomplish the same tasks and
both can equally account for bow it is that a speaker understands a sentence (meaning
theories are just constructions. remember). The difference is the presuppositions that they
both make.
Dummett's theory rests on the capabilities of a speaker as distinct from a
transcendent language where the truth ofall sentences is already defined.. The more
knowledge thai. a speaker bas ofa language. then the closer that the capabilities of the
speaker come to the truth. Davidson argues thai. it is exactly this notion ofa transcendent
or reified entity called "language" that leads philosophers down the slippery slope of
relativism. If there are different transcendent languages that have different relations to
the world. then the speakers oftbese different languages will have different notions of
truth. In Davidson's account, there is no language or truth "out there" that we try to come
llDummett, "What is a TbeoryofMeaning?(II)," pp. 110-11.
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closer to. This bypasses the question of relativism, as we shall see, because ofthe fact
that the truth ofmy language is the same as everyone else's. In other words,
interpretation into my own language ofother languages (or understanding other
individuals) presupposes that we agree on the truth ofmany things.
2 7 Conclusion
Davidson's work on the semantic problems of truth and meaning is based on
Tarski's attempt to find a definition oftrutb. Tarski's work shows us how to recursively
retrieve all the true T-sentences ofa language. The assumption that Tarski makes is that
we already understand the metalanguage that we are translating our sentences into; we
already know the meanings ofthe words. Ifwe know the meanings ofall the words ofa
language then we know how to extensionally define truth for that language. Davidson
reverses this insight ofTarski by equating ''meaning'' with ''truth condition." In this way,
a truth theory essentially becomes a meaning theory because the class ofall the true T-
sentences ofa language is identical to the class ofall the sentences ofa language that are
paired with their truth conditions (meanings). This is pivotal because it shows a way to
develop a meaning theory that is finitely recursive. A theory has to be finitely recursive
because it is beyond our finite capabilities to comprehend an infinity ofmeanings.
Application of this type ofa meaning theory to a natural language meets with
much resistance. Many, including Tarski, argue that it is impossible. A truth theory as
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outlined by Tanki cannot accommodate ambiguous meanings, sentences with indexical
elements, nor the fact that natural languages are set in an empirical environment where
the truth ofa sentence can change under different circumstances. Davidson bas shown us
a way out ofall these difficulties with some ingenious solutions. These solutions are the
first step in the argument against conceptual relativism.
Firstly, Davidson denies that there is a "Ianguagc" that we can have a meaning
theory for. Language is reduced to idiolect. Secondly, a meaning thcory is applied to the
actual and potential utterances ofa speaker at a certain time. Because ofthis, "truth" bas
to reformulated as a three-place predicate with variables ofuuerance. speaker, and time.
Ibis is his third innovation.
Chapter 3 will deal with the "principle ofcbarity." I sec this as the second major
contribution to the argument against conceptual relativism because it gives us a way into
a meaning theory. That is, if "meaning" is ''truth condition." then to understand the
meaning ofa sentence we have to know not only that the speaker holds it true, but also
that it is, in fact, true. How can we know this? The answer is to be found in the analysis
of "radical interpretation" and "the principle ofcharity."
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Cltaptcr 3
Charity ad Holism
3 I Introduction
Donald Davidson's philosophical project is to give an account ofmeaning. We
know the meaning ofa sentence when we understand what someone says by the words
they utter. Ifwe can give the necessary and sufficient conditions that arc required for an
individual to understand these utterances. then, argues Davidson, we have come as close
as we can to knowing what "mean.ingn is. The question of"meaningn is reformulated
into the question ofwhal someone needs to know in order to understand another's
utterances. Davidson's ingenious solution is to argue that an interpreter, in order to
understand (interpret) another speaker, must have implicit knowledge of a meaning
theory for the speaker's language. Davidson's early work in the philosophy of language
was an attempt to give an adequate outline ofwhat form such a meaning theory should
take. As I showed in the previous chapter, his conclusion was that a meaning theory for a
language should essentially be in the form ofa trUth theory - similar to the one proposed.
by Alfred Tarski - with certain modifications to allow for the ..natUralness" ofa naruraJ.
language. The benefits ofusing a truth theory similar to TarsIci's was that it was finitely
recursive, extensional, truth--functional. and it demonstrated how the meaning ofa
sentence depended on me meaning of its words. These are all benefits to any account of
what form. a meaning theory should take because they are all indicative oftbe fact that it
is possible, Le., it is within our finite capabilities, to construct a meaning theory.
As chapter 2 showed, mere is some opposition to this account ofmeaning. The
critics, however, do not seem to be opposed to the idea ofa meaning theory as a truth
theory in principle, but rather show concern as to whemer we can construct such theorics.
Consideration ofthesc critics was deferred to this chapter because it is in this chapter that
I intend to explain the process of"radical interpretation" as the construction ofsuch a
meaning theory.
3 2 Radical Interpretation
Davidson calls the constr'UCtion ofa truth theory for a language "radical
interpretation." Construction ofa truth theory is the process oftrying to understand the
utterances ofan individual. Davidson borrows the tenn "radical" from Quine's concern
with "radical translation" in order to show that the most extreme case of interpretation,
the interpretation ofa language that is completely foreign to you, is the most
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philosophically interesting case because it exposes all the presuppositions that one makes
when interpreting into one's own language. Davidson, like Quine, argues that all
interpretation (translation) is radical. When we give an account ofbow it is one interprets
a speaker ofa foreign language, the steps that we have to take stand out much more
clearly than when we tty to account for understanding in our own language. But,
nonetheless, the steps are the same. Everyone speaks a different language because we
develop different truth theories for their languages. Languages are individuated by their
truth theories. Only iftwo truth theories are identical can we say that the two languages
are identical. Davidson argues that this identification does not even happen in the case of
particular individuals.
I have already indicated that Davidson and Quine hold similar docttines in terms
of translation and interpretation. I That is, it is clear that Davidson's account ofmeaning
found in interpretation is heavily influenced by Quine's account ofmeaning found in
translation.
Quine held that the development ofa translation manual (through a process of
radical translation) would yield an adequate account of"meaning." A translation manual
is a list ofanalytic hypotheses oftbe form,
(A) s in the native language translates into p in my language.
ISee above, chapter I, nl3.
6S
Here. "s" is the name of the native's utterance and "p" is the name of the matching
utterance in my language. A translation manual maps every utterance of the native
language into a syntactically correct translation in my language.
Davidson., on the other hand, argues that the development ofa truth theory for a
language (through the process of radical interpretation) yields the account ofmeaning that
we are looking for. A truth theory, as I indicated in the last chapter, is a finitely recursive
theory that entails all the true T-sentences ofa language. The T-sentences that are
entailed by the axioms of this theory are ofthe form:
(T) s is true as spoken by u at time t if. and only if, p.
Here, "s" is the name of the utterance, "u" is the native speaker. "(' is the time the
sentence is spoken, and "p" is the condition under which the sentence is true. or, for all
intents and purposes, the meaning ofs.
Davidson's truth theory, although inspired and developed by Quine's quest for an
articulation for "meaning." exceeds Quine's translation manual in three respects. Firstly,
a translation manual requires at least two, and maybe three, languages to work. In a
translation manual we bave the object language (the native's language), the metalanguage
(the language that the theory is couched in), and the subject language (the language which
the manual translates the native's language into). But it is possible that we could not
understand any of these languages:
And in this general case, we can know which sentences of the subject language
translate which sentence ofthe object language without knOMng wbat any oftbe
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sentences ofeither language mean (in any sense, anyway, that would let someone
who understood the theory interpret sentences ofthe object language).l
For example, I could be in a Spanish library and pick up a translation manual that shows
how (with instructions in Spanish) to translate from German to Greek. If I speak none of
these languages, then the manual is no good to me. It gives no indication ofmeaning, nor
oftranslation. Ofcourse, I could find a manual that gives English translations of Spanish
and German to find the corresponding sentences in Greek. But the only reason that this
works is because I already understand English. A translation manual does not give an
account of this understanding, but presupposes it at some level. Translation manuals
show how to syntactically manipulate sentences of two different languages; truth theories
give the meaning or interpretation of the utterances oforullanguage (the native's or the
speaker's). 'The only expressions a theory of interpretation has to mention are those
belonging to the language to be interpreted."l
This brings us to the second poinL Davidson argues that in order to grasp the
meaning ofa sentence, we need to understand the sentence. The quest for "meaning" is
identical to the quest for an account of how it is that we understand. Davidson argues that
a truth theory is able to accomplish this task. A translation manual, on the other band,
merely gives a syntactical mapping ofsentences. Translation is a purely mechanical
2Davidson. "Radicallnterpretation," in Inauiries into Inrtb and Inlemretation p.
129.
lDavidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 130.
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process. There are computers around today that can translate from one language to
another, but it is clear that this does not mean that they have a grasp of the meaning of
either language. (fwe knew bow a computer worked. and ifwe knew bow the translation
software worked in the computer, we would still have 00 better grasp ofbow it is that a
word means sometb.i.ng.
Thirdly, a translation manual gives DO ac:eount of bow the meaning ofa sentence
depends upon the meaning of its parts. A theory that cannot show bow the meaning ofa
sentence is stlUctunilly dependent upon its constituent parts would have to account for the
meaning ofan infinity of sentences. This is beyond the range of the capacities ofa finite
being. A truth theory, on the other hand, determines the satisfaction relations ofa
language and its vocabulary. Using standard logic, a set ofsimple true sentences can be
generated with their corresponding truth conditions (the simple T-sentences). From these
sentences, using conjunction, disjunction, adverbial modification, etc., the remaining
infinity ofsentences of the language can be had with their corresponding truth conditions
generated solely out ofa finite class ofsimple T·.senteDces. Those who construct
translation manuals, however, are stuck with the task of listing an infinity ofanalytical
hypotheses.
When constructing a truth theory for a language - when doing radical
interpretation - there are, argues Davidson, three general steps that must be followed.
The first step is to find ..... the best way to fit our logic, to the extent required by
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Convention T. on to the new language.""4 When interpreting a language it is easiest ifwe
treat the utterances of the speaker as composed ofpredicates, names, logical operators,
etc.• and structured by an underlying quantificational system ofthe first order. Davidson
argues that we do this by looking at the utterances that the speakers of the native language
always take to be true. Once we have identified this class ofsentences. we overlay the
logical system ofour language as if it were "a gridn onto the object language. This
implementation ofa logical grid onto a foreigner's language is motivated partly by the
fact that we are simply accustomed to wOrldng with language in this form, and partly by
the fact that a linguistic system composed of the devices ofquantification, names. and
predicates, etc., would be a language that bad the benefit ofentailing an infinity ofrich
sentences from a finite axiomatic base. Davidson was aware ofthis early in his career:
When we can regard the meaning ofeach sentence as a function ofa finite
number of features of the sentence, we have insight not only into what there is to
be learned; we also understand how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by
finite accomplishments. For suppose a language lacks this feature; then no matter
how many sentences a would-be speaker learns to produce and understand. there
will remain others whose meaning are not given by the rules already mastered.'
The second step in radical interpretation is to identify and give the meaning (truth
condition) of sentences with indexical elements. These sentences reveal the limit of
meaning that can be attributed to each of the predicates ofthat class. It is this second step
4Davidson., "Radical Interpretation." p. 136.
'Davidson., 'Theories ofMeaning and Learnable Languages.n p. 8.
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that incorporates an empirical element into interpretation and leads one to limiting the
extension ofcertain terms.
The third step is to identify and try to determine the truth conditions ofsentences
where there is not uniform agreement among language users. This last step tries to get
the meaning ofsentences that are ofa more theoretical nature. !bis last step presupposes
the first step because one cannot disagree about theoretical statements unless they have
the same logical grid, unless they can individuate the terms and operators of the language
they are using, and unless they know the conditions of truth under the most favourable
circumstances. If these first conditions are not met, it would be questionable as to
whether they were talking about the same things, talking the same language, or even
talking at all.
These three steps of radical interpretation differ in order from those ofQuine's
radical translation. For Quine, the sentences that we are first able to translate are those
that have indexical elements: observation sentences. These are sentences that "refer" to
the medium size things that are in close proximity to us. Secondly we interpret standing
sentences - those that are taken to be universally true. Thirdly, we try to determine
logical form. The further one moves away from observation sentences. the more chance
there is for indetenninacy of translation.
On Quine's account, it is logical form that bas the greatest chance ofbeing
indeterminate. Davidson, however, holds that this is almost an impossibility. The reason
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for this, and hopefully it will become clearer below. is that for Davidson, the notion of
truth plays the primary role in interpretation, whereas for Quine it is reference to the
observable world through stimulation of the senses. Since Davidson bas shown that truth
plays an integral part in meaning, the more sure we are of the truth ofa statement, then
the better chance we have ofdetermining its meaning. Quine. however. places more
emphasis on "reference" to something, either the world, or sense perceptions of the
world, to account for meaning and the truth ofour sentences. But Quine has also shown
that reference is inscrutable, and that this inscrutability leads to ontological relativity.
Ontological relativity is not an option for Davidson. Relativity is a consequence of the
dualism. ofscheme and content that he is fighting against, and also precludes the
possibility of interpretation. An account ofunderstanding has to take a route that does
not lead to such consequences. It must give prime importance to "truth," and not
"reference."'ll
I hold that there are three main requirements for radical interpretation to take
place: i) language must be understood bolistically; ii} interpreters must apply the
principle ofcharity when interpreting, and; iii) the idiolect must be identified with
"language." Each of these requirements of interpretation are interdependent; one cannot
fully be understood without the other. For clarity. however, I will attempt to deal with
'I will deal with this more in chapters 4 and 5.
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each of these separately below. I will conclude by showing how they each depend on the
other.
There are many attempts to try to relate truth to meaning - to try to make the
meaning ofa sentence truth-functional. It is evident in the work ofFrege, Russell, and
the early Wingenstein. A major problem with this attempt, however, is the replacement
ofco-extensive terms in true statements that alters the truth value. Ibis is a problem for
Davidson. because, according to his philosophy, "meaning" is not much more than
extension. understood as a list ofsatisfaction relations that a specific term is included in.
A term with the same satisfaction relations can be substituted for another with those same
relations. But, ofcourse, ifone is not aware ofthose satisfaction relations, or is not
aware that the terms are coextensive, then one could attrihute different truth values to
different sentences.
This is essentially the point that Dummett makes in "What is a Theory of
Meaning?(I)." Dummett argues, using Frege's distinction between sense and reference,
that the sense ofa term can be different from its reference. The reference ofa term is its
extension; the sense ofa term is the inadequate grasp that a person has of this extension.
Since they are different, terms that are replaceable because oftheir coextensiveness at the
level of reference may not be replaceable at the level ofsense. This is evident in any true
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statement that attributes a false belief to a person, e.g., "George believes London is the
capital ofCanada" This statement is true because this is actually what George believes.
But ifwe replace "capital ofCanada" with "Ottawa" to result in the statement. "George
believes London is Ottawa.," we have produced a false statement:. because this is not what
George believes. Ifwe regard meaning as divided between sense and reference, then we
say that the referenceof~wa"and "capital ofCanada" are the same, wbereas the
sense that George gives to these terms is quite different.
For Davidson, the distinction betWeen sense and reference is a statement of the
problem ofcoextensive terms, not a solution to it. Davidson argues that the problems
have arisen in this area because philosophers are perplexed that two statements having the
same meaning could have different truth values. 1bis bas led some to abandon the notion
that meaning is truth-functional. Davidson suggests that instead of finding problems with
equivalent statements with different truth values, we should first question whether the
statements mean the same thing.
At this point we can see bow Davidson's ideas on charity and "language" playa
role. As I will sbow in more detail below, Davidson argues that wben there is
disagreement between two speakers, it is usually because ofmeaning, and not truth.
According to the principle ofcharity, we have to assume that if a person speaks a
language, then that person makes true statements by the sentences they use. IfGeorge
says that "London is the Capital ofCanada," then I have to assume that he is telling the
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truth. But ifwhat he says is true, he surely can't mean by "London," "capital," and
"Canada" what I mean. That is, the beliefs be bas about these things must be quite
different from the beliefs I have ifhis statement is to be taken as true. And in that
respect, his beliefs aren't different than mine about the same things. but rather, he bas the
same beliefs as me about different things. Davidson presents us with a thought
experiment which makes the point more clear:
Take as an example, how clear are we that the ancients - some ancients -
believed that the earth was flat? This earth? Well. this earth ofours is part ofthe
solar system. a system partly identified by the fact that it is a gaggle of large,
cool. solid bodies circling around a very large, hot star. Ifsomeone believes none
ofthis about the earth, is it certain that it is the earth that he is thinking about?
An answer is not called for. The point is made if this kind ofconsideration of
related beliefs can shake one's confidence that the ancients believed the earth was
flat.'
And ifwe accept this argument. which I will try to justify below, we have to accept the
claim that there is not a "language," say English. that we all try to speak, but. rather a
collection of idiolects. Everyone speaks their own language, they speak. true statements
when they usc it, and it is our task to radically interpret or understand them. This
eliminates the problem of substitution ofcoextensive tenns because ifwe substitute terms
that result in a change in truth-value, we can say that the terms were not coextensive,
even if in my language (idiolect) they were. So much for the problem of intensionality.
'Davidson. "Thought aod Talk," p. 168.
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There is a problem., however, with Davidson's formulation ofa truth·theory, with
its entailed T-sentences, that Fodor and Lepore call the "extensionality problem.... A
typical T-sentence, as has been repeatedly said, has the fonn,
(l) s is true if, and only if, p.
The form is biconditional; it is true on condition that both the left and right hand sides are
true. The problem hits one immediately: ifa-b is true because a is true and b is true.
then any true variable x could be put in place ofeither a or b, and the statement would
retain its truth. Since Davidson is using a: truth theory as a meaning theory. be is
concerned with finding a unique meaning for each statement How is this possible if, for
example, both,
(I) "'snow is white" is true if. and only if. snow is white,
and
(2) "snow is white" is true if. and only if. grass is green.
are formally true? How is it that we can say that (1) gives the correct interpretation and
(2) does not ifboth T-5entences are true?
Fodor and Lepore say that Davidson offers us three solutions. The first they call
the "compositionality solution." Compositionality is the claim that any true T-sentence
ofa language is composed ofelements derived from the axioms. The reason why T-
sentences are true is because the predicates are satisfied by the objects as outlined in the
'Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. Holism' A Shopner's Guide (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1992), p. 62.
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satisfaction relations as articulated in the axioms ofa truth theory. (2) is not aT-sentence
in my language because it cannot be derived from the axioms ofa truth theory
constructed for my language. Although by itself (2) is true, it is not in accordance with
the way the terms are used in the language. Even though both sides of the biconditional
are true, if it was the case that this T-sentence gave the truth conditions for that utterance,
it would have to reverberate all through the theory. "Snow'" satisfies "x is white," but it
also satisfies "x is cold." "x is made ofwatCf," etc. The truth conditions of these
sentences, the right-hand side of the biconditional, would also have to demonstrate these
changes. That is, if"snow is white" is true ifgrass is green. then, in the truth theory that
this theorem is derived from, sentences like "snow is cold" would have to have trUth
conditions that show how "snow" is related to grass as a name in that language. There
would have to be T-sentences that, for example, looked like this:
(3) "snow is cold" if, and only if, grass is dry.
If we were deriving sentences like (2) and (3) from the axioms, we would realize that
either: i) the truth theory is completely wrong, or; ii) we arc dealing with a language that
is foreign and not couched in the theory.
T-sentences are composed from the axioms ofa truth theory. The theorems of a
truth theory are true solely because they have been derived from the axioms. To see ifthe
truth theory actually gives correct interpretations, one tests the axioms, not the theorems
that are derived from them. The compositionality solution that Davidson gives for the
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extensionality problem is what I prefer to call semantic holism. The words ofa language
are all interconnected in such a way that they depend upon the rest of the language to
work, and influence the meaning ofall the other terms. "White," "cold," etc., are all
predicates that are related to "snow" in such a way that they have an effect on the
meaning of the tenn. It is the inter-relation between all the names, predicates, satisfaction
relations. quantificationallogic, etc., that gives a language its interconnected or holistic
character. The term "snow" is defined precisely by its relation to the whole language. It
cannot be understood or used truthfully outside ofthat context.
But the reason why these terms are interconnected this way in a language is
because the things that they name, e.g., snow, have the same relations that are found in a
language. The truth theory for English entails that "snow is white" because it is the case
that snow is white. I call this epistemic holism. What I believe about snow, cold. and
whiteness has an impact on what I think. about, for example, snowmen and winter days.
Each beliefdepends upon a large number ofother beliefs and entails many others. This
holistic belief system is mirrored by a holistic language:9
If someone is glad that, or notices that, or remembers that, or knows that, the gun
is loaded, the he must believe that the gun is loaded. Even to wonder whether the
90r is it the other way around? (s language mirrored in the belief system?
Davidson's claim is that there is not a dualism here. One side does not shape or
determine the other. They mirror each other and develop together in a circular or even
hermeneutic fashion. Davidson says that once we adopt his method of interpretation, we
erase "the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around the world
generally." cf. "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," pp. 445-446. I examine Davidson's
hermeneutic tendencies in chapter 4.
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gun is loaded. requires the belie~ for example, that a gun is a weapon. that it is a
more or less enduring physical object. and SO on. There are good reasons for not
insisting on any particular list ofbeliefs that are needed ita creature is to wonder
whether the gun is loaded. Nevertheless, it is necessary that there be endless
interlocked beliefs. The system ofsuch beliefs identifies a thought by locating it
in a logical and epistemic space.10
Particular beliefs belong to a much larger web ofbeliefs. You can't have one belief
without depending on many others, in the same way that you can't declare aT-sentence
true unless it is derived from a truth theory. What prevents sentences like (2) and (3)
from intruding into a belief system is that belief systems are. by their nature, true. The
jump from epistemic holism to objective truth is ensured by the principle ofcharity.
Fodor and Lepore see the principle ofcharity as the second solution to the extensionality
problem. lI r will further deal with c:barity below.
The third solution to the extensionality problem is called the "nomologicity
solution.,,\1 lbis is the claim that each T-sentence which is derived from a truth theory
should be regarded as a law. This follows directly from Davidson's claim that the first
step in radical interpretation is determination of the logical grid of the object language.
That is, the first step in radical interpretation is to try to determine, as best we can, what
the words, predicates, operators, etc., are for the native's language. This process results
with the determination ofmeaning for general terms, i.e., the interpreter will be able to
lOOavidson. '"Thought and Talk." pp. 156-157.
IIFodor and Lepore, p. 93.
l'2fodor and Lepore, p. 84.
78
determine which sentences the native always takes to be true. After we have discovered
the general use ofthe terms in the language, and positing these as nomological laws, we
move to indexical situations where truth and meaning depend upon context. and then to
the cases where there is disagreement as to the trUth ofpanieuJar utterances. lbis is
different than Quine's theory of radical translation.
Quine encourages the interpreter to first start with the observation sentences
(sentences with an indexical element) and then work. towards determination of the value
of the standing sentences and finally to reconstructing logical form. Ifwe were to take
Quine's advice and interpret observation sentences first and use these to constitute the
axioms of a truth theory, we eouJd ron into cases, derived from anomalous empirical
situations, where an axiom gives us a satisfaction relation that violates the general use of
a term. Such axioms could lead us to derive sentences from a truth theory like (2) and
(3). Taking Davidson's advice and determining the logical grid ofa language first,
anomalous empirical situations don't affect the axioms ofa truth theory and hence do not
yield sentences like (2) and (3).
It must be noted too that Fodor and Lepore do not hold that the three solutions
which Davidson gives to the extensionality problem are adequate. They argue that
language is neither holistic, nor is it radicalJy interpretable. I hold that their arguments
against Davidson, however, disregard some ofbis fundamental principles for the
possibility of radical interpretation.
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Fodor and Lepore argue that we can imagine a language that is composed of
sentences with nothing like the structure that our language has. They encourage us to
imagine a language that is Dot composed ofsingle terms and predicates following a
quantificationallogical system, but rather one where there is a single sound or mark for
each simple sentence. Fodor and Lepore develop a thougbt experiment where we
compare two children: one is a child from earth who speaks English. and one is a child
from some other planet who speaks at the same proficiency ofthe child from earth but
with this alternate language. They write:
But now consider a child who isjusl like this one in his speech (and inferential
and, generally, cognitive) dispositions except that, whenever child I would use
"Snow is white" to say that snow is white, child 2 uses the unstructured
expression '·Alfred;" and similarly, whenever child 1 would use ''That's snow" to
say that that's snow, child 2 uses the unstructured expression "Sam;" and
whenever child 1 would use '"That's cold" to say that that's cold, child 2 uses the
unstructured expression '"Mary;" and so forth. IJ
There are clearly two related problems with the possibility ofa language along the lines
of the one utilized by child 2.
Firstly, it would appear that the child would have an infinity ofsentences to learn
if the language was the same for even the complex sentences. like "Snow is cold and
wet." But this seems to be beyond the capacities ofa finite creature. And if it was the
case that a language user could accommodate such a capacity, it seems unlikely that
anyone would be able to interpret or learn that particular language. even an interpreter
llFodor and Lepore. pp. 65,,(;6.
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with a matching infinite capacity. That interpreter would have no recourse as how to be
able to compare the utterances of the speaker with the conditions under which they are
true. But a language that is not learnable is not a language at all. This is, ofcourse, the
conclusion that Wittgenstein comes to in his "private language argument." A private
language, he argues, is one that could not be understood or learned by anyone else. It is
the absence of these attributes that make it private; but it is also these attributes that make
it a language. "Private language" is an oxymoron.
The second problem with Fodor's thought experiment is that ifchild 2's language
is "non-compositional" at the level ofsimple sentences (sentences in om language
composed ofone single place predicate) then it seems that, ifthe language is learnable-
which it must be if it is to be a language at all - it must have complex sentences that are
composed (through roles ofconjunction, disjunction, etc.) of these simple sentences.
This proves the claim that language is holistic. For example, ifchild 2 wanted to say
"snow is white and cold," she would have to conjoin "Alfred" and "Mary" into a sentence
like "Alfred and Mary." But, clearly, sentences like"Alfred and Mary" (in the language
ofchild 2) are compositional, learnable, entailed by a finite number ofparts and, hence,
semantically holistic. The only difference seems to be that child 2 would have a much
larger axiomatic base in the truth theory for the language she uses.
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34 The; Principle; ofCbarity
The radical interpreter does not have access to the beliefsystem (which I have
argued is epistemically holistic; each beliefdepends on other beliefs in the system) ofthe
speaker that she is trying to interpreL The interpreter only has access to the external
world and the public speech dispositions of the speaker. Many thinkers have held that the
belief system is internal and private to the individual and not accessible by interpreters. It
is this point ofview that has led philosophers to posit claims ofepistemic relativism. If
the private belief system afthe speaker is different than ours, then the language that she
speaks will have meanings that are also quite different than ours. Such theories bave led
Kuhn and Feyerabend to talk of incommensurability between languages.
Incommensurability is the result of positing an intermediary entity (manifesting itself
here as a private belief system or conceptual scheme) between the beliefs a person has
about the world, and the world itself. That is, there are different things that make the
sentences of the different languages true. It is that philosophy which Davidson
characterizes as defined by the third dogma of scheme and contenL
Davidson, however, sees a different kind of link between epistemology and
semantics - he holds that they mirror each other. One does not shape or detennine the
other. What one's words mean. and how one understands the utterances ofanother, is
based upon the events and objects in the world that partly caused that understanding and
aided in the development of the truth theory. The condition under which a statement is
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true (the meaning of the statement) is the same thing which causes one to hold a certain
belief and develop a truth theory for another language. lbis conviction, he argues, is
demonstrated by the fact that you cannot interpret the utterances ofanother individual
unless you also interpret the beliefs ofthe individual. One way to fonnalize this is to say
that in a T-sentence. the left-hand side of the biconditional is the utterance to be
interpreted, and the right-hand side, the truth condition, is the belief that is uttered. Both
the interpreter and the speaker have to know that those words on the left are true if, and
only if, they mean (or state the condition oftruth for) the beliefon the right For
example, in the T-sentence:
(4) "Snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white,
both the interpreter and the speaker must know that those words express a true belief, and
that that belief is that snow is white. But it is clear that any words could be used to
express any belief. It is this fact that separates different languages - they use different
sounds or signs to express the same beliefs. The words that express the belief, for
example, that snow is white. is different in English than in German or in Japanese. It
could be said then that interpretation is the pairing ofbeliefs (or the conditions that make
an utterance true) with specific words.
The problem. an unresolvable one according to the relativists, is that we don't
have access to the beliefs of the speaker. Ifa speaker privately believed that snow was
blue, it appears that the only way I could discover this is ifshe told me. But if we spoke
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different languages, this information could never be conveyed. 1bat is, I wouldn't be
able to interpret because I don't have access to her beliefs. The dilemma is that we can't
interpret belief without knowing the language, and we can't interpret the language
without knowing the beliefs of the speaker. Davidson's solution is to suggest that we be
charitable in interpreting the utterances ofothers. By "charity," Davidson suggests that
we make the assumption that what the speaker says is true.
The need for charity at the semantic level is obvious. Since Davidson argues that
"meaning" is best understood as "truth coDditioo," it is clear that to interpret the
utterances ofa speaker we have to assume that she believes that what she says is true.
But this doesn't really solve any problems:
[I]f we merely know that someone holds a certain sentence true, we know neither
what he means by the sentence nor what beliefhis holding it true represents. His
holding a sentence true is the vector oftwo folCes: the problem of interpretation is
to abstract from the evidence a workable theory ofmeaning and an ao:eptable
theory ofbelief. '4
We can imagine two people, who speak different languages, stuck on an island together.
One, for example, could believe that snow is blue, say so in their language. without the
other able to interpret it. The reason for the failure of interpretation is not that the
interpreter doesn't recognize that the speaker holds that her sentence is true, but rather
that the interpreter cannot match up the speaker's true sentence with any sentence that the
interpreter holds true.
l4Davidsoo, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 196.
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Interpretation is only possible if the interpreter is charitable at the cpistem.ic level.
That is, when interpreting, one has to assume not only that the speaker believes that what
she says is true, but also that it is, in fact, true. But what the speaker bolds to be true
cannot. then, be any different than what the interpreter balds to be true. Regardless of
what language you speak, for example, you will believe that snow is white, ice is cold,
the ball is round, etc. \$ [fyou do not believe these things, we cannot say that you have a
different language or belief structure. but rather that you don't have a language or belief
structure at all. Davidson says:
Ifwe cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a
creature as revealing a set ofbeliefs largely consistent and true by our own
standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational. as having beliefs.
or as saying anything.16
By assuming that all speakers have the same set of beliefs, we can hold belief steady
while we solve for meaning. The interpreter no longer bas the double task of interpreting
beliefs and utterances. The speaker's beliefs are the same as mine.
The principle ofcharity reveals. however. that we have a conception oftrutb that
precedes any definition relativized to particular languages. This revelation shows that
although truth can only be defined for particular languages, truth is not relative, but
U11lis is not to suggest that there are a specific set ofbeliefs that must be shared
between speaker and interpreter, but rather that, in general, a large majority of the beliefs
that we do share are usually uncontroversial in nature and, for the most part, about the
macroscopic objects oftbe world that we both share.
l6Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 137.
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objective. Chapter 2 indicated that. in Davidson's modified meaning theory, "truth" is
relativized to.a speaker, time and utterance. Since a language is the idiolect ofa
particular speaker, as I will argue in the next section, truth is relative to a language. But
once it is shown that a language cannot be a language unless it is interpretable, and since
interpretation requires charity, the relativized notion oftruth is, in most respects, identical
to objective or absolute truth. Radical interpretation requires that we have a conception
of truth that surpasses that ofparticular languages. Otherwise, we would only be able to
interpret those who speak: our own language. As Bjarn Ramberg says:
The concept oftruth that underlies a theory of interpretation is a concept of
absolute truth..... It is by virtue of this trans-linguistic notion that [the interpreter]
is able to formulate an empirical theory that in specifying bow the truth-
conditions ofsentences ofL are determined by their parts - that is. in
characterizing the truth predicate of the language - actually interprets the
language. 17
Prior to determining what truth is for a particular language, that is, prior to interpreting a
language (it's the same process), we already must have a conception oftruth.
Ofcourse, by assuming that the speaker is speaking the truth, Davidson does not
mean to eliminate the notions oferror and mistake in our judgements and utterances. His
point is rather that we cannot make mistakes or errors unless we already have a belief
system that largely converges with the way things are. Coupled with this, we cannot
interpret someone as having a belief system that mostly gets things wrong. To get a
beliefwrong, you have to have a system ofbeliefs that is mostly correct.
''Ramberg, pp. 76-77.
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For example, ifyou thought (incorrectly) that Jupiter was the furthest planet from
the sun, you still had to (correctly) Imow that Jupiter was a planet. that the sun was a star,
that the planets orbited the sun., etc. A false beliefhas no meaning unless it is supported
by a large number of true beliefs. [t is impossible 10 interpret someone as having mostly
false beliefs, or beliefs that are largely different than oW' own. The reason for this is that:
False beliefs tend to undermine the identification ofthe subject matter; to
undennine, therefore, the validity ofa description of the beliefas being about that
subject. And so, in tum, false beliefs undermine the claim. that a connected belief
is false.... To put it another way: the more things a believer is right about, the
sharper his errors are. Too much mistake simply blurs the fOCUS. 11
Davidson's conclusion is that "we can dismiss a priori the chance ofmassive error."·9
The principle ofcharity is a transcendental principle20 which is, so to speak, forced on us.
In that sense, as Davidson says, the principle is not charitable at all, but rather a condition
for the possibility of interpretation, understanding and communication. Ramberg agrees
with this transcendentalist reading of the principle ofcharity:
The principle ofcharity, on the other band, offers no advice to us as interpreters,
it yields no interpretational strategy. It is not a heuristic device, nor is it,
accordingly, some thing we could get by without: it is a condition oftbe
possibility of interpretation.21
IIDavidson, 'Thought and Talk," p. 168.
l'Davidson, "Thought and Talk," pp. 168-169.
20[ understand "transcendental.. here as "condition for the possibility ofsuch-and·
such."
21Ramberg, p. 74.
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The conclusion from this a priori principle ofcharity is that radical interpretation
should result in a truth theory that is mostly trUe. lfthere are sets ofT-sentcoces that are
true ifcertain false conditions are met" then we can authoritatively say that the theory is
incorrect and we need. to go back to the drawing board. Let's say, for example, that we
developed a truth theory for a language that entailed the truth condition, for a specific
bcld-nue uncrance, that snow, in general, is blue. We recognize that this is a falsc belief.
and we have three options to account for it Firstly, we could say that the cpistcmic
judgement ofthc speaker is incorrect.~ is, there is something wrong with the
faculties of the speaker and she has all sorts ofwrong beliefs; she lives in a different
world. Secondly, we could say that my cpistemic judgements are incorrect I'm the one
who bas things wrong. Thirdly, and this is what the principle ofcharity counsels, we
could say that we have developed a truth theory that is faulty. A trUth theory which
entails that utterances arc true ifa falsc belief is held true, e.g., snow is blue, are to be
reformulated. The problem. docs not lie in the judgements oftbe speaker or interpreter,
but rather in the formulation of the truth theory. IfODC wants a correct interpretation, one
bas to develop a theory that maximizes the amount oftruc statements uttered by the
speaker and optimizes the amount ofagreement bctwccn the speaker and the interpreter.Z2
nofcourse, it could be the case that circumstances will arise where snow is blue,
or any other colour, e.g., blue paint spilled on snow. But that is not what the T-scntence:
(5) s is true if, and only if, snow is blue,
states. s is not a demonstrative assertion, it is a claim about snow in general. And in
general, snow is not blue, but white. Ibis is where the nomologicity solution, as referred
to earlier by Fodor and Lepore, comes in. T-sentenccs that do not have the open variables
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Some critics, however, hold that the principle ofcharity gives too much credit to
the speakers ofa foreign language by assuming that they are, for the most part, speakers
of the truth. These criticsll cite, and invent" many examples where an interpreter gives a
correct interpretation ofa native's utterances of incorrect beliefs. Such examples, they
argue, prove that the principle ofcharity is not the principle that is necessary for
interpretation. Grandy, for one, argues that when we interpret the utterances ofanother
we use what he calls the principle ofhumanity. This principle counsels that we count the
speaker as being rational in most matters;and not necessarily correct. 1bat is,. the speaker
has a system of reasoning, not a system ofbeliefs as Davidson urges, that is the same as
OllIS. The relationship between beliefs is the same as mine, even if the beliefs are not. If
the speaker bas beliefs that she holds to be true, but are in fact incorrect, then given that
she is reasonable, I should be able to predict what actions she would take given them. I
for time and circumstance on the right-hand side of the biconditional. for example, like:
(4) "snow is white" is true if. and only if, snow is white.
are laws about the meaning ofusoow" and "white." T-sentences are empirical
generalizations ofwhat a speaker holds to be true generally. It is the general case that
gives the best chance ofdetermining the meaning afthe words that a speaker uses. The
case where snow is blue because of spilled paint cannot be grounds for the formulation of
a truth theory. This is why Davidson requires, as I said above, that we determine logical
constants prior to the meaning of observation sentences.
23The critics that I am specifically referring to are: Colin McGinn.. "Charity,
Interpretation, and Belief," The JOW7lQ/ a/Philosophy, LXXIV (1977), pp. 521-535;
Richard Grandy, "Reference, Meaning, and Belief," The Journal ofPhilosophy, LXX
(1973), pp. 439-452, and; Steven Lukes, "Relativism and its Place," in Rationality and
~ cds. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1982), pp. 26t-305.
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essentially put myself in her shoes; ifl held those beliefs. then I would also hold these
beliefs by rules of induction., let's say, that are necessarily common to both ofus.2•
Davidson., using the principle ofcharity, says we must abandon truth theories that
attribute too much error to the individual we are interpreting. He argues that we want
theories that optimize the amount ofagreement between us and the speaker. Grandy
argues that we must abandon theories that attribute a reasoning systems that is too
different from our own:
!fa translation tells us that the other person's beliefs and desires are connected in
a way that is too bizarre for us to make sense of, then the translation is useless for
our purposes.2S
There is no need, argues Grandy, to alter the meanings I attribute to a speaker's
words in order to make her a speaker oftruth. Le., there is no need to invoke the principle
ofcharity in interpretation. To err is human; it is no strike against an interpretation that
2'7be fact that we share common rules, e.g.• induction, makes interpretation
possible (the principle ofhumanity). Davidson holds that interpretation is possible
because we share common beliefs (the principle ofcharity). These two different
conceptions ofthe conditions of interpretation entail two different conceptions ofwhat an
agent is. Compare Lukes (p. 265):
The necessary model ofthe agent appears to require at least that those whose beliefs are 10 be
identified are in general behaviourally rational in their actions and that they are, in general,
sensitive 10 deductive argument and inductive evidence (though the degree to which these
propensities an: developed will depend on simation and opportunities).
with Davidson ("Radical Interpretation.," p. 137):
{(we cannot fmd a way to intcrprctthe uttenmccs and other bchaviour ofa creature as revealing a
set ofbeliefs largely consistent and lrUe by our own standards. we have no reason to count that
creature as rational, as having bclie£S,oru saying anything.
2SGrandy, p. 443.
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we attribute a false belief to a speaker. McGinn even goes as far as to say that we can
develop a meaning theory by attributing faIse beliefs to a speaker:
For we may equally provide a basis for deriving the meanings ofsentences held
true by uncharitably imputingftlse beliefs to our speaker. We simply suppose,
with or without good reason, that he has made a mistake and is expressing a false
belief with a correspondingly false sentence. Falsity holds beliefjust as constant
as truth, and affords an equally systematic rule for correlating sentences ofour
language with sentences of theirs in such a way (it is hoped) that the fonner will
serve to give meanings oCthe latter.u
I disagree, as I'm SU1C Davidson would. with these critics on all points. Of
course, the desire on the part of the critics to find some principle that preserves
interpretation, but nonetheless makes room for error, is a sound one. But it is based upon
a misunderstanding ofwhat Davidson means when he says we must "count them right in
most maners. ''11 The principle ofcharity is used to develop a truth theory, in the course
of radical interpretation, not in everyday empirical situations.
Davidson uses the example ofyou and a friend looking out to sea while a ketch is
sailing by.2' If your friend utters "What a beautiful yawl," we have two possibilities in
attributing this "error" to her. Firstly, it could be that she has made an empirical mistake;
that is, the ketch is probably too far away for proper identification, or there is too much
fog in the harbour, etc. But this type ofmistake is not one that interests Davidson, nor
"McGinn, p. 523.
27Davidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 197.
UOavidson, "On the Very Ideaofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 196.
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has it any bearing on his philosophy of language. When interpreting. one has to be aware
of the fact that the speaker may make an empirical mistake. But these types ofmistakes
should not factor into the attribution ofextensions to certain words. It would be foolish
to interpret a speaker as holding that ketches are "sailing vessels with the mizen-mast
stepped forward of the rudder, except in situations where the vessel is too far away to tell
ifthe mizen is stepped forward or aft of the rudder, in which case it doesn't matter what
kind ofa vessel it is. it is still referred to as a ketch." In general, empirical mistakes
cannot factor into the meaning ofa term.. "1bis is why, as I have said earlier,29 it is
Davidson's contention that the first step in radical interpretation is detennination of the
logical grid of the language rather than the determination oftbe meaning ofobservation
sentences. The interpreter first determines what the sentences ofa language, in general,
mean (Le., determines the conditions under which they are generally true) and then
determines what a particular sentence on a particular occasion means.
The second possibility is that the speaker always refers to ketches as "yawls." In
this case, there is not an empirical mistake, but a difference in language.JO It is the second
case that requires charity. You cannot accuse your friend ofbeing incorrect, in the same
29See above, pp. 66ff.
30At least this is what Davidson argues. Dummett, and I think Grandy and
company agree. that the speaker is not using a different language, but that she is mistaken
about the language that she is using. She is a speaker oftbe English language; and if she
is going to use English correctly, then she has to use the word "ketch" this way. I deal
with this debate in section 3.5.
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way that you cannot accuse a Francophone ofbeing incorrect when she utters "chien"
when referring to a dog. Both speakers use different sounds or marks to mean the same
thing. If a truth theory was developed for my friend's language, "yawl" would have the
same extension as "ketch" does in mine. It is impossible a priori to be mistaken at this
level.
The only other criticism against charity which needs to be considered is
McGinn'5'1 claim that we could just as easily develop a meaning theory for an individual
by counting her incorrect in most matters"and attributing false beliefs to her. McGinn
holds that holding beliefs false is just as good a constant indicator in determining
meaning as holding them true. Ofcourse, he doesn't recommend that this is an efficient
way to interpret, but his point is that it will work, and this fact alone is enough to show
that the principle ofcharity is not a condition for the possibility of interpretation.
McGinn's claim is completely absurd. Let's say that (want to interpret a native's
utterance, s. According to charity, I assume that the speaker holds that the sentence s is
true, and I assume also that the belief expressed by s is in fact true. Since I assume we
have the same beliefs, a process of trial and error, most likely starting with immediate
empirical surroundings, will lead to a theory where we can pair together sentences that we
both hold true. According to McGinn, in interpreting one doesn't have to assume that sis
true. And ifs is not true, then the speaker has a belief{a held-true sentence) that is in fact
31Above, p. 88.
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false. Here is the difficulty: using charity, there is only one solution32 when trying to pair
true sentences ofdifferent languages. But, ifwe follow McGinn, there would be an
infinity ofsolutions. All we have to do is substitute false sentences on the right hand side
of the T·sentence like follows:
(F) s is true if. and only if, q,
where q is a false sentence. Ifs is true when q is false, there would be an endless number
ofpossible interpretations - as many interpretations as there are false sentences.
McGinn's interpreter cannot revert to the holistic and compositional nature oflanguage,
as Davidson does in response to the extensionality problem, because he doesn't have a
starting point from which to interpret. To hold that a person has beliefs that are false by
your standards is to hold that that person has an alternative or incommensurable
conceptual scheme. Kuhn and Feyerabend argue that translation is not possible between
such schemes, while Davidson denies that there is such a thing as an alternative
conceptual scheme (if there is, we certainly wouldn't recognize it). It seems that McGinn
bolds the absurd position, one that not even Kuhn and Feyerabend would hold, that
interpretation is possible between incommensurable schemes.
32According to Quine there could be many soluti~nsbecause translation is
indeterminate. Davidson agrees with Quine that translation (or interpretation) is
indeterminate, but he doesn't think that it has too much ofan effect on the development
ofa truth theory as a whole. Quine holds that indeterminacy is a crucial concern because
it leads to ontological relativity. For Davidson, as I am trying to show in this thesis,
ontological relativity is, in principle, impossible.
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Ofcourse, Davidson is not denying that it is impossible to make mistakes, to have
mistaken beliefs. or to interpret a person that has a wrong belief. It is the cause of
mistakes that Davidson argues needs to be clarified. Davidson gives a very natmalist
explanation ofthe mistakes people make. I gave the example earlier about an obstructed
view leading an individual to mistakenly think a ketch was a yawl. Other mistakes could
result from mistaken calculations, incorrect training or education, or hasty
generalizations. Mistakes, however, do not occur because ofdifferent conceptual
schemes or different empirical content.
It is the possibility ofmistake that separates beliefs from truths. Davidson's point
is that you cannot base radical interpretation solely on mistakes and false beliefs. A
mistake makes sense, or can be interpreted as a mistake. only after there has been much
agreement on more fundamental or basic truths. As I already pointed out, too many
mistakes tend to blur the focus of the content ofthe belief that you have. The reason that
most philosophers tend to miss this point is that the things upon which there is a lot of
agreement are things that we normally don't discuss. They are the ordinary and everyday
beliefs that we don't even bother to question:
Making sense of the utterances and behaviour ofothers, even their most aberrant
behaviour. requires us to find a great deal of reason and truth in them. To see too
much unreason on the part ofothers is simply to undermine our ability to
understand what it is they are so unreasonable about. If the vast amount of
agreement on plain matters that is assumed in communication escapes notice. it's
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because the shared truths are too many and too dull to bear mentioning. What we
want to talk about is what's new, surprising, ordisputcd.'l
35 The Primacy orlhe Idiolect
A direct consequence ofradica1 interpretation, based on the principle ofcharity, is
that meaning is Dot to be found in a community based., conventional and rule-govemed
language, but rather in the idiolect of the individual. It is the individual who assigns
meaning to the terms that she uses. This point is clearly seen in the example ofthe ketch
and yawl that I used above. Since the two speakers use different words to express the
same meaning, then it has to be said that the two speakers speak two different languages.
But these languages they speak. are not languages studied by any linguisL A linguist
would probably say that both speakers speak English, but one is using a word ofit
incorrectly. Davidson's point is that you are not using language incorrectly ifmcaning is
being conveyed to the listener, regardless of bow you distort what is typically thought to
be standard use.
Davidson says that we mtm make a distinction between the standard meaning
(say, the dictionary meaning) ofa word. and what a speaker on a particular occasion
means by that word. In many respects this is the same distinction that Humpty Dumpty
was trying to make in this famous dialogue with Alice:
llDavidson, "Beliefand the Basis ofMeaning,.. in Inquiries jnto Tnrth and
1nlolmJlllilm, p. 153.
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"And only one for birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you!"
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,''' Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Ofcourse you don't - till I tell
you. 1meant. 'there's 8 nice knockdown argument for you! '"
"But 'glory' doesn't mean '8 nice knockdown argument, '" Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means
just what rchoose it to mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's
what the question is.")01
Davidson basically agrees with the position Humpty Dumpty takes in this
exchange. Words can mean whatever a person wants them to mean as long as the speaker
knows she will be interpreted by her listener as meaning such-and-such by those words.
When different words have the same meaning we can say that there are two different
languages. What a person means by the words that they use is called the first or literal
meaning of the word (or sentence). This first meaning is distinguished from 8 standard
meaning. A standard meaning is the conventional use of8 word in 8 community based.
language. Most times the standard meaning and the first meaning are identical. When
the two types ofmeaning are identical then communication proceeds without radical
interpretation; that is, the interpreter can use the truth theory ofher own language to
interpret the speaker. She does not have to develop 8 truth theory from scratch.
The reason that Alice didn't get the first meaning of"glory" was that there was no
way for her to know that "a nice knockdown argument" was the meaning that Humpty
34Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures jn Wondl:r1and and In Through thl: I ookjng_
QJ.,. (Racine: The Western Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 164-165.
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Dumpty intended. And. presumably, since Humpty Dumpty knew that Alice would not
grasp this meaning, he could not have meant by "glory" a nice knockdown argument.
What it appears he meant to do was to instigate an argument or at least a
misunderstanding. But once she is aware of this fact, whether through direct indications
by Humpty Dumpty or through her own ingenwty (radical interpretation), the
communication offtrst meaning is possible. For communication to take place between
two people, both participants must know what the other means (must know the truth
conditions) by the statements that she uses. The speaker must also know that she will be
interpreted a certain way. If she knows she won't be interpreted as meaning something
by using particular words or signs, then it cannot be said that that was what she meant by
those words - or at least it wasn't her intention to convey that meaning.
Davidson frames this distinction in terms of truth theories. Before entering a
conversation with someone, an individual has a prior i.dea (a prior truth theory) of how
she will be interpreted and how to interpret. Whenever I enter a store and order a coffee,
for example, I assume that the cashier will understand the meaning of my words, and that
I will understand her words along the lines of the prior theory that I have. I have a prior
idea ofhow the conversation will develop - most likely along the lines ofstandard usage.
If, however, the prior theory does not work, then I have to develop a passing theory. (JJe
always have a passing theory when speaking or interpreting, but when communication
succeeds without problems - i.e., by convention - the passing theory acts as prior
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theory.) A passing truth theory is developed in much the same way that one radically
intc:tprets:
For the bearer, the prior theory expresses how be is prepared to interpret an
utterance ofthe speaker, while the passing theory is how be do<s int<rpret the
utterance. For the speaker, the prior theory is what be believes the interpreter's
prior theory to be. while his passing theory is the theory be inIends the interpreter
to use."
In order for one to UDderstand what Humpty Dumpty means. for example, one bas to
develop a passing theory that entails, for example. this T-sentence:
(7) "That's glory for you" is true if, and only u: that's a nice knockdown
ugumeoL
It is the convergence ofpassing theories that ensures that communication, the sharing ofa
common meaning, is achieved.
It is also the convergence ofpassing theories that demarcates a particular
language. The truth theory that entails (7), and is used and understood, respectively, by a
speaker and interpreter, is what Davidson wants to call a language. When two people
have the same passing theory, it could be said that they have the same language.
Davidson says:
Perhaps we can give content to the idea of two people "baving the same
language" by saying that they tend to converge on passing theories. degree of
relative frequency ofconvergence would then be a measure ofsimilarity of
language. What use can we find. however, for the concept ofa language? We
could hold that any theory on which a speaker and interpreter converge is a
language; but then there would be a new language for every unexpected tum in
)jDavidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 442.
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the conversation.. and languages could not be leamed and no one would want to
master most ofthem.16
What most linguists and philosophers prefer to call a language (a set ofrules and
vocabulary that a community uses, often most clearly outlined in a dictionary), is a
secondary notion; it is secondary to the idiolect. This idea ofa common and conventional
language is constructed in order to allow for ease ofcommunication without the hassle of
radical interpretation - that is, without the hassle ofdeteImining the meaning of
utterances ofa speaker from scratch. But.ifone is interested in the philosophically
interesting question oftbe necessary and sufficient conditions ofcommunication (as
Davidson is), then the conclusion has to be that:
... there is no such thing as a language., not ifa language is anything like what
many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing
to be learned. mastered or born with. We must give up the idea ofa clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases.]7
Michael Dummett finds Davidson's arguments and. conclusions absurd.31
16Davidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 445.
J'Davidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 446.
JSOummett, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson
and Hacking," in Truth and Interpretation' Perspectives on the Philosophy QfDonald
~ pp. 459-476. There is in this essay an amusing paragraph (p. 465) where
Dummen attacks Davidson's conclusion that there is no such thing as a language (in a
style reminiscent afDr. Johnson's refutation ofBerkeley's subjective idealism) by citing
that there are languages in the world. I quote:
The occum:nce ofthe phenomena lhaI interest Davidson is incontrovertible: but how can an
investigation ofthem lead to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a language? Oppressive
govcmments, such as those of Franco and Mussolini, attempt to suppress minority languages;
under such regimes teachers punish children for speaking those languages in the playground. In
India, crowds demonstrate against the proposal to make Hindi the sole official language. Bretons,
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Dummett thinks ofbimselfas taking the standpoint which Alice does in ber debate with
Humpty Dumpty:
The view I am wging against Davidson is an adaption ofAlice's picture,
according to which words have meanings in themselves, independently of
speakers.... They have them. in virtue ofbelonging to the language. and hence in
virtue of tile existence ofa social practice."
Words and meaning belong to the social practice ofa language. Dummett then goes on to
argue that it is conventioDS that constitute a social practice. .....[TI0 repudiate the role of
convention is to deny that language is in f:his sense a practice.n40
1ms debate is directly related to the one I outlined between. Dummett and
Davidson regarding the purported distinction made by Frege between sense and
reference.· l Dummett argues that there is a theory of truth for a language ofwhich we all
have an idiosyncratic OT imperfect grasp - the theory ofsense. For Davidson. the theory
oftIUtb and reference are coUapsed into one theory; or to put it better. the theory ofsense
is the theory of truth. In this conception there cannot exist an imperfect grasp of the
meaning ofa word. IJcnowwhat I mean by everything that I say. [fyou want to
Ca1alans. Basques aDd Kurds e.:b. declare that their language is the soul ortheireulture. The
opc:ion docs not seem to be open ttl us ttl declare thai: such governments and such peoples are
under an illusioo. dlat there is anytbina: they are suppressing.
As will emerge. this claim is irrelevant to the issue.
19Dummett, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson
and Hacking," p. 473.
4OJ)ummett,. "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson
and Hacking," p. 474.
4lAbove, PI'. 51-54.
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understand the meaning ofmy utterance., then you have to grasp my meaning. and not the
standard or conventional meaning of the words I use. You have to develop a truth theory
for these particular utterances. The crux ofDummett's position is that to grasp the
meaning ofanother's utterances., wt: have to be involved in the social practice of
language, and social practices are necessarily conventional.
Davidson argues, however, that while communication is a social practice, it is DOt
the case that social practices are necessarily conventional. Davidson admits that most
social practices are conventional, but this is out ofa desire for efficiency, ease, and other
social pressures, not out ofnecessity. Davidson admits that there are pressures on an
individual to use a word as everyone else does:
These pressures are social and very real. They do not, however. as far as I can
divine. have anything to do with meaning or communication. Using a word in a
non-standard way out of ignorance may be afaux pas in the same way that using
the wrong fork at a dinner party is, and it bas as little to do with communication
as using the wrong fork bas to do with nourishing oneself. given that the word is
understood and the fork works:u
Ifconvention is not necessary, he concludes, it should play no role in the philosophical
account ofcommunicatioD.
To substantiate the negative claim that convention does not playa necessary role
in communication, I would suggest all that is required is a counter~ple to the claim
that conventions are necessary. This is easy enough. 1bink ofthe case of radical
42Davidson, "'The Social Aspect ofLanguage," in The Philosophy ofMjchael
~ cds. Brian McGuiness et al. (Dordrecbt: The Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1994), p. 9.
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interpretation. All that is required for radical interpretation to take place are two
individuals and a common world. [fboth parties want to communicate (even though they
come from different languages) they have to devise a theory where the utterances ofone
person will be able to be interpreted by the other. The fact that they come from different
backgrounds precludes the possibility of interpretation by convention. So if
interpretation is possible between speakers ofdifferent languages, then Davidson's
negative claim is proven. It is clear that this type of interpretation is possible, and
happens all the time when people with different languages come together. Davidson
wants to make the stronger claim that it is not only speakers from different "languages"
that radically interpret and disregard the need for conventions, but also speakers of the
same language. Even people from the same "language" have different linguistic
backgrounds:
It could even happen that every speaker from the start had his own quite unique
way of speaking. Something approaching this is in fact the case, ofcourse.
Different speakers have different stocks ofproper names, different vocabularies,
and attach somewhat different meanings to words:(J
Recognizing this fact and using Davidson's contention that meaning is primarily found in
the idiolect of the individual gives the philosopher of language a means ofaccounting for
jokes, puns. irony, malapropisms, "slips ofthe tongue," etc.
°Davidson, "Communication and Convention," pp. 276-277.
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36 ConclusioD
Chapter 2 gave us an indication ofwhat conditions a meaning theory. fonnulated
along the lines ofa Tarskian truth theory with Davidson's relevant modifications, would
have to meet. The primary conditions are that the theory have a finite number ofaxioms,
that those axioms be recursive, truth-functional, entail true T-sentences, and be materially
adequate (i.e., extensional). In this chapter I tried to outline how it is that we can
construct such a truth theory in the process ofcommunication, what conditions have to be
attained. for the possibility of this construction. and what philosophical implications this
bas for our understanding of"meaning," "truth" and "language."
In order for us to understand the utterances ofanother individual, we have to
assume that the individual holds that the utterance is true, as well as assume that the
belief that she holds true is in fact true. These assumptions constitute the main points of
the principle ofcharity. A direct consequence of this transcendental principle is that
when we construct a truth theory we cannot, in general, impute too many false beliefs to
an individual. Instead ofsaying that an individual uttered a statement which was false,
charity urges us to alter what we understand to be the meaning of the statement in order
to make it true by our own standards. A direct result of this is that we have to hold that
"meaning" is primarily located in the idiolect, and not in a community-based. and
conventional language. In fact, ifwe understand communication to be govemed by a
language that is conventionally agreed upon. then we deny that there is any such thing as
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a language. Such a conception would hinder communication as opposed to allowing it to
flourish.
I hold that charity is the key argument in Davidson's attack OD conceptual
relativism. It is this principle which lies behind and is the basis of the claim made by
Davidson that there is no dualism ofscheme and contenL An individual can only be said
to have a language ifshe can communicate with others. The possibility of interpreting
her utterances to facilitate communication demands that what she says is to be true by the
standards of both speaker and interpreter.
Recognition of the impossibility of the third dogma., the dualism ofscheme and
content, leads to the conclusion that conceptual relativism is also impossible. In chapter
5 I will deal with the outcome ofthcse considerations and how it affects the claims made
by Quine, Kuhn and Feyerabend which routlined incbapter 1. Before moving on,
however, r want devote a chapter examining some startling convergences between the
philosophy of language espoused by Donald Davidson and the hermeneutic philosophy of
Hans·Georg Gadamer, especially in what both take to be the conditions for the possibility
ofcommunication, interpretation and understanding.
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Chapter 4
Hermeneutics and Analysis:
A Comparison of DaviWion with Ilans-Georg Gadamer
41 Introduction
Ifone was to look for a label for Donald Davidson,. and for the type ofphilosophy
he espouses, or the type ofphilosophical school to which he belongs, the tenn most likely
come to mind would be "analytic." Davidson clearly works in the analytic tradition,
explicating and criticizing its main thinkers and ideas. A survey of the philosophers he
challenges in his works would be a lengthy but clear justification of the "analytic"label
(the list would include Dummett, Quine, Tarski, Putnam, Burge, Strawson, Wittgenstein,
Frege, Austin. Black, Camap, Sellars, Kripke, etc.). And the ideas and problems that be
tackles certainly derive from the analytic tradition. I intend to argue, however, that the
solutions he gives to those problems are far from the kinds usually found in that tradition.
Or, maybe it would be better to say, the solutions he proposes are framed in analytic
terminology, with the corresponding rigoue and logical framing required for conceptual
analysis, but are strongly aligned in content with the "hermeneutic" tradition of
Continental thinking.
This should not be a surprising claim. Besides the obvious fact that both
hermeneutics and analytic philosophy deal with the same phenomenon - language - both
also claim their origins in the same thinkers: Brentano, Frege, and Bolzano. I It couid be
said that after those three thinkers, philosophy split in two different directions: the
henneneutic school ofHeidegger, Gadamer, etc., and the analytic school ofRussell,
Wittgenstein, Quine, etc. These two schools are not, however, as fundamentally opposed
as is often thought. Commenting on the Hegel prize he was awarded in the city of
Stuttgart, Davidson says:
Since I was the first non-European philosopher to receive this award, I interpreted
the occasion as marking another step in the remarkable rapproachment that is now
taking place between what for a time seemed two distinct, even hostile,
philosophical methods, attitudes and traditions. What we are witnessing is, of
course, really no more than a re-engagement oftraditions that share a common
heritage. But this makes it no less surprising, since as we know, it is those who
are closest in their presuppositions who are most apt to exaggerate and dwell on
their differences.2
In this chapter I will exa.mine and defend the view that there is a rapproachment
between these two schools through an analysis of the presuppositions oftwo specific
IFor an account of the history, development, differences and possibilities ofa
reunion of these two traditions, see Dummett, Origins ofAnalytical Philosophy
(Cambridge, MassachWietts: The Harvard University Press. 1993).
2Davidson, "Dialectic and Dialogue," in Language Mind and Epistemology G.
Preyer, et aI, eds. (Netherlands: The Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 429.
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representatives: Davidson and Hans-Georg Gadamer. I have chosen Gadamer as the
representative of the hermeneutic school primarily because Gadamer and Davidson both
deal with the same problems, viz., interpretation. dialogue and communication. Davidson
admits this himself: .....there is a long history to our [Davidson's and Oadamer's] shared
interest in Plato, the dialectical method, and problems of interpretation...J
As I have already outlined in the introduction. the intention ofthis thesis is to
show how and why Davidson has abandoned the view that there is a dualism between
scheme and content In chapter 5 I win summarize the results of the first 4 chapters to
systematically show how this is done, and show what results it has for philosophy. What
I partly want to realize in this chapter is a further understanding of the claim that there is
ao dualism. and an understanding ofexactly what happens when we don't regard
semantics or epistemology as defined by this dualism. I think Davidson's warnings that
"reference" can play no role in an account ofbow interpretation and understanding takes
place is one important hint toward the insight that we are after. The analysis of
Davidson's views on reference, its results, and its relation to Gadamer's hermeneutics are
found in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
I also intend to show that both Davidson and Gadamer hold that interpretation and
understanding are both part and parcel of the same hermeneutic process. that they both
see ''truth'' as playing the primary role in any interpretation., and that a language is the
JDavidson. "Dialectic and Dialogue," p. 430.
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horizon or world view that an individual has at a particular time. Since truth. and not
reference, plays the primary role in interpretation from one language (or horizon) to
another, no world-views can be incommensurable with each other since the same
structure ofopenness to interpretation is present when they are about the same domains of
experience.
4 2 Semantics and Heqneneutics
In spite ofDavidson's (and other's) enthusiasm for a reunion in philosophy
between the apparently divergent schools ofhermeneutics and analysis, Gadamer argues
that there is a difference to be noted between semantics and hermeneutics that will
forever keep them apart. 1mt is, be bolds that semantics (the philosophy of language, or
analytic philosophy) does not" and cannot, achieve the universality ofherm.eneutics.
Gadamer argues that semantics is the practice that describes linguistic phenomena
externally; it emphasizes the signs that are used and the rules and categories under which
they falL In contrast:
Hermeneutics ... focuses upon the intemal side ofour use oCthe world of signs, or
better said, on the internal process ofspeaking, which ifviewed from the outside.
appears as our use of the world ofsigns.4
4Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," in~
~ translated by David E. Linge (Berkeley: The University ofCalifomia
_s. 1976). p. 82.
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Although Gadamer grants that semantics does have some valid aims, e.g., the benefit of
the logical forma.1.izBtion of language, as an internal analysis be argues that it is
essentially impotent. In his essay, '"Semantics and Hermeneutics," Gadamer points out
several of the problmlS ofsemantics, and uses these problems as a catapult (0 argue: for
the superiority and universality ofbenneneutics. As I will indicate below, most. of the
problems tba1 Gadamer points out bave been, or could be. dealt with by a Davidsonian
semantic analysis. If this is correa, one can conclude either that Davidson is DOt doing
semantics, but rather benneneutics; or th8t Davidson is a philosopher who bas been able
to fuse the two disciplines. I will take the latter view.
So what problems does Gadamer have witll semantics? First we have the claim
tba1 semantics is ext:ernal while hermeneutics is intemal. I simply take this to mean that
semantics deals with words. signs and rules while hermeneutics deals with the meanings,
in the widest. sense oftbc word, to which these words, signs and rules relate. Iftbat is all
"semantics" is, then Davidson cannot be said to be a semantician. From the beginning of
Davidson's career be outlined the main problem for semantics as the need (0 account for
how it is that we know the meaning ofan utterance. Ofcourse be was ~ll aware that
many thinkers, including his teacher, Quine, bad taken the line that Gadamer criticizes.
But it is not Davidson's line.
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The problem of the tension between the external and the internal is illustrated in
what Gadamer caUs '·substitutionality.»S The semantic theory ofsubstitutionality states
that ..... it is difficult to find a better definition for the sense or meaning ofan expression
than its interchangeability with another expression."' Gadamer rightly criticizes this
thesis, as does Davidson (as I argue below). Elsewhere, Gadamer says:
The task ofthe translator, therefore, must never be to copy what is said, but to
place himself in the d.ire<:tion ofwhat is said (i.e., in its meaning) in order to carry
over what is said into the direction ofhis own saying.... What he has to reproduce
is not what is said in exact terms. but rather what the other person wanted to say
and said in that he left much unsaid.7
In chapter 3 I showed that there was a fundamental distinction to be made
between the "translation manual" account ofmeaning adopted by Quine, and the ''truth
theory" method adopted by Davidson. Quine held that in order to grasp the meaning of
another's utterance, we have to develop a set ofanalytic hypotheses in which a native
speaker's utterance is mapped with an utterance in the translator's languagc. Davidson
argues that this does not lead to an understanding ofmeaning, bei:ause it could happcn
that a person who wants to use the translation manual does not undcrstand cither the
nativc's or the translator's language. The key to meaning is understanding, not
translation. Davidson's meaning theory, on the other hand, only includes utterances of
5Gadamer, "Semantics and Hermeneutics,n pp. 84-87.
6Gadamer, "Semantics and Henneneutics," p. 84.
7Gadamer, "Man and Language," in PbUp§Qphical Hermeneutics p. 68.
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the speaker's language. The speaker's utterance is mapped to its meaning (or bUth
condition), not to an utterance in my language with a similar meaning.' It is when we can
map meaning to utterances that we can say we undcrstaDd.
In this respect, I would argue that Davidson's semantic analysis is not strictly an
external one. ifby ..external" we mean mere manipulation ofsigns. His is an internal
analysis, where "internal" refers to the meanings ofwhich words are a sign or indicator.
Like the above quote from Gadamer, Davidson argues that we are to interpret another's
speech into our own words even if there is no exact correlation ofvocabulary. Anything
said in one language can be said in another.' Both Gadamer and Davidson place 8Jl
emphasis on interpretation over translation because both thinkers bold that it is
understanding that is the key to meaning and communication. Understanding is
facilitated in interpretation. This implies, and both Davidson and. Gadamer accept, that
we can understand and interpret without having the ability or resources to translate.
Compare Davidson: ..It is clear, then, that my view does not make the ability to interpret
'Ofcourse., this meaning or bUth condition must be stated in my language, but this
is the best that we can do.
'As I indicated in chapter I, pp. tIff, Quine and Davidson are bothconcemed
with what it means to say that two people "'mean the same thing." Both are very clear
that this "meaning" is not some linguistic or propositional entity entertained by the
parties involved in communication (a thesis referred to by Quine as the "musewn myth of
meaning''). Rather, "meaning" is more closely aligned with the practices involved in the
use ofwords. That is wby, for both Quine and Davidson, indeterminacy oftranslation
(interpretation) must be acknowledged. Translation can never be exact because there is
nothing to be exact abouL
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a language depend on being able to translate that language into familiar tongue;"IO with
Gadamer: "Where there is understanding. there is not translation but speech. To
understand a foreign word means that we do not need to translate it into our own."11
Continuing with the theme ofsubstitutionality in semantics. or the tension
between the internal and external, Gadamer also brings up the point that it is only
hermeneutics that can account for the individualization that a language can take. That is,
he argues that a language is always involved in a conflict between how an individual
means a word to be taken, and how that word is established by convention. The
individualization ofmeaning that we find, for example, in some great poems. cannot be
accounted. for semantically. It is dangerous to try to find other words to express the same
meaning that one finds in some poems. in order to express that individual meaning.
without somehow distorting the poem. With the specific example ofpoetry in mind,
Gadamer argues for the thesis that language is occasional:
What emerges here is the vast realm of the occasionality ofall speaking that plays
an important role in establishing the meaning ofwbat is said. By occasionality I
mean dependency on the situation in which an expression is used. Hermeneutical
analysis is able to show that such dependency on the situation is not itself
situational, like so-called occasional expressions (for instance, "here" or "this'')
that obviously possess no fixed content in their semantical character, but rather
l00avidson. "Reply to Foster," in Inquiries jnto TmID and Intemretatiop p.175.
11Gadamer. Tnrtb and Method 2nd revised ed. (Continuum, New York, 1989) p.
384.
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are applicable like empty foans and in which, as is the case with empty forms,
changing content can be inserted.12
This claim is formally vindicated in Davidson's analysis of truth and meaning. In a
typical T-sentence, the left-hand side of the biconditional contains the utterance to be
interpreted, while the right-hand side contains the meaning of that sentence, or the
conditions under which it is true. The "empty foans" that Gadamer refers to could be
supplied by the three variables which Davidson says troth and meaning are relativized to:
time, speaker, and situation. As [demonstrated in chapter 2, a typical T-sentence in
Davidson's meaning theory has the form:
(T) s is true for speaker u at time 1 ifand ooly if p.
This relativization leads Davidson to the cla.im, found mostly in his later work, that to
understand the meaning ofan utterance it is not necessary to have access to the
conventions ofthe language that the utterance is uttered in. Indeed, Davidson goes as far
as to claim. that there is no such thing as a language, at least not in the conventional
sense. IJ Understanding is something dynamic, organic and essentially creative. It takes
place each time we encounter a speaker, whether that speaker is from our language
community or not.
[think the fact that Davidson's semantic theory is internal and sensitive to
particular situations and individualizations shows that, for the most part, he cannot be a
12Gadamer, "Semantics and Henneneutics,.. p. 88.
IJDavidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 446.
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target ofGadamer's polemic against semantics. The superiority which Gadamer claims
for hermeneutics over semantics is certainly valid, but not valid against Davidsonian
semantics or hermeneutics. As I will show below, many of the arguments that are
presented in Gadamer's hermeneutics are also presented in Davidson's work. if in
somewhat a different form.
43 The Pmblem ofReference
A key to understanding what Davidson means when he says there is no dualism
between scheme and content can be found in his arguments against the claim that
"reference" plays a role in an account ofhow oW' words and sentences work. That is.
Davidson is arguing against the "correspondence theory of truth.,,14 Simply put, this
theory says that there is a relation between our words and the extra-linguistic objects to
which those words refer that determines the truth ofthe sentences in which those words
14[t must be noted that Davidson. during his career. has flip-flopped on how to
characterize his (Tarski's) theory of truth. In 1969, he wrote an essay, "True to the
Facts," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation pp. 37-54, where he argues that a
Tarskian truth. theory is, in some respects, a correspondence theory because it requires the
notion ofsatisfaction between words and sequences ofobjects to define truth. Later, in
1981, in "A Coherence Theory ofTruth and Knowledge" in Reading Rorty ed. Alan
Malachowski (Oxford: Basil Blackweil, 1990), pp. 120-134, Davidson emphasizes the
holistic nature of language and the fact that it is essentially coherent It is coherence (and
its tie to the principle ofcharity) that guarantees truth. In an appendix to the latter essay,
"Afterthoughts, 1987," pp. 134-138. Davidson claims that he has decided to follow
Rorty's advice and stop calling his theory either coherence or correspondence. Both
coherence and correspondence are attempts to explain truth in terms ofsomething more
basic. This cannot be done. I will try to spell out the implications of this in chapter 5.
llS
are found. There is a relation ofreference that is essential to our understanding oftnrth.
It is this "reference" that ensures that our words have an ancbor in the extra~linguistic
world. Correspondence theories say that without reference there is no truth. Reference is
a necessary constituent to a theory oftruth (or meaning).
Davidson's arguments against the correspondence theory of truth and against the
primacy given to the concept of reference rest on the principle that we have to make a
"distinction between explanation within the theory and explanation o/the theory."'s As I
indicated in the last chapterl', there is a distinction to be made between the relativized
notion oftmthand the general or absolute notion. rt is the relativized notion of truth for
which a Tarskian truth theory is developed. In that theory, truth is relativized to a
particular language and is defined in terms ofsatisfaction. It is the technical term
"satisfaction" which, Davidson argues, takes up the role of'"reference" which
correspondence theorists are after. But for the general or absolute notion, "troth" is not
defined or reduced to any more basic concept or semantic term. Within a particular
theory (language), truth is defined by satisfaction. But outside ofparticular theories, we
still have a notion of truth that escapes all characterizations or attempts at reductive
lSDavidson, "Reality Without Reference," in Inquiries into Truth and
~ p. 221. I continue with an analysis of the importance of the distinction
between explanations ofand explanations within a truth theory, and its effects on an
understanding of the semantic concept oC"referencc" below, sec. 5.2 and 5.3.
"See above, pp. 82-83.
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explanations, what Ramberg calls a trans-linguistic notion. 17 A theory of truth does not
give an explanation ofwhat this trans-linguistic truth is, but it does show how to
detennine which statements ofa language are true. In order to detennine wbich statement
ofa language are true, a truth theory does require the semantic notion ofsatisfaction. But
"satisfaction," just like any other semantical concept. is a construction that we use to help
explain what it is we do when we speak. It is not something that has a life of its own. and
is no belp in determining the relation between language and world. Davidson says:
I suggest that words, meanings ofwords, reference, and satisfaction are posits we
need to implement a theory of truth. They serve its purpose without needing
independent confirmation or empirical basis. II
When we radically interpret someone, that is, when we construct a truth theory for
the language she speaks, we need to identify. fustly, the words, names and predicates that
make up the vocabulary oftbe language. That is. we must determine the "logical grid" of
the language.I' When we have detennined the vocabulary, we can construct the axioms
oftbe truth theory by implementing satisfaction relations between sequences ofobjects
and predicates. This is all done, ofcourse, over time and in deference to how the foreign
speaker uses her words. Through this interaction we can determine the conditions under
which the words are true.
l'Ramberg. p. 124.
IIDavidson, "Reality Without Reference," p. 222.
l'For the three general steps required in radical interpretation see above pp. 66-68.
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One of the results of Davidson's rejection of the primacy of reference is that we
do not need to make mention of reference to anything extra-linguistic. The satisfaction
relation which Davidson argues takes up the role of reference refers sequences of
interpreted words to predicates. A T-sentence derived from the axioms ofa truth theory
pairs an utterance with the conditions under which it is true. Since the truth theory is one
that I develop, the statement of the truth conditions on the right·hand side of the
biconditional is articulated in my language - [have no choice about this. The condition
under which a statement is true is certainly not the intermediary referential steps between
world and language, as some philosophers have argued, e.g, the relation between
utterances, facts or states ofaffairs, and the experienced world.. Rather, a statement is
true because of the relationship between things in the world (articuJated and mirrored in
my language). "Snow is white" is true because of the relationship (or "antics," as
Davidson calls itZll) between snow and whiteness, not because ofa relationship between
the sentence "snow is white" and some representation or propositional entity. Quine
recognized the same phenomenon in his theories of translation manuals. Davidson says
of Quine's theory:
... a translation manual is only a method ofgoing from sentences ofone language
to sentences ofanother, and we can infer from it nothing about the relations
between words and objects. Ofcourse we know, or we think we know, what our
2ODavidson, "On the Very [deaofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 198.
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words in our own language refer to, but this is information no translation manual
contains.21
Quine concluded, and Davidson accepts, that reference is inscrutable; there is no
way to determine it exactly. Ifwe try to detennine which. objects a sentence ofa
particular speaker refers to. the best we can do is to name that object through a translation
(interpretation). And all translation (interpretation). argues Quine, is indeterminate. In
principle, we can never say for sure ifwe got a particular translation (interpretation) right.
There is nothing to get right. This is not~useofsome epistemological deficiency on
the part ofthe interpreter. but rather because ofthe nature of language and interpretation.
All inquiry into the rightness ofa translation is a linguistic inquiry and itself presupposes
a level of interpretation. Quine says:
The relativistic thesis to which we have come is this, to repeat: it makes no sense
to say what the objects of a theory are. beyond saying how to interpret or
reinterpret that theory into another.22
Davidson accepts this claim. Or, I should say. he accepts the claim that it makes no sense
to say. independent ofa particular theory, what the objects ofa theory are. He does not,
however, accept Quine's conclusion ofontological relativity. Ontological relativity
demands that we be able to specify the objects ofonc theory and compare them with the
2lDavidson, "Reality Without Reference," p. 221. Nor is the information ofwhat
words refer to contained in a Tarskian truth theory. Davidson is not here railing against
the inadequacies of translation manuals, but showing how. as in his theory, reference does
not playa role. and is not needed.
UQuine. "Ontological Relativity," p. 50.
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objects ofanother. But, as Quine shows, this comparison will always escape us.
To understand what a speaker says, we do not need to know what thing makes her
statement true, but rather, we need to know how to interpret her utterance. But
interpretation requires that we know that the speaker has the same beliefs that we do and
it also requires us to develop a truth theory for her language. As we saw in chapters 2 and
3, the first step in the development ofa truth theory is the identification ofwords and
objects, and the determination ofthe simple satisfaction relations between sequences of
those objects and their predicates. Knowing which statements a speaker holds true, and
knowing what her beliefs are (through charity they are the same as mine), we can
determine what her sentences mean; Le., we can interpreL
One could misunderstand Davidson's arguments against reference as an
endorsement of some sort of linguistic idealism. It must be stRssed, however, that the
rejection of reference is not a denial oftbe external world, nor is it to say that the external
world does not playa role in interpretation. When formulating a truth theory for a
foreign language, that is, when radically interpreting, we must be aware of the conditions
under which the statements are true. The external world plays a necessary role in how it
is we come to understand a language. The rejection of the primacy of reference is a
rejection of the belief that reference gives an adequate account ofwhy our sentences or
beliefs about the world are true.
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4 4 Undemandjng and Interpretation
As I tried to indicate above, Gadamer and Davidson do share a common interest
in that they are both concerned with '"understanding" and how it is effected in
"interpretation." Both argue that the vehicle ofmeaning and understanding, and hence
truth. is to be found in interpretation. Gadamer's work is concerned mostly with the
historical interpretation and understanding ofeminent texts of the tradition. Davidson, on
the other band, is concerned with meaning and communication, as found especially in the
situation ofradical interpretation. Both thinken: are aware, however, that their analyses
of these respective types of interpretation can be transposed into the other. In other
words, Gadamer's account ofunderstanding can be used in the case ofa conversation or
dialogue, and Davidson's account can be put to use in an account of interpretation of the
literary text. In support of this claim, Gadamer says:
In bridging the gulfbetween languages, the translator clearly exemplifies the
reciprocal relationship that exists between interpreter and text, and that
corresponds to the reciprocity involved in reaching an understanding in
conversation..... The translator's task differs only in degree, not in kind, from the
general hermeneutical task that any text presents.... It is like a real conversation
in that the common subject matter is what binds the two partners, the text and the
interpreter, to each other.D
And Davidson contends that the triangulation ofspeaker-hearer-world, which be argues is
necessary and sufficient for any communication ofmeaning, can be replaced by the
DGadamer, Truth and Method pp.387.388.
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triangulation ofwriter-reader-tradition.24 The common subject matter, ofwhich Gadamer
refers, is either the common world that we all inhabit. or else the literary tradition in
which a particular text is written.
Other books help constitute the world which completes the triangle ofauthor and
reader, just as prior conversations provide much ofwhat speaker and hearer
depend on for good communication.2$
It is important to note, however, that both take the case ofa live conversation to
be primary. It is only after we have obtained the ability to speak and participate in a
dialogue that we can even approach a text and be spoken to by it. For this reason, in Part
ill ofTrntb and Method. Gadamer examines conversation as the ground ofany possible
interpretation. But Dot only does he examine conversation, he examines conversation
between people ofdifferent languages. By these means, we can uncover the conditions
that permit all hermeneutic conversations to occur, whether they occur with ~partneror
with an eminent text:
In situations where coming to an understanding is disrupted or impeded, we first
become conscious of the conditions of all understanding. Thus the verbal process
whereby a conversation in two different languages is made possible through
translation is especially informative.... But in these cases understanding does not
really take place between the partners of the conversation, but between
24Davidson, "Locating Literary Language," in Literary TheQry After Davidson ed.
Reed Way Dasenbrook (UDiversity Park. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1993), p. 296.
2$Davidson, "Locating Literary Language," p. 306.
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interpreters, who can really have an encounter in a common world of
understanding.u
This is clearly the same task that Davidson undertakes in his examination of the situation
ofradical interpretation. Davidson argues that an account of interpretation between two
speakers ofdifferent linguistic backgrounds will expose the preconditions that allow the
communication to take place. which we take for granted when we speak with people in
our "own language." Davidson also holds that this analysis dispels myths about linguistic
competence propagated by philosophers ~e Whorf, Kuhn and DummenP He says:
Speakers of the same language can go on the assumption that for them the same
expressions are to be interpreted. in the same way. but this does not indicate what
justifies the assumption. All understanding ofthe speech of the other involves
radical interpretation. But it will help keep assumptions from going unnoticed to
focus on cases where interpretation is most clearly called for. interpretation in one
idiom of talk in another.21
In terms ofthe aims and methodologies of the two philosophers. it is clear that
they share an affinity. Both hold that understanding takes place when we have correctly
interpreted either the other speaker, or the text, and both hold that the best way to expose
what happens in understanding is to look at the case of radical interpretation. Ifwe can
detennine what the conditions of understanding are in this analysis, we can apply those
conditions to the account ofhow it is we understand when we "normally" communicate,
26Gadamer, Truth and Method p. 384.
21This what I tried to show in chapter 3 above.
2'Oavidson, "Radical Interpretatioo." pp. 125-126.
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or when we try to interpret a text. My claim is that Davidson and Gadamer come pretty
close to reaching the same conclusions.
45 The Verha.\ World
Gadamcr argues for the universality ofbermencutics by arguing that the world is
essentially verbal. By this be means that we have DO access to the world excc:pt through
language. Hermeneutics is the process ofcoming to an understanding ofsome thing,
whether it is a text, a dialogue, an artwork. etc. The world is a verbal or linguistic
horizon that is interpreted (linguistically) by the hermeneutic process. In the hermeneutic
conversation. a conversation between the interpreter and text, artwork, etc., understanding
comes about (eventuates, ereignen) when we have interpreted the text or artwork. into our
own linguistic world horizon. Hermeneutics is clearly a universal process because
nothing can be Wlderstood unless it is first interpreted; it is this process or event of
interpretation (understanding) that is the scope ofbcrm.eneutics. Universality is ensured
by the fact that nothing can escape this scope.
[L]anguage is the universal medium in which undt!rsranding occurs.
Unt:krstanding occurs in interpreting.... All unde:rstaodi.ng is interpretation. and
all interpretation takes place in the medium ofa language that allows the objects
to come into words and yet is at the same time the interpreter's own language.19
Gadamer's main point in arguing that the world is verbal is to show that there is
DO dualism ofsubject (language) and object (world). For Gadamer, it makes no sense to
29Gadamer, Troth and Method p.389.
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talk. of the world-in-itself, independent ofhow we interpret or understand the world. Our
world is our language.
Language is not just one ofman's possessions in the world; rather, on it depends
that fact that man has a world at all.... Not only is the world world only insofar as
it comes into language, but language, too, bas its real being only in the fact that
the world is presented in it.:lO
1bis last line indicates that language is not a thing that determines the world, or that the
world is some thing thatfits language. There is no relationship as such between the two.
Rather, they stand in a mutual relationship where they become what they are through the
other.
This view of the world then that is presented in a language is called a "horizon."
Each language has its own horizon or world-view. Gadamer borrows this term from
Husserl.JI Gadamer holds that Hwserl uses the term to indicate the finite horizon of
perception that an individual has at a particular place and time, in a particular situation.
Gadamer uses the tenn to indicate the understanding or world-view that an individual has,
as manifested in the language wbich she uses. This horizon, however, is not fixed. Like
Husserl's "horizon," it represents the understanding oftbe world that we have at a
ll)Gadamer, Troth and Method p. 443. Compare this with: "The limits ofmy
language means the limits ofmy world," Wittgenstein. TractanlS r ogjeg-PbilOSOpbjcus
translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1961 l, f5.6.
J1Gadamer, Tnnb and Method. p. 302.
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particular time. Our horizon,. out ofwhich we can never escape. is always with us. but
nonetheless is always changing.
The historical movement ofhuman life consists in the fact that it is never
absolutely bound to anyone standpoint. and hence can never have a truly closed
horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves
with us.u
With every new experience and conversation that we have, we get more insight into our
understanding ofthe way things are.
Language is the record offinitude not because the structure ofhuman language is
multifarious but because every IaOguage is constantly being formed and
developed the more it expresses its experience oftbe world.}]
Davidson, on my interpretation, says essentially the same thing. He holds that the
world is a linguistic phenomenon in the sense that it is a particular "'world-vieW' at a
particular time. By this. I simply mean that, for Davidson, we cannot make a distinction
between what a person believes about the world. and their language. That is. in
detennining the beliefs ofa particular individual at a particular time, we are at the same
time learning how to understand or interpret the speaker's language. Davidson says:
In sharing a language, in whatever sense this is required for
communication.. we share a picture oftbe world that must. in its large features, be
true. It follows that in making manifest the large features ofour language. we
make manifest the large features ofrea1ity.:M
32Gadamer. Truth and Method p.304.
UGadamer, Tnnh and Method p.457.
:MDavidson, "The Method ofTruth in Metaphysics," in Inauiries jnto Truth and
~p.199.
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Our exegesis ofDavidson's views about "teferencc"lS ended in the claim that it is
not things that: cause statements to be true, or to have meaning. but rather that those
statements can be translated into other statements - Le., interpreted. It is interpretation
that is the key to understanding. Truth does not depend on reference to anything extra~
linguistic, but only on reference to other statements, and the components of that sentence.
In that respect. then. what has truth. or meaning. or is a possible object ofmy
understanding, is something that can be interpreted into my language. The sentence
"Schnee ist weiss," can be interpreted into my language. Since I know that
(1) "Schnee ist weiss" is true if, and only if. snow is white,
I can say that I understand the sentence. There was no need for me to appeal to an extra-
linguistic entity to understand the sentence. But I did need to appeal to a linguistic
"object" to understand. That is, I bad to appeal to my language, which includes: "snow,"
as an interpretation (or a facilitator ofunderstanding) of"Schnee."
Once we have abandoned the need for "reference" in accounting for truth and
meaning, and the relationship between world and language, it is obvious that "world" also
has to be reinterpreted. The interpretation, I would suggest, has to take the form of
something like Gadamer's "horizon:' Davidson does not spell this out in his work. but I
think one can argue that he does leave the door open to such an interpretation.
One indication that I see is to be found in the form. ofa typical T-sentence:
lSAbove, section 4.3.
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(1) s is true if, and only if, p,
where "s" is the sentence uttered and ''p'' is the condition under which it is true. We
usually understand this to mean that the sentence s is true when the condition p is met. T-
sentences, however, take the fonn ofa biconditional, and biconditionals can be defined as
the conjunction oftwo implications. In other words, the form ofthe T-sentence can
equivalently be written:
(fl) sistrueifp,andpifsistrue.
By simplification,
(f2) P ifs is true.
In this case, although (f2) is a derivation from (1), we get a different impression of the
relation between s and p. We now understand this to say thatP is the case when the
sentence s is true. The condition of truth, or the beliefabout the world, is dependent upon
the statement about that condition., in the same way that the truth of the statement is
dependent upon the condition. The condition and the sentence are inrerdependenl. That
is, when I interpret a native speaker, the condition under which her utterance is true and
the utterance itselfare both discovered in the same way. Learning the language ofa
native speaker is both an epistemic and semantic endeavour.
Now, this holistic interdependence is not denied nor hidden, but neither is it made
fully explicit by Davidson. Part of the reason for this is that Davidson's philosophic
project is not to give an account ofbow we come to acquire a language, or ofbow our
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words relate to the world, but of how we understand another speaker - how we interpret
an already living language into our own language. A person's beliefs about the world
cannot exceed the language that those beliefs are couched in. If we accept Davidson's
(and Gadamer's) claims here:
... then we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of
language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and
knowing our way around the world generally.J6
Of course, this world ofbeliefs is never fixed. It is constantly changing with each new
experience. With each new belief, our language changes. We either expand on our
vocabulary, or we develop a new understanding of the words that we have. The
extensions that we assign to words could alter, for example, with each new belief that we
have.
In this respect, then, Davidson regards the language that an individual has at a
particular time as holistic and organic. It is holistic in the sense that one cannot develop a
truth theory for that language (interpret it, or understand it) without at the same time
developing a theory about the beliefs that that person has. Nor can one Wlderstand a
particular sentence or word without understanding a whole network ofother words and
sentences (actual and potential) that are connected with it. And when one word in the
language alters, other parts of the network may change as well. Language is organic in
the sense that it grows with each linguistic encounter and with each experience. There is
J6Davidson" "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs,.. pp. 445-446.
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not some "Language" that we are all striving to master, but rather at each stage in our
organic or evolutioI18lY'" linguistic development we possess a complete language - a
complete world~view.
[I]n so far as we take the "organic" character oflanguage seriously, we cannot
accurately describe the first steps toward its conquest as learning part ofthe
language; rather it is a maner ofpartly leaming.JI
This is exactly what Gadamer says about language learning as weU:
Learning to speak does not mean learning to use a preexistent tool for designating
a world already somehow familiar: to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and
acquaintance with the world itselfand how it confronts us."
Language is not a tool or instrument, present~to-band, that allows us to do things; it is the
dynamic and ever-changing world that we occupy. Our linguistic horizon is never fixed.
For Gadamer, the idea ofa fixed horizon is an abstraction from the myriad ofblending
horizons constituted by the interaction ofmultiple individuals. He says:
Just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is always in
understanding with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a
culture is an abstraction. The historical movement ofhuman life consists in the
fact that it is never absolutely bound to anyone standpoint, and hence can never
have a truly closed horizon.40
These reflections on the nature oflanguage have led Davidson to:
n"Evolutionary" understood as getting better, but without a fixed or set goal.
3SOavidson, 'Theories ofMeaning and Learnable Languages," p. 7.
39Gadamer, "Man and Language." p. 63.
4OGadamer, Tanh and Method p.304.
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... conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not iflanguage is anything
like many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such
thing to be learned. mastered or born with. We must give up the idea ofa clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases.·1
From very similar considerations, Gadamer makes the same point:
It is obvious that an instrumentalist theory ofsigns which sees words and
concepts as bandy tools has missed the point oftbe hermeneutical phenomenon.
Ifwe stick to what takes place in speech,. and above all, in every dialogue with
tradition carried on by the human sciences. we cannot fail to see here that
concepts are constantly in the process ofbeing formed....
Indeed, the situation is even more difficult It is doubtful that the concepr
oflanguage that modem linguisti~ and philosophy of language take as their
starting point is adequate to the situation.42
4 6 The FusioD ofHoriZODS
Ofcourse, as I indicated in chapter I, the idea that we all live in different worlds
is exactly the claim that Whorf, Kuhn and Feyerabend argue for, and which Davidson
says leads to relativism. These thinkers argue that different worlds presuppose diffeR:nt
concepts, and hence a different language. And since the words or concepts found in a
world that we do not occupy cannot be words and concepts for things in our world.,
translation is impossible. This impossibility of translation is referred to by Kuhn and
Feyerabend as "incommensurability."
4lDavidson, "A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 446.
4ZOadamer. Truth and Method p. 403.
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Davidson argues against this type ofrelativism by using the thesis that "reference"
plays no constitutive role in the translinguistic account oftnnh that is required for
interpretation (understanding) between speakers of two different languages. It is only
wben I tty to account for my horizon, or worldview, that the notion of reference plays any
role. When trying to understand another individual, or language, we use truth, in the
fonn ofcharity, as the primary principle.
Taking the idea that our world is verbal, and coupling it with the principle of
charity, viz., that most ofour beliefs about the world are true, Davidson shows that the
notion of incommensurability becomes "largely true but not translatable....) And this is
impossible because «truth" is a semantic notion that is predicated ofutterances that are
able to be interpreted into our language. In other words, we know the meaning of a
sentence only when we know the conditions under which it is true. The condition under
which any sentence is true has to be articulated in my language, or on this analysis, in
terms ofmy world-view. Truth, interpretation, and understanding are interdependent
concepts. In a different context, Davidson says:
So what sounded like a thrilling discovery - that truth is relative to a conceptual
scheme - bas not so far been shown to be anything more than the pedestrian and
familiar fact that the truth ofa sentence is relative to (among other things) the
language to which it belongs. Instead. of living in different worlds, Kuhn's
scientists may, like those wbo need Webster's dictionary, be only words apart.44
.UDavidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme,to p. 194.
44Davidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme,to p. 189. The "other
things" to which the truth ofa sentence is relative to are time and speaker.
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And to be words apart (to have a different language) means that any distance can be
bridged, in principle, by a correct interpretation.
In chapter 3, I tried to outline Davidson's account ofbow radical interpretation
takes place. It boiled down to "convergence of passing tbeories," where a passing theory
is bow a speaker understands the bearer to be interpreting ber, and bow a bearer is
interpreting (understanding) the speaker. When the two passing theories are the same, it
could be said that the speaker and hearer have reached an understanding. It could also be
said that they are speaking the same language. It is only when they"speak: the same
language" that understanding takes place. Passing theories are to be distinguished from
prior theories.
Prior theories are how a speaker expects to be interpreted by a hearer prior to
speaking, and how a hearer is prepared. to interpret the speaker prior to listening. In some
cases, argues Davidson, passing and prior theories are the same. What one expects in a
conversation is sometimes what one gets. But in a lot of instances, the passing theory is
quite different from the prior theory. This is taken to its extreme in the case of radical
interpretation. In this situation, there is no prior theory. To understand each other, the
two participants must develop a passing theory (a common language) as they leam more
about eacb other. Ofcourse, this passing theory is not a language distinct from the
language (world or horizon) that the interpreter and speaker already speak- My
understanding (interpretation) ofa foreign utterance is given in tenns of my language.
133
A passing theory is not a theory ofwhat anyone (except maybe a philosopher)
would call an actual natural language. "Mastery" ofsuch a language would be
useless, since knowing a passing theory is only knowing how to interpret a
particular utterance on a particular occasion. Nor could such a language, ifwe
want to call it that, be said to have been learned, or to be governed by
conventions. Ofcourse things previously learned were essential to arriving at the
passing theory, but what was learned could not have been the passing theory:u
rn this last quote, Davidson can be regarded as one philosopher who does bold
that an actual natural language is something that is relativized to a particular situation.
This is a thesis he bas continually stressed since his earliest work in semantics."! In the
essay that the above quote comes from. Davidson makes an attempt to define a language
in terms of his model of passing and prior theories. And as I noted several times in this
thesis, Davidson's conclusion is that there is no language; at least not one like bas been
conceptualized by philosophers and linguists in the past. What this claim amounts to is
that there is no fixed language or closed horizon. Language bas to be reconceptualized as
something that is shifting, organic and dynamic. Or, in Gadamerian terms, language is an
open horizon. As an open horizon, it is susceptible to influences from other horizons.
rn fact, it is this susceptibility that allows us to partake in, or"fuse with," other
horizons. Davidson argues that it is only when passing theories converge that we can say
that we have understood. We have understood because we have taken the speaker's
4SDavidsoO, "A Nice Derangement of Epitapbs," p. 443.
46Even in "Trutband Meaning," written in 1967, Davidson argues tbata truth
predicate for a truth theory must be relativized to language, time and speaker.
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language and interpreted it into our own. It is this convergence of passing theories, or the
event ofunderstanding, that Davidson refers to as a language. For Gadamer, it is what be
calls "the fusion ofhorizons" that allows understanding to happen. "The fusion of
horizons tlult takes place in understanding is actually the achievement a/language....,
The structure ofthis fusion bas the same basic structure as the convergence ofpassing
theories. That is, it is linguistic, it presupposes a common language, and it deals with the
truth of the matter, whatever that may be. i.e., it brings the content oftbe language into
the light
Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common
language. Some thing is placed in the center, as the Greeks say, which the
partners in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas
with one another. Hence reaching an understanding on the subject matter ofa
conversation necessarily means that a common language must first be worked out
in the conversation.4•
Gadamer argues, like Davidson, that it is the fact that a horizon is necessarily
open that allows it to be fused with other horizons. A horizon that cannot be fused, or a
language that cannot be understood, is not a horizon (language) at all. He says:
(E]acb worldview can be extended into every other. It can understand and
comprehend, from within itself. the ''view'' oftbe world presented in another
language.... Our verbal experience of the world bas the capacity to embrace the
most varied relationships oflife.49
47Gadamer, Tmth and Method p.378.
4lGadamer. Troth and Method pp.378·379.
49Gadamer. Truth and Method p. 448.
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Horizonal openness is constituted not by the language itseit or the person
speaking the language, but by the truth that is presented in the language. In other words,
because a foreign language says mostly true things about the world, as our language says
mostly true things about the world, we can pair up the true sentences from both
languages; this is called "interpretation." The guarantee that a language is essentially
truthful is Davidson's transcendental argument for the principle ofcharity. As I already
showed in chapter 3. charity ensures that a language cannot say mostly false things about
the world. If it were otherwise. then it would preclude interpretation, understanding and,
hence, the claim to be a language:
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that optimizes agreement
should not be conceived as resting on a charitable assumption about human
intelligence that might tum out to be false. Ifwe cannot find a way to interpret
the utterances and other behaviour ofa creature as revealing a set ofbeliefs
consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that
creature as rational. as having beliefs, or as saying anything.5O
Gadamer adopts this methodological advice as well. He asks:
Is it DOt, in fact, the case that every misunderstanding presupposes a "deep
common accord?"... When we try to reach agreement on a matter on which we
have different opinions, this deeper factor always comes into play. even if we are
seldom aware of it~l
Being "seldom aware" of the "deep common accord" is a fact that Davidson recognizes
as weU. Whenever two people have a disagreement, it presupposes that they have a large
SOOavidson, "Radical Interpretatioo," p. 137.
~IGadamer, "The Universality oCthe Hermeneutical Problem,"in~
~pp.7-8.
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store ofcommon agreement. Otherwise, those two people would. in all1ikelihood" be
unable to even identify what they are disagreeing about Ofcourse, what they agree
about goes unsaid because of its triviality. IfI disagree with a friend., for example, about
whether the yacht that we both see in the harbour was classified as a "ketch" or a "yawl,"
then it would presuppose that we both correctly believe that yachts are sailing vessels,
that sailing vessels float, that boats float in water, that fish live in water, that boats berth
in harbours, that we are both standing on a wharf, etc. These are all trivial beliefs, they
go unsaid. and there are a buge amount of them. But without these common true beliefs,
without a deep common accord. it would be uncertain as to what we were disagreeing
about.
It isn't that anyone false belief necessarily destroys our ability to identify further
beliefs, but that the identification must depend on a large background oflargely
unmentioned and unquestioned true beliefs. To put it another way: the more
things a believer is right about, the sharper his enors are. Too much mistake
simply blurs the focus.$2
In this respect, the principle ofcharity is to be distinguished from the principle of
humanity. As I indicated in chapter 3, the principle ofhumanity counsels that we assign
a rational structure to the actions of the individual that we interpret. It recommends that
understanding comes about wben we can "put ourselves into the other person's shoes."
All that is required for interpretation on this view is that we empathize with the
individual. We are to say to ourselves: "If I were her, and I held that belief, then, using
s2[)avidson, "Thought and Talk," p. 168.
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the rational structure that is common to all humans. I would hold these other beliefs." It
doesn't matter whether the beliefs are true or false, I can still interpret
I have already shown the absurdity ofthis position.53 It is absurd because it tries
to separate interpretation,. or meaning, from truth. According to Davidson,. however, to
know the meaning ofa sentence, to interpret or understand, is to know the conditions
under which that sentence is true. Davidson accepts an aspect of the principle of
humanity that states that the set ofbeliefs a person holds fonn a consistent system, but he
goes a step further and argues that that consistent system is composed ofbeliefs that are,
for the most part. true. Without"tnrth... a language could not be understood
Gadamer agrees. He shows, in Truth and Method. that the methodology for
interpretation given to us, for example, by Schleiennacher and Collingwood, viz., where
we assume the standpoint ofthe historica16.gure that we wish to understand, is
inauthentic. What we need in order to understand or interpret. argues Gadamer, is the
"rightness ofopinion,." the truth. the common subject matter. He says:
Since we are now concerned not with individuality and what it thinks but with the
truth of what is said, a text is not understood as a mere expression of life but is
taken seriowly in its claim to truth.S4
The interpreter cannot adopt the principle ofbumanity, or what Gadamer calls "thinking
historically," as the primary principle of interpretation. To do so would be to neglect the
'JAbove. pp. 86.92.
SCGadamer. Truth and Method p. 297.
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truth ofwhat one is trying to interpret It would be to neglect the subject matter. "The
text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim to truth.»i5
Gadamer does not deny that the text, tradition. artwork. interloc:utor, etc., that we
are discoursing with is consistent and complete. Completeness is a condition ofthe
possibility of interpretation. Gadamer calls this the "fore-conception ofcompleteness.n56
An interpretation that is not rational. complete and consistent, is not an interpretation.
So when we read a text we always assume its completeness. and only when this
assumption proves to be mistaken - ie., the text is not intelligible - do we begin
to suspect the text and try to discover how it can be remedied.57
But the completeness ensured by the principle ofhumanity, although necessary, is
not all that we are looking for. A complete set ofbeliefs. as manifested in a language (or
world-view), is at the same time a set ofbeliefs that is largely true. Interpretation is
based on an. understanding ofa common subject matter, or a common world. This is
ensured by the fact that: i) the world that we live in is verbal, and; ii) all interpretation is
interpretation into my language. Interpretation into my language is equivalent to a fusion
with my world-view or horizon:
'5Gadamer, Truth and Method. p. 303.
5/lcf. Truth and Mt;tbod pp. 293ft".
57Gadamer, Tnob gnd Method. p. 294. In chapter 3 I showed. that, for Davidson.,
an interpretation that results in attributing mostly inconsistent or false beliefs to a speaker
is an interpretation that must be modified. Charity states that most errors lie in
interpretation. not in the epistemological attitudes of the speaker or hearer.
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This contention is confirmed by the fact that the concrete dealing with a text
yields understanding only when what is said in the text begins to find expression
in the interpreter's own language. Interpretation belongs to the essential unity of
understanding. One must take up into himselfwhat is said to him in such a
fashion that it speaks and finds an answer in words ofhis own language."
Davidson proves that we can only understand the language ofanother individual when
that individual expresses mostly true beliefs with that language. Ifthose beliefs are true,
then the sentences used to articulate those beliefs can be correlated with sentences that I
hold true in my language. Only a true horizon can be fused with mine. As Gadamer
says:
The prejudice ofcompleteness, then, implies not only this formal element - that a
text should express its meaning - but also that what it says should be the
complete truth.... Hence the most basic ofall hermeneutic preconditions remains
one's own fore-understanding, which comes from being concerned with the same
subject"
4 7 ConclmjoD
It is clear, I think, that the "gulf' that separates the analytic tradition from the
hermeneutic tradition is one that can easily be bridged ifDavidson and Gadamer are an
indication of the similarities in opinion that can be found in the two schools. This chapter
has been an attempt to clarify some ofDavidson's concerns by showing some of the
nGadamer, "On the Problem of Self-Understanding," in~
Heqneneytics p.57.
S9Gadamer, Tnrtb and Method, p. 294. As I argue in chapter 3, the most basic of
all interpretive conditions for Davidson is the principle ofcharity.
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convergences between the two thinkers that are indicative of the rapproacbment which.
Davidson argues, we are witnessing now.
One of the convergences that I demonstrated between these two thinkers is that
any account ofunderstanding is essentially an account of interpretation. Ifan interpreter
can devise a way to detennine the true sentences ofa speaker and match them to
sentences she holds true, then. both Davidson and Gadamer argue. she bas understood.
Now, the method of this procedure of interpretation is not specifically dealt with by either
thinker. Neither thinker holds that the task ofoutlining such a method is a
philosophically interesting one. That task should be left to the linguist, anthropologist or
psychologist. In fact, both Davidson and Gadamer hint that such a methodology may be
impossible to formalize. Davidson, for instance., says:
For there are DO roles for arriving at passing theories. no rules in any strict sense,
as opposed to rough maxims and methodological generalities. A passing theory
really is like a theory in this, that it is derived by wit, luck, and wisdom from a
private vocabulary ofgrammar, knowledge ofthe ways people get their point
across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are
mostlikely.60
And Gadamer argues that:
Given the intermediate position in which hermeneutics operates, it follows
that its work is not to develop a procedure ofunderstanding, but to clarify the
conditions in which this understanding takes place.61
6ODavidson, ...A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 446.
6lGadamer, Truth and Method. p. 295.
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It bas partly been my aim. in this chapter to show that Davidson and Gadamer have
reached the same conclusions as to what some of these conditions are by way of the
comparison of the two thinken and by trying to illuminate Davidson's critique of
conceptual relativism. Davidson's critique, then. has been illuminated in several ways.
First, I have argued that both Davidson and Gadamer hold that truth, as opposed
to reference, plays the major role in determination ofmeaning. Access to meaning is the
role of the interpretive process. Davidson argues that interpretation is not possible
without the principle of charity. Charity states that we arc to count the speaker as holding
mostly trUe beliefs. Gadamer argues for this as well from the standpoint ofan
individual's fore-understanding. Since all interpretations arc interpretations into my
language, an authentic interpretation is one that coincides with the prejudices that I have
about the world. The idea that we can shed our worldview, horizon or language and
inhabit another's horizon is a misconception. Everything has to be translated into our
language or world-view if it is to be understood. It is from this position that we can
define what the trUe is.
Secondly, I have argued that we cannot make a distinction, or at least cannot
posit a dualism, between world and language. 1his is a fallout from the claim that truth
plays the essential role in interpretation. An interpretation is an interpretation into our
language. and, hence, an interpretation into our world-view or horizon. As charity
demands, an authentic interpretation is one that brings to light the truth of the subject
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And since truth is defined from our horizon - from our language - interpretation is a
fusion ofcorresponding world-views. But I must stress once again.. this is not the thesis
ofconceptual relativism that is found in Kuhn, Whorf and Feyerabend. The conception
oftbe relationship between world and language argued for by those philosophers is one
that ignores the conception ofabsolute truth that transcends all languages or world~views
and allows communication to take place. Those philosophers hold that different
languages could demarcate radically different world-views in which there does not exist a
common subject matter or truth expressible in both languages. I have shown that this is
not the position ofDavidson and Gadamer.
Finally, Davidson and Gadamer see language as a shifting and dynamic
communion of two speakers. rt is not a fixed or closed horizon that we acquire as a tool
to achieve certain tasks in the world. Once we renounce the dualism of scheme and
content. it makes no sense to say we approach the world with a language. They both
evolve in the same way. And each time we communicate with another, we have to create
a common language. This leads Davidson to conclude that "[t]he methodology of
interpretation is, in this respect, nothing but epistemology seen in the mirror of
meaning.n62
62Davidson, ''Thought and Talk," p. 169.
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ChapterS
ne Relation Between World and Language
51 Introduction
The aim of this thesis has been to trace out Donald Davidson's philosophy of
language in order to show how he destroys the notion ofconceptual relativism. and to
show how the idea ofa dualism between scheme and content must necessarily go by the
board. Davidson's claim is that:
In giving up the dualism ofscheme and content, we do not give up the world, but
re..establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our
sentences and opinions true or false. l
It is the articulation of this unmediated touch with the world that is the focus oftbis
chapter.
lDavidson, "On the Very IdeaofaConceptual Scheme," p. 198.
My contentioD., up to this point, has been that an understanding ofseveral
important features in Davidson's work. naturally lead one to these very conclusions about
the relationship between world and language. In chapters 2, 3 and 41 have shown: i) how
Davidson transforms a Tarskian truth theory into a meaning theory for a natural language;
ii) how the principle ofcharity acts as a transcendental principle which prohibits the
possibility of attributing too much error to a speaker we are trying to radically interpret
(understand) and; iii) how, like Gadamer, Davidson's rejection of the primacy of
"reference" in an account ofmeaning and" communication leads to the conclusion that we
must understand a language as a world-view or horizon that is essentially correct and
necessarily open to our understanding. Simply put: to know the meaning ofan utterance
is to know the conditions under which it would be true, and we know we have the right
understanding because we can only understand (interpret) utterances which, for the most
pan, are true.
From these important features in Davidson's work, it is easy to see that "truth"
plays a major role. One would expect, then, that Davidson would take up the task of
explaining what "truth" is; not the task that Tarski took up - the definition oftruth
relativizcd to a particular language - but the task ofoutlining what "absolute truth.. is:
the translinguistic notion. For prior to any radical interpretation. we already have an idea
ofwhat it is for a statement to be true. We don't learn a language and tlu!n determine
which sentences are true. Rather, truth plays a major role in the whole learning process.
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The concept must be there from the beginning in order for an individual to eveo
understand, or have the possibility of understanding.
But, surprisingly, Davidson bas little to say about tnnb. itself. Actually, it is not
that he doesn't say much about trutb; but more that there isn't much to say about it The
concept of truth always plays a major role in any analysis he UDdertakes, but he insists
that it is the most basic concept we have. It caDDOt be defined in terms ofanything else;
any attempt to do so would be circular. That is, we must first have a prior notion oftrutb
in order to even be able to define any concept (even "'truth'") whatsoever:
It is a mistake to look for a behavioristic, or indeed any other sort ofexplicit
definition or outright reduction ofthe concept oftruth. Truth is one of the
clearest and most basic concepts we have, so it is fruitless to dream ofeliminating
it in favor of something simpler or more fundamentaJ.2
In this chapter. I will look at why Davidson holds this minimalist attitude towards
truth, how that attitude affects the debate between coherence and correspondence theories
oftruth. and how it can show us a way out o~ or transcend. the realismIanti-realism
debate. [fwe understand these arguments, then we are in a better position to see what
Davidson means when says that the relation between world and language is
2Davidson, 'The Structure and Content ofTruth," p. 314.
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5 2 Tnnb Explanations Md Causes
In the previous chapter I outlined why Davidson argues that "reference" plays no
role in an account ofhow it is that our words and sentCDces mean what they do.l The
conclusion was that "reference" is a concept that is used within a truth theory - it is a
construct. A truth theory that uses the concept of reference does not presuppose that there
is such a relation called '"reference." It uses that constructed relation to show how truth
theoretically works. It must be recognized, argues Davidson. that we could easily have
constructed a theory that had a very different microstructure in order to explain the
phenomenon oftruth. He says:
For if there is one way ofassigning entities to expressions (a way of
characterizing "satisfaction") that yields acceptable results with respect to the
truth conditions ofsentences, there will be endless other ways that do as weU.
There is no reason to call anyone ofthese semantical relations "reference" or
"satisfaction.'"
The argument ofthe essay from which the above passage is quoted is that we need
to make a distinction between "explanation within the theory and explanation a/the
theory.'" Truth theorists of the Past. argues Davidson., have tended to blur this
distinction. Davidson's claim is that although "reference" (or "satisfaction) is employed
to show how ''truth'' works in a particular theory (e.g., Tarski's), it is not a relation that
lSee section 4.3 above.
4Davidson. "Reality Without Reference." p. 224.
sDavidson.. "Reality Without Reference," p. 221.
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needs independent justification; it is Dot a relation that exists outside of the theory.
Outside ofparticular truth theories, "[n]othing, however. no thing makes our sentences or
theories true."6 There is no extra-theoretical explanation oftrutb.
Once we drop the idea that reference is an independent relation in the sense that it
justifies our use oftbe word "true" outside ofparticulartbeories, we also have to drop the
idea that there are extra-theoretical (extra.linguistic) things which make our sentences
true. These things have taken many forms in the past: sense impressions, ideas, states of
affairs, representations, experience. etc. Davidson's point is not that these things don't
exist, but rather that they play only a causal, not an explanatory, role in why particular
sentences are true. Once reference falls out, so does "making true." So. just as with
"reference," where we needed to make a distinction between explanation within and
explanation 01a theory, with these intermediary entities we need to make a distinction
between causal and justificatory (or explanatory) relations. We need an explanation of
"truth" that is at the same time not a part oftbe causal chain ofhow we came to hold a
certain belief to be true. 'The answer to our problem must then be to find a reason for
supposing most ofour beliefs to be true that is not a form ofevideru:e.''''
This argument is a spin-offofa long debate between Quine and Davidson. As is
well known, Davidson is a student ofQuine. Much ofDavidson's work is an extension
6Davidson, "On the Very Idea ofa ConceptuaI Scheme," p. 194.
'Davidson, "A Coherence Theory ofTruth and Knowledge," p. 127.
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and reworking ofQuine's ideas with some different emphases. but little disagreement
The work Davidson has done on radical interpretation, borrowing from Quine's radical
translation. is a good example. One point, however, on which Davidson strongly
disagrees with Quine, is the emphasis Quine places on the role of surface irritations of the
senses. As I said in the precedi.ag paragraph, Davidson does not deny that these
irritations exist, nor that they playa causal role in how we come to know the world., but
rather. he denies that they should playa role in explaining why we are justified in holdi.ag
certain beliefs true.
Davidson argues that Quine gives sensations an explanatory role in determining
the truth ofour sentences. We come to hold certain beliefs true because we have certain
sensations. Davidson refers to such theories as proximal theories. A proximal theory of
truth holds that "sentences have the same meaning iftbey have the same stimulus
meaning - if the same patterns of stimulation prompt assent and dissent"I Davidson., on
the other hand., holds to the distal theory oftruth and meaning. The distal theory:
... depends primarily on shared causes which are salient for speaker and
interpreter, learner and teacher. Meanings are shared when identical events,
objects or situations cause or would cause assent or dissent.'
IDavidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," in Perspectives Qn Quine eds. Robert B.
Barrett, etal. (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 73. "Proximal" derives from the
Latin, proximitas or proximus meaning "nearness, vicinity or proximity."
'Davidson. "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 73. "Distal" derives from the Latin,
distantia or disto meaning "distance, remoteness, a separation or opening."
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For both the proximal and the distal theory, sensations playa causal role in our
knowledge of the world. It is through the senses that we come to know the world. In
addition, however, Quine's proximal theory oftnrtb appropriates sensations for
explanatory and justificatory purposes. That is. Quine argues that sensations are
sufficient to account for why we have certain beliefs about the world.
The distal theory denies this. To give sensations, or any epistemic intennediary,
such a role leads one down the path. argues Davidson., to scepticism. Once we place an
entity between our beliefs ofthe world an:d the world itself,. we are always able to doubt
whether that entity is giving us the message correctl.y, or corresponding correctly, or
representing correctly. A person's sensory impressions could be very different from the
way things are in the world outside:
Introducing intermediary steps or entities into the eau.saI chain., like sensations or
observations, serves only to make the epistemological problem more obvious.
For if the intermediaries are merely causes, they don't justify the beliefs they
cause, while if they deliver information, they may be lying. The moral is obvious.
Since we can't swear intermediaries to tnIthfulness, we should allow no
intermediaries between our beliefs and their objects in the world. Ofcourse there
are causal intermediaries. What we must guard against are epistemic
intermediaries. 1o
The distal theory ofmeaning encourages an account ofempirical content that is
externalist By "extemalist.n Davidson means that, ,•... the contents ofour earliest learned
and most basic sentences ("Mama," "Doggie," "Red," "Fire," "Gavagai'') must be
'OOavidson, "A Coherence Theory of truth and Knowledge," p. 125.
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determined by what it is in the world that causes them to be true:'l1 In a Tarskian style
truth (meaning) theory, a typical T-sentence bas a form similar to this common example:
(I) "Snow is whicc" is true. ifand only if, snow is white.
With such a theory we arc committed to an ontology ofunerances (the left·band side of
the biconditional), truth. and conditions under which the sentences are true, or the causes
ofthe sentences (the right-hand side of the biconditional). Quine's proximal theory, it
seems. would also have to posit an ontology ofsurface irritations as truth conditions. But
this violates what the field linguist is capable ofdetermining in radical interpretation.
That is, in the situation of radical inccrpretation, an interpreter only has access to the
world which she and the native share, and the linguistic behavior of the native. It is only
from these two phenomena, plus the ingenuity of the interpreter, that a truth theory can be
constructed. It is impossible to teU what .sensations another person is having; the best we
can do is observe the causes of those sensatiODS. The triangulation ofspeaker, interpreter
and the world ofcommon causes is sufficient for radical interpretation. Intermediary
entities. of the type endorsed by Quine's proximal theory, are not necessary in an account
and explanation ofhow it is that we understand. As Davidson says:
... sensory stimulations are indeed part of the causal chain that leads to belief: but
cannot, without confusion, be considered to be evidence, or a source of
justification, for the stimulated belief.
What stands in the way ofglobal scepticism. of the senses is in my view
the fact that we must. in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take
the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief. And what we, as
1lDavidson, "Epistemology ExtemaIized."Dia/ectica, voL 45. no 2·J, 199J, p. 198.
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interpreters. must takc them to be is what they in fact are. CommunicatioD begins
where causes CODVcrgC: your uttCIal1CC means what minc does ifbclicfin its truth
is systematically caused by the samc events and objects:.12
5 3 Cobmmc;e and Correspondence Theories ofInnb
In the previous chapter, I indicated that during his career, Davidson bas shown
somc uncertainty as to bow to cbaractcrize the theory oftruth he cndorscs. lJ In ODC ofhis
early essays., "True to the Facts.," he charactcrizcs his theory as a correspondence tbcory.14
Thc main idea he was striving to explain was that the truth ofa sentence could be
cxplained by an analysis of the relation between languagc and the world. His point was
that this relationship is achieved with the semantical relation ofsatisfaction.
Ofcourse, as is stressed in that essay, satisfaction is quite different from
correspondco.ce as normally conceived. Satisfaction is the pairing ofn-tuples ofentities
with predicates ofa particular language. For Davidson (and TarsJa1, a SCDtence is true if
thc predicate is satisfied by thc entity that is assigo.ed to it The sentence, "snow is
white.," is true if the predicate "x is whitc" is satisfied by the entity "snow." We can see
if this is the case by checking thc satisfaction relations that are found in the axioms ofa
truth theory. In a theory of truth that uses satisfaction to help explain truth, each true
120avidson. "A Coherence Theory ofTruth and Knowledge," p. 132.
13Sce chapter 4, 0.13.
14Davidson. "Truc to the Facts," pp. 37-54.
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sentence is true for a different reason, viz., the predicate is satisfied by the entities which
are assigned to it One predicate is distinguished from another by the fact that it is
satisfied by different sequences of objects. "Snow is white" is true for a different reason
than "grass is green."
Since different assignments ofentities to variables satisfY different open
sentences and since closed sentences are constituted from open, truth is reached.
in the semantic approach. by different routes for different sentences. All true
sentences end up in the same place, but there are different stories about how they
got there; a semantic theory of truth tells the story for a particular sentence by
running through the steps ofthe ~ursive account ofsatisfaction appropriate to
the sentence.l~
Correspondence, on the other hand. is normally conceived as a pairing of
sentences with a non-linguistic entity. The problem with these theories, at least a
problem that Davidson tried to expose in ''True to the Facts," was that each sentence was
true, not because ofthe structure of the sentence, but because the correspondence relation
ofone sentence can not be distinguished from the correspondence relation ofother
sentences. That is, to say that "snow is white" corresponds to the fact that snow is white,
is really no different than saying that "snow is white" is true. Likewise, since "grass is
green" corresponds to the fact that grass is green. and since this is the same as '''grass is
green' is true," we can replace "is true" (using the principle ofsubstitution ofco-
extensive singular terms, so loog as both refer to the same truth value) by the
correspondence relation of the other sentence. rn other words, we could say that "snow is
UDavidson, "True to the Facts," pp. 48-49.
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white" corresponds to the fact that grass is green. And clearly, when a large number of
sentences are involved, as in any natural language, it would be impossible to determine
what any sentence corresponded to so long as it was true. All sentences would
correspond to the same thing - The Great Fact. Davidson says:
No point remains in distinguishing among various names of the Great Fact wben
written after "corresponds to;" we may as well settle for the single phrase
"corresponds to the Great Fact." This unalterable predicate carries with it a
redundant whiffofontology, but beyond this there is apparently no telling it apart
from "is true.""
That "redundant whiff" is the attempt to Posit intermediary epistemic entities cal1ed facts.
It sbould be clear from the previous section that Davidson does not endorse such a
procedure. A sentence is not true because ofa relation between it and things that are not
[6Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 42. The argument in the paragraph preceding this
quote comes from the same essay. p. 42. In an earlier essay, ''Truth and Meaning," p. 19,
Davidson gives a formal proof for a simiJar argument In that essay be is concerned to
sbow that there is no uniquely referring relation between singular terms and their referent;
in "True to the Facts," be is concerned to show that there is no correspondence relation
between the meaning oCa sentence and some fact. He cites Frege as the author of the
argument I quote:
... a difficulty looms if we want to continue in our present (implicit) tourse of identifYing the
meaning ofa singular term with its reference. The diffitulty follows upon making two reasonable
assumptions: that logically equivalent singular tenns have the same reference, and thar. a singular
Ictm docs not thange its reference ifa tonWned singular tenn is replaced with another by the
same reference. But now suppose that "I(' and"S" abbreviate any two sentences alike in truth
value. Then the follOWing four scnlCflces have the same reference:
(I) R
(2) "r(~-x.R)~(~-JC)
(3) "r(~-x.S)-'X(x-%)
(4) S
For (I) and (2) are logically equivalent. as are (3) and (4), while (3) differs from (2) only
in containing the singular term "'%(x-:c.S)" where (2) c:ontains ""x(~-x.R)" and these refer to the
same thing ifSand R are alike in truth value. Rente any twoscntences having the same reference
have the same truth value. And if the meaning ora sentence is what it refers to, all sentences alike
in truth value must be synonymous - an intolerable result.
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sentences. but because of a relation between the parts (entities) that constitute the
sentence.
So, for Davidson, "correspondence" cannot give an explanation ofa truth theory.
Within a Tarskian uuth theory, bowever, "correspondence" does playa role when
conceived as ..satisfaction." But this is clearly something quite different than the
correspondence theorist wanted Satisfaction shows bow truth works for a particular
language; it does not tell us what truth is. That is., it does not justify truth qua truth.
The only other option, it seems, once we get rid ofcorrespondence theories as
explanations of truth, is to take up the coherence theory of truth. This is the position
adopted by Davidson in "A Coherence Theory ofTruth and Knowledge." Coherence is
the best option (and, it seems. the only other option) once we drop the notion of
"reference." But, as Davidson himself later realized, this claim. is also misguided.
Traditionally, coherence theories were seen as theories that argued that consistent sets of
beliefs were true. That is not the position Davidson wants to defend in his paper.
Clearly. we could imagine a consistent set ofbeliefs that were false.
Properly understood. Davidson's point in this paper is that irone speaks a
language and is in communication with another person. then the language that one
speaks, the beliefs one has. are by their nature and for the most part consistent and true.
Communication is impossible ifthe language one speaks and the beliefs one has are
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largely false. The principle of charity, as I explained in chapter 3, ensures this. n An
interpreter is not be able to understand or interpret a speaker who does not usually speak
truthfully and consistently.
So again, the search for ajustification of truth fails. True sets of beliefs,
expressed in a language, are consistent, and "correspond" to the way things are, but this is
because the system of beliefs is mostly true, not vice-versa. Davidson's point in calling
his theory a coberence theory is that "nothing can count as a reason (or explanation or
justification] for holding a beliefexcept another belief."" But this still begs the question
as to why thaI belief is true.
For a correspondence theory, a true beliefisjustified by the beliefthat it
corresponds to the way things are. In a coherence theory, a true belief is justified by
another belief. What is common about both cases is the quest for ajustification that is at
the same time a piece ofevidence - viz., another belief. We need a justification ofwhy
our beliefs are true, not a justification of truth:
(TJruth is as clear and basic a concept that we have. Tarski has given us an idea
ofbow to apply the general concept (or try to apply it) to particular languages on
the assumption that we already understand it; but ofcourse be didn't show bow to
define it in general (he proved. rather, that this couldn't be done). Any further
attempt to explain, define, analyse, or explicate the concept will be empty or
wrong: correspondence theories, coherence theories, pragmatist theories, theories
that identify truth with warranted assertability (perhaps under "ideal" or
"optimum" conditions), theories that ask truth to explain the success of science or
I'See section 3.4 above.
IIDavidson, "A Coherence Theory ofTruth and Knowledge," p. 123.
156
serve as the ultimate outcome ofscience or the conversations ofsome elite, all
such theories either add nothing to our understanding oftrutb or have obvious
counter-cxamples. Why on earth should we expect to be able to reduce truth to
something clearer or more fundamental?l'
As I said above, Davidson's point is that we need a reason, that is not evidence, why our
beliefs are true. And this reason cannot be an explanation of troth. The reason he gives is
that beliefs are, by their nature, generally veridical. Instead ofanalyzing ''truth,.. we need
to analyze "belief."
I.nstead ofasking, "what makes this particular belief true? " Davidson prefers that
we analyze the situation of radical interpretation, keeping in mind the distal theory of
meaning I outlined above. The situation is this: a radical interpreter comes to a native
speaker armed only with ber beliefs about the way things are. and the experience ofa
common world that is shared with the speaker. Beliefs about what is and what is not the
case are expressed in the interpreters 0'WtL language. The interpreter, the native speaker,
and the shared world form the triangulated matrix necessary for communication to take
place. The task ofthe interpreter, then. is to pair up native utterances with her own based
on behaviours Oinguistic and otherwise) of the native, and the interpreter's beliefs about
the world. Quine's account ofbow a field linguist comes to understand the native's
Utterance of"gavagai" as "Lo, a rabbit" is an instance of the steps that are to be
undertaken.20 We assign beliefs (held-true sentences) to a native by what we perceive to
l'Davidson, "Afterthoughts, 1987," pp. 135-136.
2OQuine, Word and Object pp.26f[
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be the causes (which are the distal, not the proximal. stimulus) of those beliefs. A true
belief is caused by an object or event in the world; ..... we can't in general first identify
beliefs and meanings and then asked what caused them.":Z1 Since it is the case that beliefs
are in part identified by what caused them. it seems unlikely that a person could have
beliefs radically different from my own because they are caused by the same things in the
world. And since most beliefs are caused by the world, at least the beliefs one holds to be
most central, most beliefs have to be true. Davidson says:
The agent bas only to reflect on what a belief is to appreciate that most ofms
basic beliefs are true, and among his beliefs, those most securely held and that
cohere with his main body ofbeliefs are the most apt to be true. The question,
how do I know my beliefs are generally true? thus answers itself. simply because
beliefs are by nature generally true. Rephrased or expanded, the question
becomes, bow can I tell whether my beliefs, which are by their nature generally
true, are generally true']2'2
From this we can see why Davidson is tempted to call his theory a coherence
theory. Since beliefs are, by their nature, generally true, the only justification we need for
a particular belief is another belief. Although Davidson repeals the "coherence" title for
his theory oftrutb, be still holds to the basic conclusion of"A Coherence Theory ofTrutb
and Knowledge," viz., "all that counts as evidence or justification for a belief must come
from the same totality ofbeliefs to which it belongs.'>23 A sentence in a language is true,
21Davidson, "A Coherence Theory ofTrotb and Knowledge," p. 131.
UOavidson, "A Coberence Theory ofTroth and Knowledge," p. 133.
13Davidson, "A Coberence Theory ofTroth and Knowledge," p. 134.
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not because it corresponds to the way things are (although it does correspond to the way
things are), but because it is implied by, and implies, many other true sentences.
Davidson's stance towards truth is maybe best dcscnDcd in Arthur Fine's,
"Natural Ontological Attitude.""14 Fine says:
Ifpressed to answer the question ofwhat. then" does it mean to say that something
is true (or what does the truth ofso--aod~socommit one), NOA [the Natural
Ontological Attitude] will reply by pointing out the logical relations engendered
by the specific claim. and by focussing, then, on the concrete historical
circumstances that ground that particular judgement of truth. For after all, there is
nothing more to say.2S
lfasked, for example, "Why is the sentence 'Corks float in water' true?," Davidson (and
Fine) would respond, not with an analysis or explanation oftrut:h, but with other true
sentences, most likely regarding buoyancy, cork trees, the density ofwater, etc.
54 Realism Anti-Realism and tbe Natural OntQlogical Attitude
There has been a controversy as to bow to characterize Davidson's philosophy of
language in terms of the realistIanti-realist debate. Because the realism debate has close
ties to the debate between correspondence and coherence theories of truth, a sense of
confusion issues from Davidson's attempts at selfcharacterization. Davidson has often
labeled himself a realist, especially early in his career. Michael Dummett, for one,
24Fine, ''The Natural Ontological Attitude," pp. lI2~13S. I explain how that "attitude"
is relevant to Davidson in the next section.
UFine, p. 134.
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picking up on these early pronouncements ofDavidson. uses him as his arch-rival.26 It is
widely recognized DOW. even by Dummett himself, that be essentially misinterprets the
type of realism that Davidson was espousing.
Dummett interprets Davidson's claim that meaning is truth-functional as
equivalent to the fact that the meaning ofevery sentence is determinately either true or
false. That is, he regards Davidsonian realism as the position that to know the meaning
ofa sentence is to know whether it is true or not Dummett adopts an anti-realist
(intuitionist) approach to semantics becaUse there are a wide range ofsentences about
which it is in fact impossible to say whether they are true or not.27 The anti-realism he
endorses is called "verificationism.''11 Verificationism discards the principle ofbivalence
(which Dummett wrongly attributes to Davidson) and identifies the ability to determine
meaning with the ability to verify a statemenL Dummett holds that verification and
falsification are much more in line with the intuitionist philosophy ofmathematics which
he endorses. But Dummett is clearly confused here. Davidson holds that to know the
meaning ofa sentence is to know the condition under which it is true; this is different
than knowing that it is true:
It would not be possible to grasp or entertain a proposition without knowing what
it would be for it to be true; without this knowledge there would be no answer to
26Dummett, "What is a Theory ofMeaning?(U)," pp. 89ff.
27See above, section 2.6.
2'Dummett, "What is a Theory of Meaning?(II)." pp. 109ff.
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the question what proposition was being grasped or entertained. I do not mean
that all propositions necessarily have a truth value.... To know what it would be
for a proposition to be true (or false) it is not necessary to be able to lelI when it is
true or false (much less to brow whether it is true or false}.... In order to
understand a proposition one must know what its truth conditions are, but one
mayor may not be concerned with the question ofwhether it is ttue.29
lbis last quote states what bas been Davidson's position from the start. which is not very
different from Dummett's.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that because he is not a realist in
Dummett's sense that Davidson is therefqre an anti-realist. In his essay, '"Realism and
Anti-Realism in Davidson's Philosophy ofLanguage," Frederick Stoutland rightly argues
against the realist interpretation put on Davidson by such thinkers as Dummett and Mark
PlansJO, but he replaces it with an anti-realist interpretation which in my view is
incorrect.J ! Stoutland's attack on the realist interpretation is quite acute. He argues that a
realist philosophy oflanguage has to hold to the thesis that i) a sentence is true in virtue
ofsome extra-linguistic entity, and ii} that there are intermediate entities (like
representations, meanings, etc.) between a sentence and its truth condition. To adopt i} is
to see a need for an explanation of truth, and to adopt ii} is to see some intermediate
2tOavidson, "The Problem ofObjectivity," Tijdschrift Voor FiIosofie, 57, 1, Je 95, pp.
210-211.
30Mark de Bretton Platts, Ways ofMeaning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1979).
JIFrederick Stoutland, "Realism and Anti·Realism in Davidson's Philosophy of
Language," Critica. va/U, 1981: no. 4/, pp. IJ-S1; no. 41, pp. /9-39.
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entity as that needed explanation. I have tried to show above, in sections 5.2 and 5.3, that
this is not Davidson's position.
Stoutland, citing passages from Davidson. and doing some commendable
interpretation, rightly shows us that these two theses are not consistent with Davidson's
philosophy oflanguage. One ofms main arguments against the realist interpretation is
the prohibition Davidson places on the possibility ofexplaining truth in general outside
ofa particular language. A sentence, Stoutland argues, is not true in virtue ofanything
that is not already contained within that sentence. "Davidson's theory ofmeaning is a
theory about the structure of language; the relation of language to extra-linguistic reality
is not explained within that theory."l: Elsewhere, he says:
Although (most) true sentences are "about" extra-linguistic objects, they are not
true in virtue of such objects, but in virtue of their fitting in (cohering) with other
sentences held true by competent speakers of the language.ll
But Stoutland does seem. to go wrong in the second balfofms essay when he
attributes an anti-realist interpretation to Davidson.l4 Davidson's point in showing that
l1Stoutland. no. 41, p. 49.
llStoutIand. no. 42, p. 19.
l4Stoutland, no. 42. pp. 19-39. Dummett wrongly attributes the realist interpretation to
Davidson because ofa sentence Davidson included in one ofms essays to the effect that
"we can still remain realists ...n. Stoutland makes the same mistake in attributing an anti-
realist interpretation to Davidson. He finds an obscure sentence that says sentences are
true because they "help people achieve goals and realize intentions." Both sentences. in
my view, are taken out ofcontext and do not cohere with the overall sense of Davidson's
work. Neither Dummett nor Stoutland are justified in attributing their respective
positions to bim.
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truth is not "correspondence to the facts" was that truth does not need an extra-linguistic
explanation. No sentence is true in virtue ofanything. Stoutland violates Davidson's
prohibition against explanatory endeavors. presumably thinking it was applicable only to
realist attempts at explanations oftruth. That is, when Stoutland interprets Davidson's
claim that ..... no thing makes sentences and theories true."lJ as meaning that sentences
are not true in virtue ofextra-Linguistic objects, he still holds it to be the case that
sentences could be true in virtue ofthings that were not objects. e.g., desires and
intentions. In spite orhis earlier arguments, he says:
What we need is some account ofthe conception ofttuth assumed in Davidson's
theory of meaning - an account which does something other than analyze the
truth-structure ofa language.36
The account Stoudand gives is an anti-realist one.
Arthur Fine's "Natural Ontological Attitude" (from DOW on, NOA) is, I think. the
position which should be taken after one realizes truth cannot be explained by something
more basic.J7 Fine's results do not come from an analysis ofDavidson's philosophy of
language, but rather from an analysis ofthe different accounts of truth found in the
UDavidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme,n p. 194.
J6Stoudand, no. 42, p. 36
J7J:t is Rorty who suggests this connection between Fine and Davidson; cf.
"Pragmatism., Davidson and Truth.n fn. 61, p. ISO. In this same essay, Rorty also
acknowledges his indebtedness to the work done by Frederick Stoutland to show that
Davidson is not a realist, but thinks (as I do) that there is an inconsistency in trying to peg
him as an anti-realist.
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philosophy ofscience. In this particular paper he argues against the attempt made by
realists to try to explain truth as "correspondence.0>31 He sees that attempt. as Davidson
does, as fruitless. To say that a sentence or a theory corresponds to things "out there" is
to say no more than that that sentence or theory is true. The realist attempt to explain
truth as correspondence, argues Fine, amounts to nothing more than "a desk-thumping.
foot-stomping shout of"Really!"39 True statements are about things that really, really
exist. The failme ofme realist's attempt to explain truth as correspondence resides ..... in
his repeating the question-begging move from explanatory efficacy to the truth of the
explanatory hypothesis:-.o That is. in order to explain tnnh as correspondence. the realist
must presuppose truth in the explanation, Le., as truly corresponding. As well. the realist
has to admit be has access to a relation that violates realistic principles; " ... realism
commits one to an unverifiable correspondence to the world."4' This rejection is formally
articulated in Davidson's rejection of the argument that there is a relation of
correspondence to an extra-linguistic reality. For Davidson, "corteSpOndence" cannot be
made any more explanatory than "correspondence to the Great Fact."
JlFolIowing this essay in The Shaky Game Fine also has an essay entitled, "And Not
Antirealism Either," (pp. 136-1 SO) where he is concerned to show that a rejection of
realist view of truth. and the adoption ofNOA, does not lead one to anti-realism.
39pine, "'The Natural Ontological Attitude," p. 129.
oIOfine, ''The Natural Ontological Attitude," p. 120.
4lFine, ''The Natural Ontological Attitude," p. 116.
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Anti-realism, Fine argues, also takes up an analysis oftruth after the abolition of
realism. But now, instead ofdescribing truth in tem1S ofcorrespondence to reality, anti-
realists put a limit on what is real. Fine says:
To be sure, the antirealist is quite correct in his diagnosis of the disease of
realism. and in his therapeutic recommendation to pay attention to bow human
beings actually operate with the family oftruth concepts. Where he goes wrong is
in trying to fashion out ofthese practices a completed concept ofbuth as a
substantial something, one that will then act as a limit for legitimate human
aspirations.·2
The real, they argue, bas to be confined k? either the observable, or verifiable. Everything
else is a tool or instrument that allows us to perform our tasks and predict the future. So
where the realist may insist that monopoles or charmed quarles or neutral boSODS are
really real, the anti-realist may say, since these things are not observable, that they
constitute part ofa system. play indispensable role in that system, but do not make up a
part of the set oftrue sentences. But it seems that any limit, like observability, can easily
be broken or stretched. A prime example is the anti-realist credo that states that true
statements come from observables. Since this is a true statement that is not observable. it
seems that the leeway granted to it could also be granted to statements about monopoles
and charmed quarks.
The predicament that the debate between realism and anti-realism puts us in is
that realism "reaches for more than can be had" by postulating a relation of
correspondence independent of the concept of truth, while anti-realism retreats to secwe
qFine, "And Not Antirealism Either," p. 142.
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ground, setting limits to what can be known and what is true, all the while breaking those
very limits. Fine suggests we adopt NOA. NOA. he says, is essentially the "core
position" ofboth the realists and the anti-realists, while refusing to make the move to an
analysis or explanation of truth. The "core position" that Fine refers to here is the fact
that both realists and anti-realists accept as true the beliefs ofeveryday discourse and the
beliefs ofscience. What distinguishes realists from anti-realists, then, is what they add to
this core position:
(R]ealism adds an outer direction to NOA, that is, the external world and the
correspondence relation ofapproximate truth; antirealisms (typically) add an
inner direction, that is, human-oriented reductions of truth, or concepts. or
explanations.... NOA suggests that the legitimate features of these additions are
already contained in the presumed equal status ofeveryday truths with scientific
ones, and in our accepting them both as tndhs. No other additions are legitimate,
and none other are required.4J
So, both the realist and the anti-realist will agree. for instance, that "... electrons really
carry a unit negative charge and really do have a small mass (ofabout 9.1 X 10.21
grams},"'" but they will disagree on how to explain "really" and ''true.'' Fine suggests we
take up NOA, which is the "core position" minus any attempt at explanation, because
truth explanations always lead to failure. With Davidson he agrees that:
_.. the concept of truth is the fundamental semantic concept Its uses, history,
logic, and grammar are sufficiently definite to be partially catalogued, at least for
43Fine, "The Natural Ontological Attitude," p. 133.
44Fine, "The Natural Ontological Attitude," p. 129.
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a time. But it cannot be "explained" or given an '<account of' without circularity.
Not does it require anything ofthe sort."
The "partial cataloguing" that Fine refers to here is the characteri2:ation of truth offered
by a Tarskian truth theory based upon a language that is attuned to the truths ofscience.
The truths of science constitute our present horizon or world-view. We can show how
truth works for such a particular language at a particular time, but we cannot erplain it.
And as I tried to demonstrate in the last three chapters, truth theories vary over time for
particular individuals or language commU;Dities. world views or horizons.
5 5 Conclusjon
In chapter I, I schematically outlined the philosophies ofQuine, Feyerabend and
Kuhn in order to show what kind ofposition Davidson is arguing against in his essay.
"On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," and negatively to indicate what the relation
is between language and world. The common position that these thinkers hold is that
there is something called "content" (sensations, surface irritations, experience. etc.) and
something called a "conceptual scheme" (theoretical framework, paradigm. Language,
ideology, educational programming, etc.) that shapes, fits. or organizes that content 1
indicated that this view of the relation between the language and the world is a relic of the
Cartesian search for first philosophy.
4SFine, "And Not Antirealism Either," p. 149.
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In this thesis I have tried to show that there is no such thing as a conceptual
scheme Oanguage) nor that there is any such thing as empirical content. at least not in any
explanatory sense ofthe term. With the abandonment of these two notions, understood in
the terms that the above thinkers set forth, the relation between world and language
becomes unmediated. By "unmediated" I mean that the relation oforganizing or fitting
falls away. Let me recap.
A language is a set ofwords and sentences that can be grouped into manageable
chunks in order to convey a meaning. "Meaning," as Davidson has taught us, is the
condition under which a particular sentence is true. In order to understand the language
ofanother individual, we must develop (at least implicitly) a truth theory for that
language. The process ofsuch a development is called "radical interpretation." In radical
interpretation, all that we have access to, in order to develop our truth theory, are the
verbal dispositions of the native speaker, and our experience ofour shared world. But
what we want to have access to are the meanings oftho words that the native is speaking,
and the beliefs that the native has about the world.
At this point. we apply the principle ofcharity. Since the meaning of the natives
utterances are the conditions under which they are true, and since the conditions under
which any statement is true (regardless of language) arc shared by speaker and interpreter,
it could be said that the native and the interpreter have the same beliefs, regardless of
which language they are couched in. Charity is an a priori principle. If we did not
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assume that the speaker was a speaker of the truth. it would be impossible to interpret her.
It: when a rabbit ran by, the native speaker uttered "Gavagai!," and we did not assume
that the speaker was telling the truth, then there would be an infinity ofpossible
interpretations for that particular utterance. A condition., theo" for the possibility of
interpretation is charity. And like interpretation, it is also a condition of leamability
(which is essentially the same thing - understanding, interpretation., and leamability are
synonymous for Davidson). That is, unless the native speaker held that what she said was
the truth. not only would foreigners not understand her, but neither would people in her
own language community be able to understand her. In other words, a language that, for
the most part, contains false sentences and is essentially unleamable is a private language.
But, as Wittgenstein bas shown. there are no such things are private languages.
Notions such as incommensurability cannot be accommodated into Davidson's
conception oflanguages and how they function. The incommensurability thesis says that
there are languages (or conceptual schemes) that are so different from each other that
there is no way to translate between them. But, as was said above, a language is a set of
words that is used by a person to express mostly true sentences. Not only that, it is only a
language ifother people can understand, learn and interpret it. As Davidson says,
incommensurability becomes:
...largely trUe but not translatable [interpretable]. The question ofwhether this is
a useful criterion is just the question how well we understand the notion oftruth.
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as applied to a language, independent ofthe notion of translation [mterpretation].
The answer is, I think, that we do not understand it independently at all.<46
But Davidson does not only argue against the notion of incommensurable
conceptual schemes seen as untranslatable languages. Like Gadamer's insistence that
language should be understood as an open horizon. Davidson argues against the idea that
language is something that has any fixed (closed) structure at all. To see languages that
way is to reify them. when in fact languages are dynamic and organic. changing to the
situation, time and place. In effect, ..... there is no such thing as a language, not if
language is anything like what many linguists and pbilosophers have supposed.""
The abolition of"language," in the sense ofa structured entity or conceptual
scheme that organizes empirical contents., is one step in abjuring the third dogma. The
next step is "content" itself. I showed how Davidson dealt with this concept above}'
The idea ofa content that could be shaped, fitted or organized by language bas to take the
form ofexperience, sensations, impressions, surface irritations, etc.
The primacy that bas been placed on these entities in the West could be seen as a
direct result of the emphasis placed on the Cartesian cogito. As I stated in chapter I,
taking the cogito as the starting point for a system ofknowledge results in a philosophy
where special emphasis is placed on both the cognitive abilities of the individual, and the
46Davidson, "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 194.
('Davidson, ...A Nice Derangement ofEpitaphs," p. 446.
('Above, section 5.2.
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perceptions (sensations or representations) that the cogito cannot doubt Davidson,
however. argues that we should be anti-eartesian; that is, anti-subjective. anti-
foundationalist, and anti-representationalist. His justification for this claim again comes
from the examination of radical interpretation.
Like Descartes, Davidson agrees tbat we cannot doubt our own perceptions. They
are the first step in a long causal cbain that leads to our knowledge of the extemal world.
But the language that we use to communicate to others is not about those perceptions, or
any other component in the causal chain (e.g.• surface irritations. firing synapses, etc.).
Language, for the most part, is about objects and events in the world - the distal
stimulus. As I have stressed several times, it is these things that cause us to bave certain
beliefs, which in turn affect the meanings ofour sentences. And since it is the distal
stimulus which causes us to bave certain beliefs, that is. causes us to hold as true a set of
certain sentences. we can only interpret those who have the same beliefs. Because the
interpreter's beliefs are caused by the same things in the world as the speaker, there is no
place for scepticism here.
The confusion, Davidson seems to think, regarding the dualism ofscheme and
content has come from a misunderstanding as to what truth is. and what causes us to hold
sentences as true. The picture presented by the Canesians (and that includes Quine, Kuhn
and Feyerabend) is that reference is the main constituent in our knowledge ofthe world.
Each language has a set ofwords that refer to things in the world. A sentence is true or
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false if it means a proposition that represents the way things actually are. But. the
Cartesians argue. languages could be so disparate. in the sense that their words cut up the
world in such a different way. that translation would be impossible between the two
languages. There could be true sentences in one language that represent the ways things
are in that particular world-view that cannot be expressed in the alternative language.
For Davidson., such a situation cannot arise. Understanding and interpreting a
language is a matter ofobserving the linguistic behaviour ofthe speaker. and how she
interacts with the world around her while using her language. Interpretation is not a
matter ofdetermining bow words cut up the world or represent a particular world-view.
The world is not a intermediary entity that a language can cut up. It is necessarily
independent oflanguage. otherwise language could Dot work. It is something that is
available to both the speaker and the interpreter. regardless ofwhich language they speak.
The field linguist bas no access to such determining referential relations, nor does sbe
need any. Sentences are true or false because ofwhat the words mean and because of the
way the world is. Those are the objects that the linguist is after, not referential relations,
or the contents ofexperience.
To repeat, a sentence is true because ofwbat the words mean and because of the
way the world is. lbis is all we know about truth. and all we need to know. Nothing
more can be said. As Davidson says, no thing makes a sentence true. Nothing stands in
the way oflanguage and the world; DO empirical content. no intermediary entities, no
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tertium quid4' As Fine says. reading too much into the Dotion oftnIth will only get us
into philosophical trouble. Taking this advice, and recognizing that we cannot explain
truth in general, but only show how it works in particular, we can see what Davidson
meant when he said that we are in "unmediated touch with the world," and that it is the
"antics" of familiar objects that make our sentences true or false.~
49[ am borrowing "tertium quid' from Ratty; cf. "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth."
5OI)avidson. "On the Very Idea ofa Conceptual Scheme," p. 198.
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